




COALITION OPERATIONS HANDBOOK



31 DECEMBER 2003
STUDY DRAFT
THIRD EDITION

Preface

The American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) Program is not an alliance nor has an ABCA force ever been employed under the program. However, the ABCA nations have served together in ad hoc coalitions on several occasions to pursue common objectives. In 1998, the *Coalition Operations Handbook* (COH) was evaluated during ABCA Exercise Rainbow Serpent in Brisbane, Australia. At that time, the Australian joint deployable headquarters (JDHQ) served as the headquarters. In 1999, the JDHQ deployed to East Timor to lead the ABCA armies and other coalition nations in a highly successful mission as International Force East Timor (INTERFET) using the COH. The COH is designed to assist the ABCA nations in serving together in any coalitions and assist these nations when they serve in a coalition with other countries.

As in the first two editions, this edition of the COH provides the coalition commanders and staff with general information on important topics necessary for conducting coalition operations. It primarily provides questions that coalition partners need to ask to improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the coalition to accomplish its assigned missions. Every coalition differs. The purpose, character, capabilities, composition, and scope of a coalition is a function of changing missions, which are magnified by the complexities of two or more armies operating together. Each army brings its own view and methods of operations.

When using this handbook, one key issue that crosses all functions which commanders must identify is recognizing those areas within coalition control and those that remain under national control. This enables the coalition commanders and staff to focus on important coalition issues and to develop procedures to function more effectively and efficiently.

The ABCA nations conduct coalition operations to prevent, contain, or resolve conflicts that may pose threats to common national interests. This handbook provides to commanders and staff of organizations operating in a coalition environment a handy reference of fundamental issues and interfaces that must be addressed to promote a successful coalition operation.

While the ABCA program has achieved some levels of standardization in certain areas, no common doctrine exists between the armies. This handbook does not fill this gap, rather it assists the coalition commander in understanding and developing solutions to create an effective fighting force. This manual incorporates selected information from Quadripartite Standardization Agreements (QSTAGs) and Quadripartite Advisory Publications (QAPs) but does not reproduce these documents in total. This manual does not repeat staff planning procedures and the military decision making process. It includes some of the differences in doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures used by each of the ABCA armies.

The *Coalitions Operations Handbook* is supported by these ABCA handbooks and planning guides:

- QSTAG 2020, *Coalition Logistics Planning Guide* (CLPG).
- QAP 082, *ABCA Armies' Medical Interoperability Handbook* (MIH).
- *Coalition Airspace Control Manual* (CACM)
- QAP 110, *Electronic Warfare and Organization Handbook* (EWH).
- *Communications and Information Systems Planning Guide* (CISPG).
- *Intelligence Handbook* (IH).

These publications provide detailed information in their specific areas for assisting in the conduct of successful coalition operations. The COH, CLPG, MIH, and CACM can be found in electronic version on the ABCA Internet site at <http://www.abca.hqda.pentagon.mil/>.

Unless otherwise stated, whenever the masculine or feminine gender is used, both men and women are included.

This version replaces Edition 1 (! May 99) and Edition 2 (1 November 2001).

*Coalition Operations Handbook

November 2001

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Introduction

Where commonality of interest exists, nations will enter political, economic, and military partnerships. These partnerships can occur in both regional and worldwide patterns as nations seek opportunities to promote their mutual national interests or seek mutual security against real or perceived threats. Cultural, psychological, economic, technological, and political factors all influence the formation and conduct of coalitions.

Coalitions, which are created for limited purposes and for a set time, do not afford military planners the same political resolve and commonality of aim as alliances. Thus, planners must closely study the political goals of each participant as a precursor to detailed planning. Political considerations weigh more heavily with coalitions than with alliance operations. Coalition military operations are not new. The ABCA nations have participated together in several coalition operations during the twentieth century. Since human nature has not changed, conflicts over territory, religion, politics, and economics, such as those that prompted previous military operations, will continue to be widespread. The precise role of armies in these operations will vary according to each political and military situation.

Another reason nations conduct coalition operations is that rarely can one nation go it alone. Participating national contingents, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and private voluntary organizations (PVOs) bring certain unique core competencies. This blending of capabilities and political legitimacy makes possible certain operations that a single nation could not or would not conduct unilaterally.

COALITIONS

A *coalition* is an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action (JP 3-16). A *coalition action* is a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for a single occasion, or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest (JP 3-16). This handbook will center on ABCA coalitions, but can also include those operations in which one of the ABCA armies participates with other non-ABCA nations in a coalition.

Sovereignty issues will be the most difficult issues for the commander of the coalition force to deal with, both in regard to forces contributed by nations and by host country nations. Often, the commander

coalition force is a “commander” in title only; the commander coalition force will accomplish the mission through coordination, communication, and consensus or leadership rather than by traditional command concepts. Commanders must acknowledge sensitivities and often they and their subordinates must operate as “diplomats” rather than as “warriors.” Such is the nature of coalition operations.

OPERATIONS

Coalition operations are conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission. Coalition operations cross the entire range of military operations from war to operations other than war. Coalition operations can also be a subset of multinational operations. These operations can also include various nonmilitary organizations and other services. Conducting military operations with foreign military partners, like operations with civilian partners, is uncommon to many soldiers, so a clear understanding of this different environment is necessary

Coalition operations may be driven by common agreement among the participating coalition partners or through a mandate provided by the United Nations (UN). Either way, their multinational character merits particular attention because national interests and organizational influence may compete with doctrine and efficiency. Consensus is painstakingly difficult, and solutions are often national in character. Commanders can expect contributing nations to adhere to national policies and priorities, which at times complicates the coalition effort.

In UN-sponsored coalition operations, a force is employed under a single commander. The secretary general appoints the force commander with the consent of the UN Security Council. The force commander reports either to a special representative of the secretary general or directly to the secretary general. While the force commander conducts day-to-day operations with wide discretionary powers, he refers all policy matters to the special representative or secretary general for resolution.

CONFIDENCE

Successful coalitions are built on the commander’s focus. It focuses on the political objective, assigned mission, patience, sensitivity to the needs of other coalition members, a willingness to compromise or come to a consensus when necessary, and mutual confidence. After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower said that “mutual

confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” This mutual confidence stems from a combination of tangible actions and entities and intangible human factors. Tangible considerations, such as liaison, language, and others, are discussed throughout this handbook. The intangible considerations that must guide the actions of all participants, but especially the senior commander, are rapport, respect, knowledge of partners, team building, and patience. These factors cannot guarantee success for the coalition, but ignoring them can usually guarantee failure of the coalition in accomplishing its mission.

RAPPORT

Commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from other coalition countries. This is a personal, direct relationship that only they can develop. Good rapport between coalition members results in successful teamwork and overall unity of effort.

The first concern when establishing rapport is an understanding of the characteristics, personalities, capabilities, ambitions, and cultural habits of the various coalition partners. Once this understanding exists, the keys to developing and maintaining rapport are respect, trust, patience, and the ability to compromise. The coalition commander must be visible to members of the coalition. Personal visits to all units provide the opportunity to assess capabilities, readiness, and morale as well as to build rapport.

Commanders can more easily establish rapport within the partnership when nations combining forces share similar cultural backgrounds. Conversely, the partnership can be fractured when members come from diverse cultural backgrounds and do not attempt to respect each other’s cultural sensitivities.

RESPECT

Respect must exist among coalition partners. All nations should perceive they are contributing equally toward accomplishing the mission, regardless of the rank of their senior member or size of the national force. Respect for the partners’ culture, religions, customs, and values combined with understanding and consideration of their ideas, will solidify the partnership. Without such genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence can not exist; lack of respect may lead to friction, jeopardizing mission accomplishment. All members of the coalition force must understand their partners’ national views and work to minimize friction within the coalition force.

In assigning missions to coalition forces, commanders must consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing coalition force as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, considering, and accepting coalition partner ideas often lead to a solidified coalition. Without genuine respect of others, rapport and mutual confidence cannot exist.

PARTNERS

Commanders must know the coalition partners as well as they know their shared enemy or adversary. Much time and effort is expended in learning about the enemy and perhaps even more important is a similar effort among partners to understand each other. Each partner in an operation has a unique cultural identity. Nations with similar cultures face fewer obstacles to interoperability than nations with divergent cultural outlooks. Commanders and planners must learn the capabilities of partner nations or organizations. These capabilities differ based on national and organizational interests and objectives, political guidance, limitations on the national force, doctrine, organization, rules of engagement (ROE), rules of interaction, laws of armed conflict (LOACs), equipment, religions, customs, history, and a myriad of other factors.

TEAMS

Coalition operations are often difficult while team building is essential. Differing national agendas can be disruptive, but on a more personal level, the natural competitiveness among soldiers and nations can become a serious problem. Such competitiveness can be a motivating factor if properly managed. Left unchecked, it can destroy the cohesion of the coalition effort. Coalition commanders at all levels must reinforce the fact that all coalition forces are on the same team. Establishing an atmosphere of cooperation and trust at the highest levels of any coalition effort is essential. When such an atmosphere is established, subordinate commands are influenced positively. Commanders must ensure equitable treatment and exposure of all units, regardless of national background. Failure to do so may be perceived as prejudice and result in political repercussions. All members must have fair representation on coalition planning staffs to preclude allegations that any nation was excluded from participation in the decision making process. All participants must perceive missions as appropriate, achievable, and equitable in burden and risk sharing. Their capabilities are an obvious factor in assigning missions to units,

but national honor and prestige may be as important to the partnership as battlefield capability. Partners should be included in the planning process; and their opinions must be sought concerning the type of mission assignment for their units. However, the political impact of high casualties must always be balanced against national honor and prestige.

PATIENCE

Developing effective partnerships takes time and attention. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with coalition partners requires untiring, even-handed patience.

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Chapter 1

Forming Effective Coalitions

This chapter provides guidelines for prospective coalition commanders as they attempt the difficult task of forming the coalition force to conduct a coalition operation. This chapter is specifically targeted to provide the commander with a guide to the political/military aspects that are keys to success in the campaign planning process.

In coalition operations, consensus building to ensure compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners is key. A successful coalition must establish at least unity of effort, if not unity of command. The success of a coalition operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces.

The coalition force commander has much to consider, in addition to military considerations. Considerations such as the strategic context within which the operation will be carried out; civil administration; the reestablishment of justice; civil policing; humanitarian assistance; intra and post conflict development reconstruction; the possibility of election organization; financial management; and multicultural issues. Commanders must harmonize these considerations to ensure that the operation has the best possible chance of success. Doing this well, early, and professionally with the optimum level of input and up front accountability from all likely participants will provide a firm base for a successful operation.

COALITION FORMATION

1-1. Creating coalition is a political act that sets the conditions for success or failure of a multinational operation. Commanders have an overriding interest in providing advice to assist their

political leadership in forming practical military guidance. Further, all national military commanders in a coalition will require specific understandings and agreements with the coalition commander and their counterparts if they are to achieve and maintain unity of effort. Establishing these understandings and agreements are a commander's first responsibility. They provide not only the basis for unity of effort, but also the foundation for the command guidance needed by staffs when doing campaign planning (political-military-civil). These commander-to-commander understandings and agreements are central to setting the conditions for success. They are unavoidable. It is far better to negotiate them during coalition formation, or when a new member joins, than after operations commence. In establishing these understandings, commanders need to be acutely aware of the national interests of each coalition partner. For example, would that coalition partner be prepared to accept casualties?

1-2. Military advice to the National Command Authorities (NCA) is critical in the early stages of coalition planning when the political leadership is determining the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the coalition. This guidance, as well as other conditions and parameters, are contained in the political mandate and terms of reference for an operation. They set the conditions under which the coalition force will operate and are key determinants for success or otherwise. Commanders should ensure that political leaders fully understand the capabilities and limitations of coalition forces and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation. See Appendix A for coalition capabilities.

1-3. Strategic planning often begins with the mandate of a legitimizing authority such as the UN. This may sometimes be too general to be of direct use in planning, though it will contain important clues as to the political leadership's intent and the extent of their will. The mandate creates broad expectations. The mandate is usually expanded by terms of reference (TOR) that establish for the military the limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct operations. NCA often supplement the TOR with national guidance for their own military force.

1-4. The use of coalition TOR and a Status of Forces Agreement helps understanding of TCN national policies and international obligations. Therefore in order to ensure that possible conflicts of coalition LOAC / ROE are not misunderstood by TCN, which may precipitate use of force / weapons not acceptable by all Coalition

partners, it is important to highlight what TCN are signatories to what treaty and international agreements. This will prevent possible conflicts of interest with regard to acceptable weapon system employment. For example acknowledgement that some TCN are not signatories to certain treaties or international obligations. Mapping of a common coalition understanding of such impacts will facilitate known force employment options of TCN units. For example a TCN may not be a signatory to the following treaties:.

CAMPAIGN PREPARATION

1-5. Today, military operations cannot be divorced from political and civil influences. The success of an operation requires coordinated political, civil and military spheres of action. Campaign planning that fails to consider and use potential national and international politics to shape conditions for success may fail or achieve limited success. Campaign planning should be conducted with nonmilitary governmental agencies. Additionally, campaign planners should coordinate with international and private organizations operating in the joint operations area. Campaign planners should brief all agencies having a military, political, or social role in the planned operation. Such communication is vital when trying to achieve unity of effort between coalition partners and civilian agencies. Such intentional involvement builds consensus and strengthens trust among commanders and the various coalition members. Processes should be simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand. Habitual relationships in peacetime, or sufficient training time before operations commence, will allow coalition military planners time to familiarize others with the key points of the process and to build consensus on the approach to the particular operation.

PROCESSES

1-6. The mandate expresses political will. The TOR establish conditions for execution. The comprehensive campaign plan translates these conditions into military and political tasks, ways, and means. Transition planning should be an integral part of the campaign planning done simultaneously with the other elements. This will not only assist with the timely creation of the follow-on force or civil capability, but will also promote a smooth transition for any subsequent follow-on operations or transition to another authority.

COALITION FORMATION CHECKLIST FOR COMMANDERS

1-7. Keys to unity of effort among nations are certain understandings and agreements with contributing coalition force commanders. Coalition commanders should make every effort to achieve consensus before planning a detailed campaign or deploying forces. As a minimum, commanders should ensure that a common understanding exists for the following:

- Mandate and TOR for the operation.
- Political objectives of all parties, to include third parties and neighboring states.
- Latitude given each commander by NCA.
- Means of resolving disputes over use of forces.
- Types of force available and the usefulness of each.
- National force capabilities, limitations, and readiness.
- Operational environment and implications, to include—
 - Threat.
 - Consent of disputants.
 - Disputants' view of multinational force(s).
 - Maneuver and logistics appreciation.
 - Nonmilitary actors.

1-8. Has agreement been achieved in the following:


- Mission and end state.
- Role of military forces under the mandate:
 - General war.
 - Peace enforcement and peacekeeping.
 - Security and civil law and order.
 - Civil administration.
 - Economic and infrastructure.
 - Humanitarian responsibilities.
- Appropriate use of national forces.
- Required forces.
- Rules of engagement and orders for opening fire.
- Operational time line.
- Command authority or status of command:
 - Command relationships.
 - Transfer of command authority to lead nation.
- Acceptable risk.
- Estimated costs (lives, money, and resources).
- Information operations:

- Media relations and parameters for use of information.
- Parameters for sharing of information among partners.
- Authority for staff to staff contact.
- Role of partners in developing and vetting the campaign (political-military) plan.
- Common operational language and level at which it will be used.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

COMPATIBILITY

1-9. In coalition operations, consensus building to ensure compatibility at the political, military, and cultural levels between partners is key. A successful coalition must establish at least unity of effort, if not unity of command. The success of a coalition operation begins with the authority to direct operations of all assigned or attached military forces.



Lead Nation

1-10. Command and control in most coalition operations conducted by the American-British-Canadian-Australian (ABCA) armies will use the lead nation concept. This concept recognizes that one nation is assigned the lead role and its command and control predominates. Normally, the lead nation is the country providing the largest number of forces for that operation. Figure 1-1 illustrates the concept of a force structure with a lead nation.

Figure 1-1. Force Structure Concept with a Lead Nation

1-11. In the lead nation concept, the lead nation determines the appropriate command, control, communications, and intelligence (C4I) procedures, working closely with the other national contingents. The lead nation should provide unique C4I equipment and software to national component headquarters of other nations whenever feasible. Other nations participating in the operation provide appropriate liaison personnel to the lead nation headquarters. Robust liaison is essential to developing and maintaining unity of effort in coalition operations.

1-12. Depending on the size, complexity, and duration of the operation, staff augmentation from other national contingents may be required to supplement the lead nation staff to ensure that the lead nation headquarters represents the entire coalition. Such augmentation may include designated deputies or assistant commanders, planners, and logisticians. This facilitates the planning process by providing the coalition commander with a source of expertise on coalition members. Augmentation will be required if a coalition partner possesses unique organizations or capabilities not found in the forces of the lead nation.

Parallel Command Structure

1-13. An alternative to the lead nation concept is the parallel command structure. Under a parallel command structure, no single coalition commander is named. The coalition leadership must develop a means for coordination among the participants to attain unity of effort. Because of the absence of a single coalition commander and lack of unity of command, the use of a parallel command structure should be avoided if possible.

Combination: Concept and Structure

1-14. The lead nation concept and a parallel command structure can exist simultaneously within a coalition. This occurs when two or more nations serve as controlling elements for a mix of international forces, such as the Gulf War coalition. While more desirable than the parallel command structure, an effort to achieve a total lead nation concept for unity of command is preferred.

Command Jurisdiction

1-15. Command jurisdiction is the legal position of command by one national commander over the soldiers of another nation. Each nation participating in a coalition is responsible to its own national authority for the conduct of operations. Each nation will view the conflict based on its own national interests. Where those

interests coincide, the coalition commander will have his greatest latitude, and where those interests vary, he will have the least. He will be dealing not only with the national force commander, but also with the national command authority of that nation. Coalition commanders always must operate within constraints of one sort or another. Therefore, commanders must understand not only what has been agreed to, but also what national caveats have been made so they can account for them in plans. Commanders should be prepared to spend time working political and military issues rather than purely military matters.

Unity of Effort

1-16. In coalition operations, unity of effort must be achieved. The principle of unity of command also applies, but this principle may be more difficult to attain. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), government agencies may have the lead. Commanders may report to a civilian chief and employ resources of a civilian agency. Command arrangements often may be loosely defined and many times will not involve a command authority as normally understood. Commanders should consider how their actions contribute to initiatives that are also diplomatic, economic, and informational in nature. Because peace operations may be conducted at the small unit level, all levels must understand the military-civilian relationship to avoid unnecessary and counterproductive friction.

1-17. To be successful in coalition operations, sound and effective command relationships must be developed. Coalition commanders should seek assistance from governmental agencies in assessing other countries' capabilities to participate in operations. They must carefully consider national sensitivities as well as differing norms of behavior among national militaries and civilian agencies. Coalition forces should anticipate that some forces from coalition member nations would have direct and near immediate communications capability from the operational area to their respective national political leaderships. This capability can ease coordinating issues, but it can also be a source of frustration if leaders external to the operational area issue guidance directly to their deployed national forces.

National Interests

1-18. Political agendas of participating countries affect coalition operations. Many nations will not—or are reluctant to—relinquish command of their forces to other countries. On a case-by-case basis, the NCA may place national forces under the operational

control of a coalition commander. In such cases, parallel chains of command may exist, with part being through the coalition force and part through the national command authority. The coalition's challenge is to arrange the best command relationships with its subordinate forces to ensure mission success.

1-19. The national interests of nations regarding the operation are usually described in the terms of reference between the contributing nations and other coalition partners or, if involved, the UN. Developing a written document—such as an annex to an operation plan (OPLAN), an operation order (OPORD), or a campaign plan that outlines command relationships—is vital.

1-20. One essential issue in command and control (C2) concerns the transfer of authority (TOA) of coalition forces to the coalition commander's control. Nations may not agree on when the transfer should occur. The earlier the coalition force gains control, the more flexibility it has in training for and conducting the operations. Differences in national interests, objectives and policies at the national level, as well as the availability of forces based on concurrent military commitments may delay initiation of combined planning and agreement to subsequent decisions.

Command Relationships

1-21. The national authorities providing forces to the coalition will normally assign national forces under operational control (OPCON) of the coalition force commander. Smaller nations may place their forces' OPCON to a larger force, and the larger force is placed under OPCON to the coalition force commander. The assignment of these national forces under OPCON may be qualified by caveats from the respective nations in accordance with their national policies. Further assignment to service component commanders in an OPCON status by the coalition force commander is subject to approval by the respective NCA. Commandless OPCON of the national forces is retained by the parent national commander and is exercised through the designated national commander of the respective nations within the coalition force. The coalition commander and national commanders should discuss and clarify their mutual understandings of the command authorities that have been transferred to him. This clarification will ensure there is common understanding of those authorities and preclude potential misunderstandings. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) has specific definitions for OPCON and tactical control (TACON). Figure 1-2 compares the different command authorities using US and NATO terms.

1-22. **Operational Control.** The authority delegated to a commander to direct assigned forces to accomplish specific missions or tasks that are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned; and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include administrative or logistical control (QSTAG 894, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*). This differs from the US definition. Commanders must exercise caution not to interchange NATO terms and US terms.

Authority	Least control						
	US COCOM	US OPCON	NATO OPCOM	NATO OPCON	CFC/USFK COMBINED OPCON	NATO TACOM	US & NATO TACON
Direct authority to deal with DOD, US diplomatic missions, agencies	X						
Coordinate CINC boundary	X						
Granted to a command	X		X				
Delegated to a command		X		X	X	X	X
Set chain of command to forces	X	X					
Assign mission/designate objective	X	X	X				
Assign tasks	X	X	X			X	
Direct/employ forces	X	X	X	X	X		
Establish maneuver control measures	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Reassign forces	X						
Retain OPCON	X	X	X				
Delegate OPCON	X	X	X	X with approval			
Assign TACOM	X	X					
Delegate TACON	X	X	X	X	X		
Retain TACON	X	X	X	X			
Deploy forces (information/within theater)	X	X	X	X			
Local direction/control designated forces	X	X					X
Assign separate employment of unit components	X	X	X				
Directive authority for logistics	X						
Direct joint training	X	X					
Exercise command of US forces in MNF	X	X					
Assign/reassign subordinate commanders/officers	X	May suspend or recommend reassignment					
Conduct internal discipline/trng	X						

NATO Full Command and CFC/USFK Command less OPCON are basically equivalent to US COCOM but only for internal matters.

X – has this authority
 – denied authority or not specifically granted

LEGEND
COCOM –Combatant Command
OPCON –Operational Control
OPCOM –Operational Command
TACOM –Tactical Command
TACON –Tactical Control

Figure 1-2. Comparison of Command and Control Authority Levels
 Authority

1-23. **Tactical Control.** The detailed and usually local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned (QSTAG 894, *NATO Glossary of Terms and Definitions*, and US Joint Publication 1-02, *Department of Defense Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms*). TACON does not provide organizational authority or administrative and support responsibilities.

CONTROL

1-24. Two essential structural enhancements improve control of coalition forces: the establishment of a liaison network and coordination centers.

Liaison

1-25. Regardless of the command structure, effective liaison is vital in any coalition force. Using a liaison is an invaluable confidence-building tool between the coalition force and subordinate commands. It also fosters a better understanding of mission and tactics, facilitates the transfer of vital information, enhances mutual trust, and develops an increased level of teamwork. A liaison supplies significant information for the coalition force headquarters about subordinate force readiness, training, and other factors. Early establishment reduces the fog and friction caused by incompatible communications systems, doctrine, and operating procedures.

1-26. Liaison should be established as early as possible between a command and its higher headquarters, adjacent units, supporting, attached, and assigned forces, as well as other appropriate host nation (HN) and international organizations. When supporting UN operations, liaison personnel should be placed at the UN headquarters in New York and the UN office in Geneva, Switzerland.

1-27. The command must identify and request the requirement for liaison personnel—to include any specific qualifications needed—at the earliest opportunity. Differences in doctrine, organization, equipment, and training among the coalition nations demand a more hardy liaison structure to facilitate operations than would be necessary in a purely national force. The requirement may be for liaison teams instead of individuals because of the many required functions that must be covered on a 24-hour basis. This requires more liaison personnel than a force

normally has assigned. Liaison personnel must have equipment compatible with the coalition force.

1-28. Liaison personnel must fully understand the capabilities and limitations of their parent units and nations, to include the structure, capabilities, weapon systems, logistics, and planning methods employed and their national interests. Whether they are language qualified or have interpreter support, personnel must understand the language and culture for to successful liaison operations. However, professional knowledge and functional expertise are far more important. Officers who have participated in schools and training with other coalition nations or have experience in multinational operations can provide this expertise. The sending command should provide liaison teams—with knowledge of the language, organization, materiel, and doctrine of coalition partners as well as an understanding of appropriate regional information. Liaison officers (LOs) assigned to the coalition force headquarters should be of sufficient rank to influence the decision-making process. They should also possess the authority to answer routine coalition force queries on behalf of their commands.

1-29. Once liaison is established, liaison teams become the direct representatives of their respective commanders. They monitor, coordinate, advise, and assist the command to which attached. As such, they attend briefings and maintain close contact with the coalition operations center. However, the command to which they are sent should not formally task their sending unit through the LO. Formal tasking should be accomplished through normal command and control channels. Figure 1-3 lists preferred ranks for LOs. Figure 1-4 shows possible staff liaison requirements.

UNIT SIZE REPRESENTED	UNIT SIZE GOING TO	PREFERRED RANK	
		Warfighting	MOOTW
Division	Corps and Above	Major	Colonel
Brigade	Corps and Above	Major	Colonel
Brigade	Division	Captain	Major
Battalion	Brigade and Above	Lieutenant	Captain
Company	Battalion and Above		Lieutenant

Figure 1-3. Preferred Ranks for LOs by Unit

Unit Size Represented	Unit Going To			
	Battalion and Above	Brigade and Above	Division	Corps and Above
Possible Staff Elements Requiring LOs*				
Division				Logistics Operations/ Plans Intelligence
Brigade			Logistics Operations/ Plans Intelligence	Logistics Operations/ Plans Intelligence
Battalion		Logistics Operations/ Plans	Logistics Operations/ Plans	Logistics Operations/ Plans
Company	Operations/ Plans	Operations/ Plans	Operations/ Plans	Operations/ Plans

* Under certain circumstances, multiple LOs may be required due to the complexity of operations.

Figure 1-4. Possible Staff Liaison Requirements

1-30. Integrating multinational liaison personnel into the staff of the coalition force totally depends on the commander’s desires, but when integrated creates a more effective organization. The coalition should establish a orientation program for all liaison personnel. The coalition personnel reception center (CPRC) could perform this requirement. The coalition force must determine what staff officer or staff section will have overall responsibility for liaison personnel reporting to the headquarters.

1-31. Special operations forces (SOF) have proven particularly effective in coalition operations as LOs or liaison teams. Their language capabilities, cultural training awareness, and experience in working and training with other country’s militaries allow them to improve coordination and minimize misunderstanding.

Coordination Centers

1-32. Using a coordination center is a proven means of enhancing stability and interaction and improving control within a coalition. Coalition forces should routinely create such a center in the early stages of any coalition effort, especially one that operates under a parallel command structure. The coordination center can be used for C2, and variations can organize and control various functional areas, including logistics, chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) staff and civil-military operations (CMO).

Initially, a coordination center can be the focal point for support issues such as force sustainment, medical support, infrastructure engineering, host nation support (HNS), and movement control. However, as a coalition matures, the center's role can be expanded to include command activities. When a coordination center is activated, member nations provide action officers who are familiar with its activities. Coalition nations should be encouraged to augment this staff with linguists and requisite communications capabilities to maintain contact with their parent headquarters. Early establishment and staffing of skilled personnel adds to the success of such centers.

C2 INTEROPERABILITY

1-33. All coalition force troops must fully understand the mission, goals, and objectives of the operation. Standing operating procedures (SOP) should be developed whenever appropriate. These SOPs should be easy to understand and address "coalition" procedures, not single nation procedures. When there is a lead nation, its SOPs will be used for most purposes.

1-34. Even with SOPs, the lead nation will still need to provide a forum for deconflicting and resolving misunderstandings. This will require more than a platform to express ideas. There may be personnel, to include commanders from coalition forces, who do not have a working understanding of English. The coalition force must use some mechanism, such as sand tables, as a tool to overcome language deficiencies when describing operational requirements. Regardless of the mechanism used, the coalition force commander and his staff will need patience and possibly detailed explanations to ensure understanding.

1-35. Terminology is also a problem between coalition forces and other organizations. For example, the usage of acronyms—such as NGO for nongovernmental organization and PVO for private voluntary organization—could pose a problem between organizations. Therefore, all military forces and the agencies they work with should develop and distribute a lexicon of mutually-agreed terms. The glossary in this handbook can help provide a common basis for understanding.

1-36. The location of the coalition force headquarters is important. The coalition force must protect itself against various threats, but it should be in a position to easily work with both the political and military sides of the operation.

1-37. The coalition force must remember that many countries are not staffed or equipped to offer a full spectrum of support. They may not possess a full array of combat support or combat service support assets, maps of the projected area of operations (AO), the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other coalition forces or CBRN hazard warning, reporting and prediction systems. These military forces probably will look to other nations for equipment and supplies. It is important to know what agreements exist between the UN and these militaries before their arrival in the projected AO.

1-38. The coalition force commander will have to look at which nations can offer special capabilities. These capabilities—airlift, special operations, intelligence collection, communications, security, and logistics—can offset other countries' shortfalls and enhance overall operational competence.

1-39. The coalition force commander may have difficulty removing particular forces or individuals from a coalition force unless they are from his own nation.

MISSION

1-40. When dealing with most nonmilitary agencies, the coalition commander must focus on cooperation and coordination rather than command and control. These agencies will have their own missions and goals. The coalition commander will have a limited ability to influence their actions. To ensure that he can accomplish his mission and end state—while he allows these agencies to do the same—requires that he seeks their cooperation and that their efforts are coordinated to prevent interference in one another's missions. Additionally, these agencies may be in a position to help the commander in his mission accomplishment. Developing a civil-military operations center (CMOC) is one way of achieving cooperation and coordination with nonmilitary agencies. The CMOC, described in detail in Chapter 9, provides a single point of contact between these agencies and the commander.

COMPREHENSIVE CAMPAIGN PLAN

1-41. The coalition commander and his staff will seek as much guidance and information as possible in planning and preparing to execute their mission. Of significant help to the commander would be a comprehensive campaign plan provided by either the mandating authority or the coalition governments. If none exists,

the commander should use this process as a source for obtaining guidance and information for his planning.

1-42. The comprehensive campaign plan provides a means by which all agencies can discover and coordinate their efforts. This plan results in a single document which captures every agency's intent. It fully informs civil government and military decision makers at the strategic level before they commit coalition forces in response to a crisis. It allows nongovernmental agencies the opportunity to inform the composition and operational approach of those forces prior to their arrival. The comprehensive campaign plan should—

- Provide timely guidance to advance planning and preparation of a force.
- Harmonize military capabilities and strategy with the wider political goal and intent.
- Provide the commander's mission and guidance in one document for use by all agencies.
- Align authorities with responsibilities and clarify tasks before deployment.
- Enable preparation for transition and exit planning.
- Offer a framework for capturing lessons from an operation.

1-43. The comprehensive campaign plan process is broadly based on a five-paragraph plan. The format includes the following considerations:

- Situation:
 - Threats.
 - Friendly forces available.
 - Coalition interests.
- Mission. Purpose and end state.
- Execution:
 - Concept of operations defining the critical path and responsibilities.
 - Priorities.
 - Criteria for success.
- Operational Support. Details implied and specified tasks for both military and nonmilitary players. Assures that military priorities mirror those of political and civilian agencies so far as possible.
- Command and Control. Specifies who is in charge and how integration and coordination will take place.

1-44. Annexes should include plans from all participating organizations—such as UNICEF, UNHCR, World Food Program, International Criminal Tribunal and the International Police. The military operations plan would form one of these annexes.

OPERATION STRATEGY

1-45. Each operation is conducted in a unique setting with its own political, diplomatic, geographic, economic, cultural, and military characteristics. Key considerations involved in planning and conducting coalition operations vary with the international situation and the perspectives, motives, and values of the organization's members.


1-46. The mission of the coalition can be derived from a number of sources. These sources include mission statements or orders issued through national chains of command or through international treaties, accord, mandates, resolutions, or agreements. An important first step for the coalition force is immediately to establish connectivity with the higher authority. The coalition force can then be prepared to accept the responsibility for detailed planning and immediate execution.

1-47. Politicians and diplomats develop missions. They are often collections of compromises. Because of ambiguities—purposeful or otherwise—in a mission statement, the commander who receives the mission may find it difficult to put into operational terms. Normally changes to missions require the consensus of all participating countries, after approval by an implementing body, if there is one. Figure 1-5 offers an overview of how coalitions are influenced in their building process.

SUCCESSFUL TERMINATION

1-48. Success is more likely if nations agree on a strategic end state with well-defined termination and exit conditions. These conditions help prompt the decision to end an operation. All participants should agree to these conditions. Exit conditions are critical to the transfer of responsibility from the coalition force to another authority—such as the UN or other regional political bodies—or the overall termination of the operation. UN Security Council resolutions may impose these conditions. The UN or political leadership sets the strategic end state conditions before committing forces.

1-49. Commanders must establish and regularly review indicators of success related to the end state need to be established and regularly reviewed since progress and success or



victory often are difficult to assess. They have to recognize when the mission is not achievable without restructuring or committing additional assets, or when further action may result in a waste of resources.

Figure 1-5. Coalition Building Process

ANALYSIS STATEMENT

1-50. One of the most important tasks in planning coalition operations is a detailed mission analysis. It should result in a mission statement for the coalition force and for the subordinate command when necessary. The headquarters conducting the mission analysis will normally use its own procedures for mission analysis, which includes the respective capabilities, political will, and national interests of the coalition force components. Force requirements should be identified and commitments solicited from likely coalition participants. To reduce disparities among participating forces, participants should establish minimum capability stand-

ards for participation and develop a certification process that covers specific areas of concern to include training level competence, logistics capabilities, deployment, sustainment, and redeployment readiness. This is a critical step as each nation determines what its contribution to the operation will be.

1-51. Based on national contributions and after determining the tasks necessary to achieve assigned objectives, the coalition force should assign a specific task to the element of the coalition force most capable of completing that task. If several elements can complete the task, the commander should consider assigning tasks so that all elements make meaningful contributions to the mission. Other planning factors that will affect the analysis include the cultural and political situation in the AO. In an environment with likely hostilities, a portion of the coalition force, those nations authorized the full range of force, may be assigned to offensive operations. A second group, due to political constraint, may be assigned to support and protect lines of communications in the theater, while a third group with greater political and military constraints may be restricted to combat service support (CSS) operations.

1-52. Throughout the mission analysis, if some part of the tasking or the mission is unclear, the commander should request the higher authority to explain or redefine it. He can influence a rewrite of the tasking or mission by developing a mission statement for the force and coordinating it with higher authority before issuing the tasking. This may provide the opportunity to clarify force structure requirements, end state, and “commander’s intent” with higher commander approval.

1-53. Political issues often affect all aspects of a military mission. Political decisions will normally take precedence over military requirements. For example, the size of a force may be artificially capped more by political decisions than by military requirements. Such political issues are usually beyond the commander’s authority, but when possible he should try to influence them if they affect mission accomplishment.

1-54. The mission must be periodically reviewed to avoid both directed and self-imposed mission creep. A thorough mission analysis will help in deterring mission creep and any adverse impact on the actual mission. In most operations, it is difficult to deter mission creep because the coalition personnel inherently desire to do more than is required, especially when faced with human suffering. However, commanders must remember that well-intended actions can be especially dangerous in MOOTW, where they can

threaten impartiality as well as undermine long-term programs. In some cases, political inaction is better than action.

1-55. Development, refinement of rules of engagement (ROE), and resource and funding requirements are important parts of mission analysis.

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1-56. ROE are directives to military forces and individuals that define the circumstances, conditions, degree, and manner in which force or actions may or may not be applied. Although the participants may have similar political mandates, each nation will likely come to the coalition with different national ROE reflecting that nation's reason for entering the coalition. Some national ROE will be relatively free of constraint while others may be severely constrained. In many cases, commanders of deployed forces may lack the authority to speak for their nation in the ROE development process. Complete consensus or standardization of ROE should be sought but may not be achievable. The commander needs to reconcile differences as much as possible to develop and implement simple ROE that can be tailored by member forces to their national policies. For the individual soldier to understand and implement ROE, they must be clear and simple. Trying to obtain concurrence for ROE from national authorities is a time-consuming process that commanders should address early in the planning process. Chapter 13 discusses ROE in more detail.

ASSESSMENT TEAM

1-57. A valuable tool for mission analysis is the early deployment of an assessment team to the AO. The team can validate the mission analysis, reduce duplication of effort, and provide for a rational division of labor. It can help clarify the mission by actually deciding what needs to be accomplished, what type of forces are required to accomplish it, the proper sequence for deployment, the availability of in-country assets, and what ongoing operations are being conducted by civilian organizations in the AO. Team members should attempt to answer as many of the checklist questions as possible at the end of each chapter. Some of this information will be directed by the tasking; however, this should not deter the commander from emphasizing requirements.

1-58. Composition of the assessment team varies. The team should have members capable of identifying, determining, and assessing infrastructure, transportation limitations, and environmental concerns in the AO. The team should also include mem-

bers of the coalition who will participate in the actual operation. Suggested team membership is—

- Commander or designee.
- Linguists or interpreters.
- G/S2.
- G/S3.
- G/S4 and key logistics planners to include engineer, transportation, and contracting personnel.
- G/S5.
- G/S6.
- CBRN staff with G/S3 and G/S4
- Medical planners to include preventive medicine personnel.
- Legal planners.
- SOF planners to include civil affairs and psychological operations.
- Public affairs.
- Political-military representative.
- Embassy LO.
- UN representation, when appropriate.

STAFFING

1-59. The coalition staff organization will be based on what option is used to form the coalition headquarters, either the lead nation concept or a composite headquarters. The commander may not have a choice if the establishing authority designates an organization. If the lead nation concept is used, the routine duties of the commander and his staff will be those assigned by the doctrine of the lead nation, modified as necessary for the specific situation. If a composite headquarters is selected, the commander and his staff will have to specify duties in more detail. It may be necessary to change the names of various coalition functions based on sensitivities when working with organizations such as the UN. This section highlights several responsibilities unique to coalition operations.

1-60. The coalition staff should be composed of appropriate members in key positions from each country having forces in the coalition. Positions on the staff should be divided so that country representation and influence generally reflect the composition of the force. These positions should also stem from the mission and type of operations to be conducted. Coalition commanders must also look at force composition as it applies to capabilities, limitations, and required support. The importance of knowing,

trusting, and quickly reaching a comfort level with staff members may make it desirable for the coalition commander to handpick some members of his staff, such as the chief of staff or G3.

1-61. When mission requirements exceed staff capabilities, the commander must request the necessary personnel, facilities, and equipment from either his national chain of command or the coalition establishing authorities. They may have a “cell” of experts prepared to augment a coalition to provide assistance in the early stages of organization and planning. Staff officers who augment the staff nucleus should be trained as part of a coalition training and exercise program. The staff should include experienced operators for the C4I systems used to support the coalition. Personnel nominated to fill coalition augmentation billets possess the following attributes:

- Knowledge, confidence, forcefulness.
- Preparedness to represent their nations and units.
- Understanding that they are the de facto country “experts.”
- Ability to work as part of a coalition team without country parochialism.

1-62. The command should establish a staff orientation program to ensure that all individuals joining the staff become thoroughly familiar with their surroundings. This could be accomplished by establishing a CPRC under the G/S1. The “buddy system” is another program that the command could establish with the reception center or by itself. This system assigns an experienced staff member to a new staff member to assist in the familiarization process.

COALITION FORCE COMMANDER

1-63. The coalition force commander is responsible to the coalition nations for the successful accomplishment of the mission. The following responsibilities are provided as a guide and can be adapted to the specific mission and forces assigned:

- Making recommendations to the establishing authorities on the proper employment of assigned and attached forces and for mission accomplishment, to include identifying requirements for additional forces needed.
- Exercising control over assigned and attached forces. The commander must also determine when to transfer forces to the coalition OPCON.
- Developing an OPORD or campaign plan within the planning guidelines as directed by the establishing authorities. The commander determines applicability of existing

OPLANs, if any, to maximize the benefits of prior deliberate planning.

- Requesting supplemental ROE needed to accomplish the assigned mission.
- Establishing combat identification measures.
- Notifying the establishing authority(ies) when prepared to assume responsibility for the assigned AO.
- Ensuring that cross-nation support is provided and the force operates as an effective, mutually supporting coalition team.
- Determining the requirement for and providing guidance on establishing the necessary boards, centers, and bureaus such as Coalition Visitors Bureau, Coalition Movement Center, or CMOC. If a staff proposes creating an organization, the commander should require that the staff provide criteria, supporting rationale, and membership. The final decision is the commander's. If it is not required, do not establish it.
- Defining the subordinate AOs for each subordinate force, to include SOF. The commander should—
 - Ensure accurate accountability of forces deployed.
 - Monitor the operational situation and maintain daily contact with the establishing authorities to keep fully informed of the situation.
 - Coordinate with forces and agencies not assigned or attached, including friendly forces and governments, coalition nation agencies, NGOs, PVOs, or international organizations (IO) as appropriate.
 - Build a cohesive team, to include NGOs, PVOs, IO, and others.

DEPUTY COALITION FORCE COMMANDER

1-64. Normally, the deputy commander is from a different country than the commander. His selection may be based on the mission assigned or the number and type of forces in the coalition. The deputy usually is of equal or senior rank to the subordinate force commanders. He should possess a broad understanding of the operation to be conducted. He performs special duties as directed by the commander such as chairing committees and coordinating liaison personnel, incoming and outgoing requirements, and inter-agency requirements.

CHIEF OF STAFF

1-65. In most cases, the chief of staff will come from the same country as the commander, probably from the same command. Because the staff may have officers from different nations, the chief of staff places special emphasis on training, coordinating, and directing the work of the staff. The chief of staff must pay particular attention to establishing routine procedures that ensure necessary coordination takes place and in reviewing staff actions for completeness and clarity.

G/S1 MANPOWER AND PERSONNEL

1-66. See Chapter 2, "Personnel," for details. It also covers financial, legal, and religious ministry support to the command.

G/S2 INTELLIGENCE

1-67. See Chapter 3, "Intelligence," for details.

G/S3 OPERATIONS

1-68. See Chapter 4, "Operations," for details. This includes planning and information operations.

G/S4 LOGISTICS

1-69. See Chapter 5, "Logistics," for details. This chapter includes health service support and contracting.

G/S5 POLICY AND PLANS

1-70. See Chapter 6, "Transition Planning," for details.

G/S6 COMMUNICATIONS

1-71. See Chapter 7, "Communications," for details.

COMMANDER'S PERSONAL STAFF

1-72. The commander's personal staff group may include the political advisor, inspector general, comptroller, command historian, public affairs officer (PAO), legal officer, surgeon, provost marshal, chaplain, and others as directed. Each member has specific taskings and responsibilities. Chapter 2 covers the chaplain; Chapter 11 covers the surgeon; Chapter 13 covers the legal officer and provost marshal; and Chapter 15 covers the PAO.

Political Advisor

1-73. Commanders will routinely work directly with political authorities in the region. The commander should establish a close and efficient relationship with his political advisor (POLAD). The responsibilities of the POLAD include—

- Working with the commander and assisting the NCA in creating policies that meet coalition objectives and are realistically executed.
- Acting as the principal contact with ambassadors and informing the appropriate diplomatic personnel of coalition force plans within the AO.
- Supplying information regarding policy goals and objectives of the diplomatic agencies relevant to the operation.

Comptroller

1-74. The coalition must develop a policy for “funding” the operation. This may be a complex and time-consuming task. Finance management support to the coalition includes financial and resource management functions. Responsibilities of the coalition comptroller may include—

- Serving as coalition force principal financial management advisor.
- Representing the commander in identifying coalition resources and financing country needs to the national authorities, national components, and others as required.
- Establishing AO financial management responsibilities, to include designating lead agents for specific financial management functions or special support requirements.
- Providing estimates of resource requirements to the national authorities, national component commands, and others as required.
- Establishing positive controls over funding authority received.
- Coordinating with the G/S4 for a system for prevention of fraud, waste, and abuse.
- Coordinating with the Staff Judge Advocate on funding authority issues.
- Handling reimbursement for nations providing services to coalition forces and others.
- Preparing finance and disbursing for the personnel annex of OPLAN or OPORD.

Command Historian

1-75. All too often, important events, important decisions, and lessons learned of an operation are not recorded and thus not available for use as learning tools for future coalitions. The commander should establish a staff section to collect historical information and lessons learned about the operation from the initial planning process to redeployment. A command historian should head this section, capturing and recording events for historical purposes (to include photographs), collecting lessons learned, ensuring turnover files are properly developed, and assisting in the development of SOPs.

1-76. Additionally, the historian should record all events daily. This record must be created at the time of each event and include available sources as well as a synopsis of rationales for adopted actions. The staff section should not become entangled in the decision making process.

Linguists and Interpreters

1-77. Linguists and interpreters can be critical to mission success. Communications with the local populace and coalition forces can be greatly hindered without them. Language barriers may cause difficulties in interoperability with other armies and in dealing with the host nation. Language problems can make it difficult to sustain a rapid decision cycle. Even common tasks, such as sharing intelligence, must await translation before data can be passed through the command, slowing the development of plans and execution. Language capability speeds command, reduces confusion, and contributes to mutual respect. Forces must be able to effectively exchange commands and other information to work successfully together. Few linguists have both the technical expertise and depth of understanding to be fully understood while crossing both language and doctrinal boundaries.

1-78. Planners must consider LOs, foreign area officers (FAOs), and language-capable personnel to fill these positions. Planners must determine requirements for language-trained personnel early in the planning cycle because of the scarcity of these assets and the long-lead time required for deploying them. These Language-qualified personnel will probably require a training period to familiarize themselves with technical terms and procedures of the organization. Language is more than the direct translation of words. Word choice, mannerisms, and so forth also convey much information.

1-79. Linguistic requirements are not confined to liaison teams or headquarters elements. Linguists are needed throughout the

logistics functions to coordinate with local authorities, civilian transportation coordinators, refugee and relief centers, hospital staffs, legal offices, and local police forces.

1-80. Historically, the timely acquisition of enough linguists and interpreters has been a problem that significantly impacted both personnel tempo and coalition operations. These assets often are in the reserves and must be requested early to ensure availability and timeliness for deployment. Contracted interpreters can also be used. While this is acceptable for many requirements, some sensitive positions will require military linguists with appropriate security clearances. In cases of less common languages, coalition components may require parent country or other country augmentation.

CHECKLISTS

1-81. Commanders participating in a coalition operation should be able to answer the following questions with respect to the force's participation in the operation.

COMMAND

1. What is the command structure? Is it lead nation, parallel command, or a combination?
2. What political motivations are responsible for each nation's participation in the operation? What potential conflicts may arise?
3. Have the implications of national and regional culture on contemplated coalition operations been assessed?
4. Have appropriate orientation briefings from civilian agencies been requested?
5. Have status-of-forces been agreed to? If not, who should conduct negotiations?
6. What interoperability factors will affect the mission, for example, command, control, communications, or logistics?
7. Are there cultural barriers that may prevent a harmonious relationship? What force structure will minimize friction between partners?
8. Have supported and supporting relationships been established or referred to higher authority to resolve inadequacies?
9. What unique capabilities does a national contingent bring to the coalition?
10. What constraints are imposed on coalition forces by their national authorities?
11. Have standards regarding operational or logistics capabilities been established for certifying units to participate in the operation? Have nations with deficiencies indicated a method of resolution?
12. Have deficiencies with coalition commanders been negotiated for resolution?
13. Have C2 arrangements been made to include the coalition ambassadors, military attaches, and nonmilitary government officials in coordinating functions?
14. Are forces; command, control, and communications capabilities; and logistic support robust enough to respond to increased levels of operational intensity?

15. Have all coalition legal constraints been considered in planning for C2?
16. Have the personnel for the coalition staff been chosen to reflect the required functional skills, training level, language skill and avoidance of historic animosities?
17. Have minimum communications capabilities been established for each coalition member to enable successful 24-hour operations?
18. Has the command structure been designed to minimize the number of layers?

COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

1. Have command relationships for control of forces been defined?
2. Is there an initiating directive, which clearly articulates the command arrangements?
3. Have the command relationships been defined and analyzed for the following:
 - Feasibility of achieving unity of command or unity of effort?
 - The feasibility of achieving mission under the command relationships?
 - Assistance is required from the NCA in negotiating unity of command or effort at the strategic level?
 - Clarity of relationships and understanding on the part of all coalition elements?

LIAISON

1. What LOs must be sent to coalition force headquarters and adjacent, supporting, and supported units?
2. Do liaison elements on the staff possess requisite authorities and have a full understanding of both national interest and coalition objectives?
3. Do liaison elements have appropriate communications, linguistic, logistics, and office support capabilities in place?
4. Have LOs been identified? Have key LOs been interviewed for suitability?
5. What are the requirements for interagency and multinational coordination? Does the force have an adequate LO or LO teams to meet required coordination?

LANGUAGE

1. What language will be used for forcewide communications?

2. At what command level will each force resort to its national language?
3. Are there sufficient interpreters for planning and execution?

MISSION

1. What is the source of the mission tasking? What is the relationship between the military force and this political entity? If the source is not the political authority sponsoring the coalition operation, has clarification and support from national military chains of command been requested?
2. What is the process to consider and approve changes to the mission statement?
3. How is the military role coordinated with the roles of other governmental agencies, NGOs, and PVOs?
4. What is the mission? Is it clearly defined, decisive, and attainable?
5. How does the mission statement accomplish the desired end state?
6. What are the specific objectives of the force? How do the objectives help achieve the end state?
7. Have these objectives been translated into tasks for subordinate commanders?
8. What is the exit strategy?
9. What are the requirements for transition and who is the transition force and controlling headquarters?
10. Has a comprehensive campaign plan been developed?

END STATE

1. What is the end state? Does it clearly define mission success and the military role in attaining it?
2. What are the national end state criteria of each coalition partner? Do they differ from the criteria of the coalition force itself?
3. Does the end state identify the conditions under which the coalition military operation can be terminated?
4. Are the conditions tangible in military terms?
5. Are they contained in the mission statement?

MISSION ANALYSIS

1. Can the force accomplish its mission in the allotted time?
2. What means are available to accomplish the mission and are they adequate?

3. Has the use of strategic forces been considered and planned for?
4. Does the force have sufficient assets to protect itself? Do they balance with the potential political ramifications of failure to protect the force?
5. What is the probable cost of the operation (in lives, money, and resources) and is it acceptable to the political authorities directing the force's involvement?
6. Has the end state and exit strategy been articulated as part of the commander's intent? Does this intent support the desired political end state?
7. What are the courses of action to be followed by the coalition force when a national military element withdraws from the force?
8. What are the courses of action to be executed if the sponsoring organization orders withdrawal of coalition forces in advance of end state achievement?
9. Do plans exist to transition from a standing start to MOOTW, standing start to war, or war to MOOTW? Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
10. What are the redeployment or withdrawal plans for coalition forces?
11. Is the departure of forces to be accomplished under tactical conditions?
12. What are the environmental standards to be met by withdrawal in humanitarian or other peaceful operations?
13. In addition to the above, for MOOTW the following questions should be answered:
 - What and how much of the affected nation's infrastructure should be restored?
 - Will the coalition's projected actions solve the long-term problem of the mission area?
 - How will the force control mission creep?
 - What is "one thing" the force can do to stabilize the situation?
 - What tolerance should the force have for violence?
 - Is a weapons bounty program needed?

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. Have ROE been agreed upon by national authorities or by national military commanders?

2. How will national ROE affect other coalition force organizations and operations?
3. What are the procedures for commanders to request a change to the ROE?

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Chapter 2

Personnel

PERSONNEL SUPPORT

2-1. Coalition personnel service support (PSS) assets should be co-located for ease of coordination between the national elements of the coalition force, although personnel functions for national contingents are a national responsibility. PSS includes replacement operations; strength management; personnel accounting; casualty management; personnel database and information management; postal operations; personnel evaluations; promotions, transfers and discharges; morale, welfare and recreation; awards; finance; religious ministry; public affairs; and legal support to the command.

G/S1 (PERSONNEL)

2-2. The G/S1 is the principal staff assistant to the commander on manpower management. He is responsible for providing guidance, oversight, and coordination of overall manpower and personnel issues. He is the coordinating staff officer for finance, religious ministry, and legal support.

2-3. The coalition G/S1 should recommend a policy on tour lengths to the coalition force commander. A rotation policy should be based on the coalition's mission, length of operation, operational environment, and requirement for skilled personnel. A standard tour length for all personnel is equitable and impacts favorably on morale, but may not be supportable from an operational aspect. The rotation policies of participating nations will also affect tour length. However, the coalition commander will require visibility of national contingent rotations so that he is aware of the status of national forces and can accurately account for all the forces in the area of operations.

RECEPTION CENTER

2-4. The G/S1 runs the coalition personnel reception center (CPRC). The CPRC familiarizes coalition personnel with the coalition, its mission, and the situation for which the coalition was formed. It also assists personnel in acclimating themselves to the

host nation (HN), its culture, and its history. Each coalition nation should be represented in the CPRC. The CPRC may also serve as the location of national PSS operations.

VISITORS BUREAU

2-5. The number of visitors to an area of operations (AO) may warrant establishing a coalition visitors bureau (CVB). This bureau can assist in handling all visitors, especially distinguished visitors. This is usually a full-time responsibility. A senior officer should be the director of the CVB. Reservists with a protocol background are good choices as directors. The CVB should be a separate entity and not part of the Coalition Information Bureau or Public Affairs Office. It should be composed of representatives from all coalition nations. It must possess sufficient communications and transportation capabilities. Its personnel may require training in executive protection and properly escorting distinguished visitors.

FINANCE OPERATIONS

2-6. Finance operations and resource management focus on supporting local procurement efforts, funding and tracking operations costs, and military pay support. Finance elements help access HN and other support by paying for contracts and by providing cash to agents making local purchases. They also provide military pay support and limited support to other services such as cashing checks and currency exchange for individuals. Resource managers focus on obtaining obligation and expenditure authority and on tracking the costs of the operation. Finance elements provide essential input into the accounting systems to support cost capturing. Accurate, detailed costs are needed for reporting dealings with coalition partners to determine how costs have been or should be apportioned.

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

2-7. The entire coalition force must understand any religious groups or movements within the AO and the potential impact they may have on the mission. Religious differences among personnel in both participating nations and populations in the AO need to be identified and addressed during the planning stages. Religion plays a pivotal role in the self-understanding of many people, and has a significant effect on the goals, objectives, and structure of society. This may seriously impact coalition policy, strategy, or tactics.

2-8. Coalition religious support plays a key role in promoting, developing and maintaining the spiritual health and morale of the soldier, as well as advising the command and staff on the spiritual and moral well being of the command and the impact of indigenous religions on the military mission. The coalition force commanders must ensure that the religious needs of the command are maintained. This requires coordinating religious support assets, a detailed religious support plan, and effective liaison between the senior chaplains of each nation. The idea of one nation's chaplains providing worship services or pastoral care for the soldiers of another nation should be possible.

2-9. Religious support consist of the following pastoral/spiritual functions:

- *Worship*: Worship includes Divine Services, liturgies, and the performance of sacraments, rites and ordinances. While attendance at services is voluntary, every attempt should be made to allow soldiers the opportunity to worship according to the tenets and practice of their faith. The sharing of religious support assets is to be encouraged.
- *Spiritual Care and Counseling*: This may include visitations, visible presence among soldiers, opportunities to support spiritual formation, prayer, and personal counsel. Spiritual care enables the chaplain to gain insights into the lives of his/her soldiers, determine the morale of the unit, provide for the spiritual well being of soldiers, and to represent an eternal or divine presence. Formal or informal counseling allows the chaplain to assist soldiers and their families in dealing with the critical issues and concerns that shape their lives, sustain their spiritual formation, and may impact the morale and readiness of the unit.
- *Funerals and Memorials*: Funerals and Memorial services, reflect the emphasis placed on the worth and value of the individual. Chaplains conduct these services and ceremonies fulfilling a vital role in rendering respect and honor to the sons and daughters of our respective nations who paid the ultimate price serving their country.
- *Critical Event Debriefing*: Military operations whether combat, peacekeeping or stability operations and support operations, are inherently dangerous. Traumatic events can and do occur. It often falls to the chaplain to provide the means for assisting soldiers and commanders to deal with these events in order to assist in quickly restoring unit

cohesion and effectiveness, reducing short-term emotional and physical distress, mitigating long-term distress and "burnout", and facilitating the transition from traumatic event(s) to a sense of normalcy.

- *EPW/POW/NGO/Contractor Support:* Under the Geneva Accords, chaplains provide religious support to Enemy Prisoners of War (EPWs) (also referred to as Prisoners of War or POWs). Chaplains under ordinary circumstances will enable EPW chaplains or their equivalent to provide spiritual care to their fellow prisoners rather than provide direct religious support. Chaplains may provide religious support (within legal and regulatory boundaries) to civilians working for nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), or contractors working for the military.

2-10. Advising the Commander: Chaplains serve as advisors to their commanders on matters of religion, moral and ethical conduct, morale, and the impact of indigenous religions on the military mission. Chaplains provide an analysis of the religious impact in the area of operations. This advice/information on indigenous religious culture must be shared with each commander, both laterally and vertically in the chain of command, and across the coalition.

2-11. National senior chaplains oversee the research, assessment and sharing of information on local religions as they affect the military operation. This will allow chaplains to better advise the command and staff on the impact of indigenous religions on the mission. Senior chaplains also provide professional support as well as mentoring to subordinate chaplains. Supervisory chaplains integrate a commonality and strength in each area of operation. Their responsibilities include:

- Coordination.
- Synchronize assets through command and informally through relationships.
- Answer higher command issues.
- Provide liaison with higher senior chaplains.
- Gather/coordinate/distribute multinational lessons learned for all chaplaincies involved in the operation.
- Provide/perform ministry to senior staff.
- Be the senior religious support staff officer for the commander.
- Collect religious support reports from all chaplains (common template for all reports).

- Dissemination of operational information to chaplains in the area of operations.

2-12. The primary responsibility for religious ministry support in coalition operations remains with the national component commanders. The coalition force may assign the senior national component chaplain to the coalition force staff. This helps ensure comprehensive ministry cooperation and respect for any religious sensitivity of the HN and among the national components. This also helps ensure a balanced coverage among personnel and faith group requirements exists among the coalition force. The coalition chaplain has the following responsibilities:

- Recommends deployment of religious ministry teams.
- Advises the commander on religion, morals, ethics, and morale.
- Performs ministry according to his faith and country practices and standards.
- Ensures that all nations' religious support personnel receive professional assistance, program funding, logistics, and personnel through appropriate staff channels.
- Establishes and coordinates a coalition force religious ministry support plan to provide adequate religious ministry support to all elements of the coalition force.
- Recommends personnel replacement or rotational policies.
- Assists the command with humanitarian and disaster-relief programs.
- Ensures that detained people receive ministry and care appropriate to their needs.
- Prepares religious ministry support portions of the operation plan and operation order.
- Provides confidential and privileged communications in counseling for coalition personnel in support of stress management, morale, and early identification of critical personnel problems.

TEAM MINISTRY

2-13. Chaplains should communicate with one another, in order to provide both needed information and mutual support. Some chaplains may be limited by the laws/regulations of their nation with regard to the ministry they may perform. These limitations must be understood and respected. The concept of one nation's chaplaincy providing support for the chaplaincy of another nation should be applied. It is inherent for chaplains to pray for one

another and those deployed throughout the world in service to their countries.

2-14. Chaplains and those enlisted personnel assigned to assist chaplains are usually among the first to respond to the needs of those who experience the often traumatic and fearful nature of combat and military operations other than war. Chaplains in a combined environment can provide invaluable support to one another, promoting spiritual recovery, emotional and psychological support, counseling and spiritual direction. Chaplains respect the individual distinctive faith groups represented among our soldiers and within the chaplaincies and represent their faith tradition with honesty and integrity. Soldiers with individual religious needs should be accommodated as much as possible. Coalition partners may enhance their mutual ministry by sharing faith group chaplains.

2-15. Chaplains of each nation will deploy with sufficient supplies according to the standard established by their army. Chaplain resupply is the responsibility of the armies and the units they serve. Coordination for chaplain logistics will go through unit logistics officers.

CHECKLISTS

PERSONNEL

1. What areas come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
2. What are the special skill requirements (unit or individual) of the command?
3. What are the requirements for reserve component units, individuals, or a combination of both?
4. What is the personnel replacement and rotation scheme?
5. What language-qualified personnel are needed for augmentation? What training is available?
6. Has the G/S3 been consulted on required augmentation?
7. What mortuary affairs capabilities does the command have?

FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

1. What are the arrangements to provide or receive coalition support to the local procurement process?
2. Who is providing check-cashing funding for finance elements of other nations?
3. What are the limitations on the amounts of cash payments (including check cashing) that soldiers may receive in the AO? Who imposes the limitations?
4. How will coalition finance support provide currency exchange?
5. Will contracted subsistence support to the command affect entitlements to personnel?
6. What financial support weapon bounties and claims are needed?

RELIGIOUS SUPPORT

1. Is there a common template for operational reports?
2. Is there a Letter of Cooperation/Memorandum of Understanding for Combined Religious Support?
3. Is there a listing of Commonality and Limitations of each country?
4. Are there religious support lessons learned available for dissemination?
5. Is there a database of information on religious organizations, NGOs?

Chapter 3

Intelligence

Intelligence is the product of the processing of information concerning foreign nations, hostile or potentially hostile forces or elements or areas of current or potential operations. The intelligence function translates commanders' decision support requirements, drives information collection, analyses this information into intelligence and disseminates the product. The intelligence process supports the command functions of: planning, operations execution, targeting, force protection and mission support. It provides assessments of current and future adversary and neutral forces in the context of the situation and the commanders' intent.

MANAGEMENT

As every coalition is different, so too are the ways in which intelligence will be collected and disseminated within the coalition. Classification may present a problem in releasing information, but keeping as much unclassified as feasible will improve interoperability and trust within the coalition. The commander must know what his own and other nation's positions are on intelligence sharing. Early sharing of information during planning ensures that coalition requirements are clearly stated, guidance supports the commander's intent, and the coalition uses procedures supportable by other nations. All nations of the coalition should endeavor to produce information and intelligence in a format that is releasable to all members of the coalition. This should be easily accessible through systems of an appropriate classification.

National policies on intelligence affect the intelligence cycle. Each coalition must develop intelligence procedures tailored to the mission. These procedures must be responsive to the commander and deliver timely intelligence products.

PLANNING OPERATIONS

Intelligence provides the commander with an assessment of the adversary's most likely tactics, capabilities and intentions taking account the effects of the environment on both friendly and

adversary operations. To achieve this end, the intelligence staff uses the following principles of intelligence to guide them: command-led centralized control, systematic exploitation, objectivity, timeliness, relevance, accessibility, source protection, continuous review and responsiveness.

Centralized control is desired but frequently unattainable in coalition intelligence operations. As with command relationships, an organization may evolve that has some national assets and intelligence at the coalition's disposal, while others are under national control. Due to the nature of many intelligence sources, it is unlikely that nations will make all of their sources available for tasking by a coalition. This must be taken into account when planning coalition intelligence operations. Many nations will have a national intelligence cell at the coalition force headquarters through which tasking by and support to the coalition will flow. Integrating intelligence representatives and liaison personnel at each organizational level will improve access to intelligence capabilities. Matching intelligence requirements with available assets in an area of operations (AO) is the basis of a collection plan.

The intelligence effort must be unified. The commander must provide the G/S2 with a clear mission statement, commander's intent, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIR). Coalition nations' ability to gather and process intelligence varies widely. The command's collection manager(s) must account for this and task accordingly. The manager must gather information from various sources, fusing it to answer CCIR. Sharing and mutual support are key to integrating all resources into a unified system to best meet the command's intelligence requirements. The G/S2 prioritizes component intelligence requirements to meet the commander's needs.

THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

The intelligence cycle is a logical process of thought and action for identifying, and producing the intelligence required by a commander for planning and conducting operations. It comprises direction, collection, processing and dissemination.

The intelligence cycle is a sequence of activities whereby information is obtained, assembled, converted into intelligence and made available to users. This sequence comprises the following four phases:

Direction - Determination of intelligence requirements, planning the collection effort, issuance of orders and requests to collection agencies and maintenance of a continuous check on the productivity of such agencies.

Collection - The exploitation of sources by collection agencies and the delivery of the information obtained to the appropriate processing unit for use in the production of intelligence.

Processing - The conversion of information into intelligence through collation, evaluation, analysis, integration and interpretation.

Dissemination - The timely conveyance of intelligence, in an appropriate form and by any suitable means, to those who need it. The intelligence cycle is supported by several intelligence processes.

The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB). It determines the options open to the adversary or potential adversary; assess the likely order of their adoption; and determine gaps in intelligence and information possessed by the intelligence staff. It may be advantageous for the C2 to capture the essence of the IPB process and disseminate it beyond his own HQ.

The Intelligence Estimate. It is an appraisal, expressed in writing or orally, of available intelligence relating to a specific situation or condition with a view to determining the courses of action open to the enemy or potential enemy and the order of probability of their adoption. The intelligence estimate is essentially a by-product of the IPB and is normally disseminated as a graphical product.

Information and Intelligence Requirements . The IPB and Intelligence Estimate processes generate information and intelligence requirements. From these, with the assistance of the C2, the coalition commander identifies Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). These PIR are a sub-set of the Commander's Critical Information Requirements.

Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Management Requirements (CCIRM). This includes Collection Management and the Collection Plan. In collection management, it is the process of converting intelligence requirements into collection requirements, establishing, tasking or coordinating with

appropriate collection sources or agencies, monitoring results and retasking, as required. The Collection Plan is the plan for collecting information from all available sources to meet intelligence requirements and for transforming those requirements into orders and requests to appropriate agencies. These requirements are received, collated and matched to appropriate collection assets. The Collection Plan is constantly revised, monitored and updated to ensure that the collection requirements are being satisfied.

COMMUNICATIONS AND PROCESSING

The ability to gather, process, and disseminate information to many users requires effective lateral and vertical communications. The coalition must have a system that can transmit critical intelligence rapidly to units. This system may rely on the distribution of standardized equipment by the lead nation to ensure commonality. It should include liaison officers (LOs) at major intelligence centers to provide redundant communications to their parent nation and to determine and obtain intelligence uniquely suited for that nation's mission in time to exploit it.

EFFECTIVE COORDINATION

A coalition must compensate for the lack of standardization through coordination. The communications architecture is an essential element in this area. Areas requiring extensive coordination include the friendly use of the electromagnetic spectrum, use of space assets, the location of intelligence assets, and intelligence collection targets. Intelligence centers should be multinational, serving both the coalition and national needs. Such centers require the personal involvement of the coalition commander to make this a reality. The CCIR should serve as the focus of the intelligence effort, the answers to which can only be gained through effective coordination at all levels.

MOOTW SUPPORT

There are no standard templates for intelligence support to military operations other than war (MOOTW). Commanders must use the same approach for MOOTW as for war. In MOOTW, the nature and intensity of a potential threat can change even more suddenly and dramatically than in other operations.

MOOTW demand greater attention to the political, social, economic, and cultural factors in an AO than conventional war de-

mands. MOOTW expand intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) beyond geographical and force capability considerations. The centers of gravity frequently are not military forces or terrain. Cultural information is critical to gauging the potential reactions of the population to the operation, to avoiding misunderstandings, and to improving the effectiveness of operations. Changes in the behavior of the populace may suggest a needed change in coalition strategy. Biographic information and leadership analyses are key to understanding adversaries or potential adversaries, their method of operation, and how they interact with the environment. Knowledge of the ethnic and religious factions in the AO and the historical background of the hostilities underlying the deployment are vital to mission success. Such information helps to prevent unintentional mission creep and ultimately achieve the objectives of the operation.

The commander's understanding of the local infrastructure improves his situational understanding. While traditional reconnaissance elements still provide much information, local media, diplomatic mission personnel, and civilian agencies can provide information not available elsewhere. Special consideration must be given to the intelligence role that combat support soldiers have in MOOTW. Medical, transportation, civil affairs, psychological operations, observer, and engineer personnel, as well as soldiers in constabulary roles, are a superb source of information. These personnel routinely operate in the host-nation environment and can discern change within it.

The primary source of intelligence in MOOTW is normally derived from human intelligence (HUMINT). Interpreters, low-level source operations, elicitation, debriefs of indigenous personnel, screening operations, and patrolling are primary sources for assessing the economic and health needs, military capability, and political intent of those receiving assistance. Emphasize to all personnel the importance of always being intelligence conscious and provide basic guidelines to improve their intelligence-gathering capability.

Counterintelligence (CI) operations are a good source of security intelligence. (UN operations may inhibit collection of CI information.) This intelligence will aid in determining any threats to the coalition or its mission by advisarial intelligence personnel. It will aid in determining the host nation's willingness and ability to protect coalition resources and personnel. CI also provides input into force protection and operations security (OPSEC) estimates.

Approaches to civilian organizations, including the media, for information should be characterized by openness and transparency, including a clear statement of the use of the information, to avoid undermining cooperative efforts with such agencies. If you keep the media informed, they may become willing to exchange information with your staff.

INFORMATION VERSUS INTELLIGENCE

In coalition operations, national sensitivities may exist concerning disseminating intelligence. These sensitivities may even extend to the term intelligence. Consider the ramifications of labeling information as intelligence, especially when dealing with civilian organizations. In many cultures, intelligence connotes information gathered on the nation's citizens for use against them. Further, attempts to exchange information with civilian agencies may be stifled as they try to maintain neutrality by not being part of any perceived intelligence programs. To enhance exchanging information, the command should consider labeling unclassified data as "information" rather than "intelligence" and using "information gathering" rather than "all-source intelligence gathering."

INTELLIGENCE ARCHITECTURE

The intelligence architecture is made up of organisations, systems and the CIS that supports them. It enables the timely flow of critical information and intelligence vertically and horizontally across all formations. It is the responsibility of the lead nation in a coalition to provide the means of ensuring compatibility of information and intelligence across the intelligence architecture.

The intelligence architecture is defined by the Intelligence Support Plan. The Intelligence Support Plan sets out the manner in which the intelligence process supports a particular operation or campaign is to be conducted. The plan allocates intelligence elements to formations, details their tasking and identifies information and intelligence flows. The C2 staff is responsible for the development of the Coalition Intelligence Support Plan. The plan should take account of national intelligence cells and their linkage to the force.

Nations may deploy national intelligence cells to support deployed national elements of the coalition in order to meet national intelligence requirements. This should not preclude requests for information being made by the coalition headquarters to national intelligence cells. National intelligence cells should be

encouraged to meet coalition information requirements with information that is directly releasable to the coalition.

GEOSPATIAL DATA

Coalition operations require interoperable geospatial information and services (GI&S) data and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to and ensure all work is on a standard datum. A GI&S plan must coordinate all coalition products, to include access approval procedures and blending coalition assets into a cohesive production program. The following concepts should guide coalition intelligence operations:

- Adjust for national differences in intelligence concepts.
- Create an integrated coalition staff and intelligence center with representatives from all participating nations, within the national limits on intelligence sharing.
- View the mission from a coalition as well as a national perspective. Treat an adversary's threat to one member as a threat to all members.
- Agree to and plan for coalition intelligence requirements in advance of the operation.
- Plan complementary intelligence operations using all coalition intelligence resources, focusing on national strengths to enhance and overcome weaknesses in others.
- Exchange LOs to help reduce problems of culture, language, doctrine, and intelligence requirements.

CHECKLISTS

WARNING-PLANNING PHASE

1. What are the CCIR? Have the CCIR been clearly stated to focus the collection effort?
2. Does the coalition have an initial all-source cell and collection management cell? What are their positions in the deployment timetable?
3. Has the command conducted initial IPB, to include CI estimates?
4. Does the collection plan identify gaps in intelligence and incorporate all collection assets available for tasking?
5. Are there any unique relationships such as cultural, historical, or religious between coalition force partners and the adversary?
6. Have the cultural, social, political, and economic factors in the AO been included in the intelligence estimate?
7. Has the adversary's use of space assets been analyzed and have requests for denying militarily useful space information to the adversary been considered?
8. What is the intelligence architecture?
9. Has the command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system been established with the capability to rapidly disseminate to all participants the time-sensitive information for targeting or rapid reaction?
10. Do coalition forces have the capability to obtain or use intelligence and imagery data of the type commonly used by other coalition forces?
11. Have sufficient intelligence collection resources been placed under the control of the coalition or are the resources immediately responsive to the coalition?
12. Have efforts been made to pool intelligence and battlefield information into coalition centralized processing and exploitation centers?
13. What are the commander's requirements for intelligence briefings and products?
14. What is the CI plan?
15. Is there a single focus for asset management?
16. Are intelligence-gathering tasks assigned in accordance with the CCIR and the capability of the coalition equipment under coalition force control?

17. Has theater reconnaissance been undertaken to utilize available assets?
18. What are the coalition force intelligence gathering and dissemination capabilities and plans?
19. What are the procedures for sharing intelligence and information or releasing information policies? Are all coalition partners treated equally, considering compartmented and national sensitivities?
20. How is strategic intelligence shared among other forces?
21. What are the levels of interoperability between different intelligence information systems, to include database compatibility?
22. What are the manning requirements for the G/S2 staff including specialists, linguists, and LOs? What support is available from the G/S1?
23. What are the requirements for national intelligence centers?
24. What are the differences in availability and capability of national collection sources?
25. What are the requirements for rules of engagement governing intelligence aspects of the operation like wiretaps, HUMINT activities, or reporting?
26. What are the contingency plans when normal communication channels fail?
27. What are the coalition or force security procedures?
28. What links should be established with civilian agencies, to include the media? Have efforts been made to pool information with applicable civilian agencies?
29. Have HUMINT and CI operations been deconflicted?
30. Has the use of a HUMINT coordinator been considered?
31. Do the subordinate forces have collection assets available? What type? What are their capabilities and limitations?
32. Is the analysis effort prioritized?
33. Are intelligence liaison officers planned for in the operation?
34. Is the intelligence support package planned for with capabilities and limitations explained to supporting units?
35. Have intelligence staff attachments and detachments been planned?
36. Are training programs in place with a focus creating a common view of the enemy, enemy dispositions, order of battle, doctrine, capabilities, and intelligence systems?

37. Has an intelligence daily cycle been established to include reporting time lines, routine briefings and conferences, as well as collection management time lines defined?
38. Have intelligence-reporting formats been defined and rehearsed?
39. Does the deployment plan provide for early deployment of intelligence assets in theater?

NBC DEFENSE THREAT

1. What enemy nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) weapons, delivery means, and employment doctrine exist?
2. What infrastructure exists that could result in low-level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards, such as nuclear power plants, chemical industries, hospital radiotherapy sources?
3. What intelligence-gathering assets are available to monitor NBC threat changes?

PREDEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. Have the commander and staff been briefed on initial IPB?
2. Who are the host nation, civilian agency, and media contacts?
3. Have all intelligence systems, to include communications and information systems, been rehearsed?
4. Do subordinate forces have sufficient personnel to handle the amount of intelligence available?
5. Has all familiarization training on deploying intelligence systems been completed?
6. How will national intelligence cells exchange intelligence between coalition nations?

DEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. Has the intelligence architecture, including communications and information systems and supporting LOs, been established and tested?
2. Are links with host nation, civilian agencies, and the media functioning?
3. Has the collection management plan been refined?
4. Have the commander's briefing and intelligence product requirements been refined?
5. What additional specialist personnel or equipment is required?

6. What is the effectiveness of ABCA SOPs, especially for handover by the in-country force, operations of all-source cell, Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management and national intelligence cells, compatibility of intelligence communications and information systems, and protocols for the handling of HUMINT sources?
7. Was the actual process for national intelligence cells to exchange intelligence between ABCA and non-ABCA nations effective?
8. Have HUMINT and CI operations been deconflicted?
9. Have national intelligence summaries, imagery, and threat assessments approved for dissemination been shared? See Appendix B.

REDEPLOYMENT PHASE

1. What are the handover procedures for intelligence and physical architecture to the UN or other agencies, to include protocols for information exchange and handling, resettlement, or handover of HUMINT sources?
2. Are security procedures for the redeployment of personnel, equipment, and documentation adequate and properly supervised?
3. What are the requirements for and have necessary debriefings been conducted?

Chapter 4

Operations

Operations conducted by a coalition force require continuous coordination among coalition formations throughout the process. Coordination must occur in all phases of the operation from planning and deployment to redeployment. Coalition force commanders and their staffs should involve their coalition partners in each phase to the greatest extent possible. Exchanging information among coalition formations must occur as soon as possible.

PLAN EARLY

4-1. Coalition planning must start well before the actual operation and may use generic plans to build the specific plan around. Depending on the type and nature of operations to be conducted, planning may include governmental agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and private voluntary organizations. Predeployment, deployment, sustainment, and transition operations must be addressed in the plans.

STRATEGIC SCHEME

4-2. Military advice to the National Command Authorities is critical in the early stages of coalition planning to determine the strategic end state, objectives, and composition of the coalition force. Commanders should take every opportunity to ensure that political leaders fully understand the force's abilities and limitations and the time required to successfully plan and prepare for an operation. See Appendix A for further details on coalition capabilities.

4-3. Strategic planning begins with the mandate of a legitimizing authority, such as the UN or other multinational political coalition. The mandate is usually expanded by terms of reference (TOR) that establish for the military the limits of the mission, operational parameters, and specified authorities to conduct

operations—for example, the right to search civilians and seize property. Nations often supplement the TOR with national guidance for their own military force.

4-4. Whether in TOR or another form, the TOR guidance must be secured because it is the starting point for the military appreciation, analysis, and estimate process. This process, which precedes or is the first step in campaign planning, establishes a common understanding of the mandate among coalition partners. Without a common understanding, agreement on such factors as the role of the military, required forces, acceptable risk, and rules of engagement (ROE) cannot be formed.

CAMPAIGN PREPARATION

4-5. Thorough campaign planning is a vital factor in achieving unity of effort among coalition partners and civilian agencies. Processes must be simple enough for subordinate commands to agree to and understand. Habitual relationships in peacetime or sufficient training time before operations allows enough time for coalition planners to teach others the key points of the process and build consensus on the approach to the particular operation.

4-6. The mandate expresses political will. The TOR establish conditions for execution. The campaign plan translates these into military and political tasks, ways and means. Transition planning should be an integral part of campaign planning and done simultaneously with the other elements. This not only assists in the timely creation of the follow-on force, but promotes a smooth transition.

FORCE PROJECTION

4-7. Force projection, especially for a coalition, is critical to overall mission success. Coalition considerations must be known from the beginning to smoothly deploy forces and most effectively use lift assets. Coalition operations often have duplicated effort and unit capabilities. For example, before the UN Protection Force (UNPROFOR) deployed to the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, each participating nation performed its own engineer reconnaissance of the infrastructure resulting in duplications and omissions. The coalition force must coordinate and anticipate requirements during this phase to maximize capabilities and minimize resources. Planners must review national military contingents and host nation (HN) assets and agree on a division of labor.

4-8. Limited lift calls for maximizing its efficiency during deployment. This requires coordination with the HN so units do not deploy capabilities already available, such as port operations forces. In some cases, one coalition nation may transport another's forces to the area of operations (AO). Liaison officers from national contingents either must coordinate directly with the nation that is moving its forces, or with the coalition force headquarters if it is responsible for coordinating the movements with the nation providing lift. Chapter 5 provides additional information on logistics considerations.

MISSION FOCUS

4-9. Political considerations and the military capabilities of the coalition force are the most important factors in coalition operations. The commander must remain focused on the assigned mission and understand the reason each national contingent is participating. This determines the structure of the coalition force. Failure to understand it may cause the force to split into components operating under differing political direction. While agreeing to the overall goal, national contingents may have different ideas about how to execute the mission. The commander must recognize that political considerations may force him to choose an acceptable course of action, rather than the optimum military solution. The commander must remain flexible to adjust to unforeseen political influences, keep the coalition forces focused on the military objective, and avoid mission creep.

4-10. To overcome differences in doctrine, training, or equipment, leaders may assign selected functions to a smaller group of partners. For example, the coalition force could assign the mission of rear area security to home defense or police forces. Commanders may also entrust one member of the coalition force with air defense, coastal defense, or some special operation based on the threat force's special capabilities. They must recognize the strengths and differences of the cultures from which these forces come. Their decisions on employment, made with the military leadership, must consider the capabilities of the forces. Subordinate commanders may request control of forces that provide capabilities not organic to that nation's forces. The guiding principle is to allocate assets, as they are needed, while maintaining concentrated critical capabilities.

COMMANDER'S INTENT

4-11. The glue that binds a coalition operation together is the commander's ability to understand and integrate each nation's capabilities into a cohesive force. This requires the commander to clearly articulate his intent, so that each nation forms the same picture of the end state and the rules governing engagements. Given the language difficulties found in many coalitions, the commander's intent must be clearly and simply stated.

AUTHORITY TRANSFER

4-12. At some point, national units come under the control of the designated coalition commander. This process, known as transfer of authority (TOA), should be accomplished as early as possible. The timing of the transfer must be part of the initial negotiations that govern how the coalition forms. Planners must determine where the TOA—and the follow-on integration of units and headquarters—occurs. Early TOA enables the coalition commander to plan and conduct effective integration training of the coalition force.

4-13. The first option is to arrange TOA to the coalition force before deploying a unit's home station. Commanders can then control unit arrival sequence to best suit operational requirements and facilitate reception area base operations. This option also assumes clear political consensus, timely decisions on national participation, and a significant lead time for planning and setting up the coalition force headquarters.

4-14. A second option is to have TOA at an intermediate staging base en route to the operational area. Forces resolve problems in a secure area and deploy only when fully ready and in the sequence required by the coalition force.

4-15. The third option is to have TOA occur once forces arrive in the AO. This option leaves each nation responsible to deploy its contingent and prepare it for operations. It does not allow the coalition force positive control of deployment into the AO and is less than optimum if immediate combat is likely.

4-16. Whichever option is chosen, central coordination of deploying forces is preferred. Then reception operations are not done by repetitive crisis management. Centralized control of force flow provides the best support to the coalition's requirements and the best support to the forces.

4-17. Each coalition nation has a slightly different process for planning operations. If a lead nation commands the coalition, then the coalition planning process that will be used is that of the lead nations. At national contingent headquarters, nations will use their own planning process. The formats for QSTAG 506, *Operations Orders*, *Warning Orders*, and *Administrative/Logistics Orders*, are embedded in national doctrine.

PLANNING GROUP

4-18. Forming a coalition planning group (CPG) will facilitate the coalition planning process. When the coalition is formed, the commander decides on the organization and functions of the CPG as well as how the CPG and staff sections will interact during planning and execution. The CPG should conduct crisis action planning, be the focal point for operation plan or operation order development, perform future planning, and accomplish other tasks as directed. The CPG comprises representatives from appropriate coalition staff sections, national formations, and others deemed necessary.

INFORMATION AND SERVICES

4-19. Coalition operations require interoperable geospatial information and services (GI&S) data and data exchange capabilities. Whenever possible, participants should agree to and ensure that all work is on a standard datum. A GI&S plan must coordinate all coalition products, to include access approval procedures, blending coalition assets into a cohesive production program.

CHECKLISTS

OPERATIONS

1. What areas come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
2. Does the command have a capabilities brief and description or organizational chart of its own force and coalition forces?
3. What is the effect of national ROE and objectives on force composition and mission assignment? Additional information on ROE is found in Chapters 1 and 13.
4. Do ROE support force protection?
5. Does the force have a mechanism to identify potential threats to the force?
6. What nonlethal technology is available, how is the force trained to use it, and do the ROE authorize its employment?
7. What is the current situation in the AO?
8. Has the mission, to include commander's intent, been disseminated and do elements two echelons down understand it?
9. Has planning begun for transition to UN or other organizations that will take over from the coalition? See transition planning below.
10. What is the logistic situation?
11. What are the language and interpreter requirements?
12. What are the special customs and courtesies of the population in the AO or among coalition forces?
13. Does the command have a SOP that includes reporting requirements and procedures?
14. What units are available to the command and when are they available?
15. How will the command coordinate ground and air reconnaissance?
16. Has a common map database been established?
17. Have staff visits been coordinated?
18. Have visits by the unit commander to higher headquarters been coordinated?
19. What forces remain to support the coalition and how long are they required when redeploying or moving?
20. What national forces will interface with the joint movement control center?
21. What training is required before deployment?
22. What training is required once deployed?

23. Has a psychological operations (PSYOPS) program been developed to support the operation?
24. Have PSYOPS assets been requested?
25. Has a search been conducted to determine if extant documents are available to support operations or on a given capability? Both for military and nonmilitary agencies?

PLANNING

1. Has the deployment sequence been completed and validated?
2. Have the forces relying on strategic mobility for deployment and redeployment from other coalition members been included in the supporting nations deployment sequence?
3. Has the deployment plan deconflicted civilian agency and contractor transportation requirements to avoid competition for limited transportation infrastructure?
4. Has a risk assessment been accomplished as appropriate?
5. To what standard have coalition forces been trained?
6. Does the coalition force have a standard of training? Is a standard provided by an outside agency?
7. Have all coalition forces received the proper predeployment training?
8. What type of predeployment training have coalition forces received?

AVIATION PLANNING GUIDE

Force Structure

1. What is the coalition force structure?
2. What is the desired aviation organization for battle for early entry forces?
3. What is the desired order of arrival of aviation assets?
4. What types of readiness are coalition aviation forces and supporting elements, including strategic air and shipping for deployment, ordered to maintain and how long can they sustain this readiness?
5. What are the phases and flow of aviation units, capabilities, and materiel to the AO? Is this flow reflected in the coalition time-phased force and deployment list?

Command and Control

1. What is the commander's intent?
2. What is the coalition command and control (C2) structure for aviation?

3. Has a coalition aviation commander been appointed and what is his command, control, and coordination authority?
4. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aerial vehicle use?
5. Ascertain other nations' navigational equipment performance (input requirements, accuracy and susceptibility to attack). Will relative performance affect control and utilization of battlespace or control, direction, and coordination of fires and ROE?
6. Are nations' target designators interoperable? If not, what effect will this have and what can be done to avoid or mitigate these designators?
7. Where are the aviation coordination interfaces?
8. When will any changes of status of command and coordination measures take effect?
9. Is there a requirement for a coalition battlespace management cell?
10. What will be the coalition command relationships—for example, operational control versus tactical control—for aviation assets?
11. What are the command arrangements for the conduct of coalition deep operations?
12. What national aviation command arrangements are required to support the coalition command structure?
13. What are the national requirements for aviation liaison officers?
14. How will national communications and information systems be integrated?
15. What coalition bearer communications system will be used?

Mission and Tasks

1. What is the coalition aviation mission?
2. What are the coalition aviation specified tasks?
3. Are there any coalition aviation implied tasks?
4. What is the coalition command and control warfare plan? Can aviation enhance its effectiveness?
5. Are coalition aviation assets for communications and information systems protected against possible attacks?
6. What is the coalition nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) threat assessment? What can aviation forces do to identify and monitor hazards, including contamination?

7. What is the coalition plan for recovery of critical aviation equipment, facilities, and resources?

Constraints and Freedom of Action

1. Coalition headquarters should establish constraints on coalition aviation output—including legal, acceptance of risk, financial, and human factors (physical, moral and cultural)—and technical media activity or effect.
2. Is there nations' capability confirmed for night movement and finding, fixing, and striking the enemy?
3. Do nongovernmental organizations and civil-military cooperation activities affect the aviation plan?
4. Coalition headquarters should establish environmental and AO characteristics likely to impact on aviation equipment and coalition interoperability such as terrain, altitude, and climate. Subsequently, has the coalition headquarters reviewed participating nations' capabilities and aircraft performance (weapons, payload and radius of action) in light of environmental conditions?
5. Has the coalition headquarters established the mapping, global positioning system, and geographic datums to be used and ascertained consequent implications for coalition interoperability and coordination of fires.

Control of the Electromagnetic Spectrum

1. Has a coalition aviation electronic preparation of the battlefield (EPB) been prepared? Is the EPB continuously being reviewed, developed, and disseminated throughout the coalition aviation chain of command?
2. Is there a coalition aviation electronic warfare (EW) targeting process or surveillance and target acquisition plan (STAP) and battle damage assessment process? What countersurveillance control measures are in force?
3. What factors will frustrate coalition control of the electromagnetic spectrum? Are all nations' cryptographic driven systems interoperable?
4. What coalition EW assets are available to support aviation maneuver?

Information and Intelligence

1. Has a coalition aviation intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) been prepared? Is the IPB being reviewed or developed and disseminated continuously, throughout the coalition aviation chain of command?

2. What is the coalition's information and intelligence collection and dissemination plan? How is this information collected from and disseminated to aviation?

Protection

1. What are the coalition aviation protection requirements?
2. Is there a coalition aviation EW targeting process or STAP? What countersurveillance control measures are in force? Have limitations been placed on using white illumination to facilitate aviation night vision goggle (NVG) operations?
3. Compare national and individual aircraft EW and defensive aid capabilities against threat and aircrew individual protective equipment against laser and NBC hazards. Is the coalition C2 structure capable of delivering threat information and essential codes and preflight messages? Are fills and threat library information for identification, friend or foe systems; missile approach warning equipment; and infrared or radar jammers available? Are means and media to move and load codes and fills interoperable?
4. Are combat identification systems available to all allies? If not, can they be made available and embodied to enhance allied freedom of action? Are nations' combat identification systems interoperable? If not, what coalition joint anti-fratricide measures are in place?
5. Are coalition plans, procedures, and training (scale, radius of action, quality, quantity, and timely) suitable for likely combat search and rescue as well as recovery of encircled forces?
6. What NBC protection measures (individual and collective) are afforded to other nations' air crew, ground crew, and technical personnel? What effect will adopting protective measures or using protective equipment have on coalition aviation operations (quality, quantity, and sustainability)? Are nations able to decontaminate aircraft, to what standards and what effect will residual NBC contamination or hazards have on operational output?
7. Coalition headquarters should establish differing national approaches to risk management. How have these approaches affected coalition operational output? What is the impact on the planning cycle and battle procedure?

Weapons Effects and ROE

Coalition headquarters should establish contributing nations' aircraft weapons' capabilities and performance. What are their effects on ROE?

Doctrine

1. What level of aviation doctrine standardization has been achieved within the coalition? What does the lack of standardization for coalition aviation operational output imply?
2. Is there a coalition aviation mechanism for capturing lessons learned and informing nations to ease continuous review of equipment performance; doctrine; tactics, techniques, and procedures; and other vital information?
3. What coalition agreements or standards are available to enhance operational output? What scope is there to exploit existing agreements or standards or to develop new ones?

G1/G4

1. What aircraft are coalition partners bringing to theater?
2. Confirm nations' aircraft performance, given ambient conditions in the AO (payload and radius of action).
3. Has a coalition, host nation, or theater facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the coalition headquarters aviation level?
4. What is the logistics structure?
5. What arrangements will be in place for coalition resupply of common user items? If fuel and munitions are included, is the system appropriate for the planned operational activity level?
6. Does the coalition lead nation's criterion for fuel quality and fuel system icing inhibitor meet national equipment requirements?
7. What will be the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?
8. Has the coalition headquarters established the support capabilities and levels of service—to include national environmental restrictions—that nations' aviation forces can offer each other?
9. Coalition headquarters should establish national aircrew duty time specifications. What impact will this have on planned coalition aviation surge and continuous operational output?
10. Are there national fleet management issues that will reduce expected coalition operational output?
11. Are there coalition support issues that will affect the nations' efficient aircraft fleet management resulting in reduced operational output?

Finance and Budget

1. What are the coalition funding arrangements for aviation mission or tasks?
2. Are procedures in place to capture costing and expenditure information?
3. Are coalition and national funding authorities clearly understood throughout the coalition?

Training and Collective Performance

1. What scope is there for coalition aviation mission rehearsal and war gaming? Is appropriate simulation equipment available; can it be made available; can an appropriate environmental database be developed?
2. Are there any coalition mission-specific training requirements and training responsibilities?
3. What scope exists for coalition forces using coalition, national, or host nation training facilities, particularly simulation and live firing training space?

HN Issues

1. Coalition headquarters should coordinate the HN provision of aviation services.
2. Coalition headquarters should establish HN perceptions and cultural issues that will likely impact coalition aviation operations.

NBC DEFENSE

1. What is the NBC warning and reporting structure in-theater? What communication nets will be used to pass NBC information?
2. How are the high-value assets such as biological detectors allocated among coalition partners and deployed in-theater?
3. What national caveats exist for deploying biological detection assets?
4. Have armies adopted a standardized individual NBC protective dress state?
5. Has an operation exposure guide been established to manage radiation exposures?
6. Have armies adopted standard guidance for interpreting hazards identified by chemical detectors?
7. Are sampling standard and identification protocols in place to verify first use of weapons of mass destruction (WMD)?

8. Which national laboratories will be used to analyze collected samples for first use and treaty violations?
9. What medical pretreatment or prophylaxis do coalition partners have for NBC protection such as vaccinations, auto-injectors, and anti-emetics? What are national policies for their use?
10. How will the psychological impact of potential enemy WMD use be countered?

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Chapter 5

Logistics

UNITY OF EFFORT

5-1. Unity of effort is essential to coalition logistic operations. All nations must work together to identify requirements, prioritize them, and share capacity to provide the most effective and efficient support possible. This requires coordination not only between contributing nations, but also with civilian agencies in the area of operations (AO). Executing coalition logistics should be a collective responsibility of the coalition force. When possible, mutual logistic support should be developed for economy of effort. Coalition logistics should be flexible, responsive, and predictive and provide timely sustainment throughout the entire coalition force. The coalition logistic plan should incorporate the logistic requirements capacities and capabilities of all contributing forces to ensure sustained and synchronized execution. Consensus on coalition logistic issues and requirements should be formed early. Commanders should thoroughly comprehend coalition forces' doctrine and have good relations with subordinate commanders and civilian leaders, as well as cooperation and continuous coordination between all elements providing logistic support and the operational elements. This must begin during the initial planning phase and continue through the operation's termination and redeployment of the contributing nations back to their countries of origin.

5-2. Commanders should handle logistics on a coalition basis, with as much centralized control over logistics as interoperability permits. Creating a single coalition logistic command provides economy of assets and system efficiency. Even if coalition participants for national command reasons insist on maintaining a national logistic structure, assigning a lead for logistic responsibility precludes duplication of effort. The G/S4 should establish a planning group to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between coalition forces. The *ABCA Coalition Logistics Handbook*, which provides detailed information on the conduct of logistic operations, and guidance in optimizing the use of available logistic resources, supports the coalition commander and the G4 in this effort. The *ABCA Coalition Logistics*

Handbook also discusses the following special CSS capabilities: reconstitution; reception, staging, onward movement, integration, redeployment; urban operations; and operations in an NBC environment.

5-3. Commanders should identify the funding authority to support coalition forces as early as possible and develop procedures to prevent an adverse impact on operations.

5-4. Coalition operations can complicate logistic support and reduce the degree of flexibility inherent in a national logistic system. Although responsible for logistic support of its national forces, not all nations have deployable logistic capabilities. Such nations then become dependent on other nations for all or part of their support. In these cases, the coalition force must be prepared to provide the required support to both military and civilian organizations. Support may include both deployment and sustainment. For deployment, close liaison with theater airlift command and control (C2) can assist in coordinating approval and facilitating airlift once approved. When support is required, close liaison will ensure funding lines are clearly identified.

RESPONSIBILITY

5-5. The responsibility for providing logistic support to national forces ultimately resides with their nations. Some nations will not relinquish authority over their logistic assets. However, to require each nation to perform all logistic functions separately would be inefficient and hinder the coalition force's ability to influence operations logistically. Varying degrees of mutual logistic support among coalition partners must be planned to complement partners' capabilities and minimize weaknesses. Equitable cooperative arrangements and mutual assistance among coalition nations in the provision and the use of logistic resources, including medical, should ease the individual burden.

5-6. The coalition commander should be given the responsibility to coordinate the overall logistic effort in all phases. In some cases, the coalition force may exercise control over the national logistic units, in other cases it will act only as the coordinating authority. The degree of authority will depend on existing agreements and arrangements negotiated with contributing nations. The coalition force may delegate to subordinate commanders the level of authority granted to him by the individual nations. The coalition force commander may establish a logistic coordination or control center headed by a senior logistic

coordinator or commander to coordinate common logistic support within the AO.

5-7. Early on, the coalition needs to establish a planning group to define the extent of interoperability that may exist between coalition forces while designing the organization for the coalition, the command and support relationships, and the support relationships. The G/S4 should determine what, if any, logistic authority for a common support capability that national authorities have delegated to the coalition force and whether that authority meets the coalition's requirements. The coalition force's delegated or directed authority does not negate national responsibilities for logistic support or discourage coordination. Nor is it meant to disrupt effective procedures and efficient use of facilities or organizations.

LOGISTICS SUPPORT OPTIONS

5-8. There are four methods of executing co-operative logistics in a coalition, and all may be singularly or concurrently. Regardless of the methods used, it is imperative that national decisions and commitments to lead or participate in such arrangements be provided early during the planning cycle. The choice of method is to be based on an analysis of effectiveness and efficiency, and the degree of multinational support will be depend largely on the time constraints, the degree of standardization and any bilateral or multilateral agreements in place between contributing nations. The four methods are:

- National Responsibility. In this option, each nation takes full responsibility for providing its own support. Short notice deployments and the initial phases of operations benefit from this method as it is the most simple to arrange, and carries the least risk.
- Lead Nation. One nation, due to the size, scope or nature of its force contributions takes the lead in co-coordinating and/or providing a broad scope of logistic support with reimbursement from other supported nations.
- Role Specialization. Logistic support may be provided by a single nation or service component within a key functional area or supply class taking advantage of economies of scale and national strengths in areas where other nations may have capability gaps. A nation or service component assuming this responsibility will provide the logistic

support with its own resources with reimbursement from other supported nations.

- Multinational Integrated Logistic Support. Building this support framework would take time, and is likely only exist in a mature theatre. The elements would include:
 - Multinational Integrated headquarters and staffs. Lead nation Force headquarters, Component headquarters, Theatre Support Commands, and formation support commands will require individual augmentation from all nations to fulfill their multinational functions.
 - Multinational Logistics Elements. These are multinational logistic formations; battalions or companies assembled from the formed elements of two or more nations, under one commander.

5-9. Multinational or cooperative logistics is a means not an end. The more complex the multinational arrangement, the higher the risk of failure. The more tactical the level of support, the higher the risk, and combat service support to formations and below is likely best left to the nations themselves.

SUPPORT RELATIONSHIPS

5-10. Support relationships can be created between forces to create a “supporting” and “supported” relationship without the need to establish command relationships between them. The support missions understood by all nations are direct support and general support.

- direct support the support provided by a unit not attached to or under the command of the supported unit or formation, but required to give priority to the support required by that unit or formation.
- general support: that support which is given to the supported force as a whole and not to any particular subdivision thereof.

PLANNING

5-11. The aim of logistics planning is threefold: to create and sustain tempo, to extend the potential to take greater operational risk, and to increase the endurance of the force. The *ABCA Coalition Logistics Handbook* describes common planning in some detail. Proper planning will identify when operational pauses may be required to mitigate or eliminate unsupportable

overextension or premature culmination due to logistics. Early involvement of the logistic staff is critical to the success of the operation and ensures that sustainment requirements balance with capabilities. To facilitate planning, personnel must be identified and made available as early as possible. Concurrent logistics and operations planning is critical. Plans should be developed with all participating nations to achieve logistic efficiencies. The coalition headquarters should determine the logistic support needed to uphold the commander's plan and provide estimates of these requirements to national units. Planners should share partial planning data with prospective partners to facilitate parallel planning. Staffs should evaluate the level of standardization and interoperability among participating nations; determine differences in logistic doctrine, capabilities, methods for computing requirements, stockage levels, organizations, and communications and information systems; and account for these differences in the plan. They should also account for differences in language, values, religious beliefs, economic infrastructure, nutritional standards, and social outlooks, which may impact logistic support to coalition forces.

5-12. The logistic plan should assign responsibilities and procedures for providing logistic support within the coalition force and the task organization of coalition logistic units. It must also address the requirements of the local population, if they are being supported. When planners quickly determine what support the civilian populace requires, they help develop that supporting plan.

5-13. The plan must ensure all appropriate environmental reviews are completed in accordance with national, international, and host nation (HN) agreements; environmental laws; policies; and regulations. The G/S4 must coordinate with legal and other appropriate staff officers to ensure that current environmental conditions—such as water and soil contamination—epidemiological surveys, and disease risk assessments comply with legal requirements and that data has been recorded for future remediation.

5-14. When planning to acquire real property and lease facilities, planners must determine what facilities and land are needed and whether they exist in the AO. Priorities for property acquisition should be established taking into account when the property is needed.

5-15. Logistic planners must determine the coalition force resupply requirements and make recommendations to the

commander on the best method and type of servicing recommended.

HOST NATION SUPPORT

5-16. Support from the host nation will be extremely valuable to the coalition. Therefore, the coalition command must analyze the physical infrastructure in the HN to determine what facilities and services are available to support the command and how they can reduce the logistic footprint. Evaluation should include location and what the command will be allowed to use. AOs without a functioning government may only be able to provide limited support. HN support may be integrated into the logistic structure of the command to ensure their effective use. Commanders should be prepared to assume all logistic responsibilities in the event this support is curtailed. Allocating this support is based on command priorities. Nations must agree on whether a coalition force will have the authority to conclude HN support arrangements on behalf of participating nations, or whether prior national approval is required.

5-17. HN support expertise (legal, financial, acquisition, medical, and administrative) should be centralized within the logistic staff for both identifying and procuring HN support. This ensures that the command's requirements are known and prevents competition between partners.

5-18. Local procurement efforts may be beneficial to the HN, but they may also undermine important goals. Local suppliers may have important political connections. An otherwise innocent procurement decision may have significant political meaning in the HN. Procurement may bid up local prices with negative impacts on local groups or civilian agencies. These effects may influence the attainment of the end state and the timing of withdrawal. Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) and civil affairs (CA) personnel are trained to identify and coordinate HN support and can provide valuable assistance to the logistic staff in this area.

5-19. Nations should agree on whether a coalition force will have the authority to conclude HN support arrangements on behalf of participating nations, or whether prior national approval is required. Likewise, the letting of contracts will remain a national responsibility unless the coalition is authorized to do so by the contributing nations. In doing so the cost sharing arrangements, and reimbursement policies must be agreed upon. The coalition command should be involved in this process. Agreements with the

HN should include the authority for the command to deal directly with the HN for HN support. The command should develop a list of current HN agreements. The command legal advisor helps to negotiate HN support agreements. Agreements should be negotiated for local contracting, currency exchange rates, local hire wage scales, and customs regulations.

5-20. The logistic staff should evaluate current HN contracts between the HN and civilian agencies in the AO and evaluate their effectiveness. Then, the staff must determine the best lead agency (military or civilian) to negotiate and contract for HN support. Figure 5-1 provides HN considerations for support.

Item and Considerations	
1. Accommodations a. Billeting b. Offices c. Stores and warehouses d. Workshops, vehicle parks, gun parks e. Medical f. Hardstands g. Fuel h. Weapons and ammunition i. Transportation, including aircraft j. Firing ranges k. Training areas and facilities l. Recreation areas and facilities m. Laundry and dry cleaning facilities	5. Communications a. Local b. International c. Security
2. Weapons and Ammunition a. Security b. Storage c. Collection or delivery	6. Finance. Payment for— a. Accommodations, supplies, communications, equipment, local labor maintenance, medical, and movement facilities b. Emergency facilities c. Personal facilities
3. Local Labor a. Method of hiring b. Method of payment c. Administration	7. Fuel a. Aircraft b. Vehicles c. Ships d. Method of Delivery e. Storage f. Interoperability of refueling equipment g. Common use of refueling installations
4. Medical a. Normal facilities b. Emergency facilities c. Reciprocal national health agreements d. Evacuation of casualties	8. Rations a. Fresh b. Pack c. Potable water
	9. Translation a. Interpreters/language specialists b. Translation of documents

Figure 5-1. Host Nation Considerations

Item and Considerations	
<p>10. Maintenance</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Accommodations b. Vehicles c. Ships d. Equipment e. Roads (including snow clearance) f. Fixed- and rotary-wing aircraft g. Provision of assembly areas h. Damage control i. Emergency facilities for visitors' vehicles and equipment j. Evacuation of disabled vehicles and equipment 	<p>12. Supplies and Equipment (other than ammunition, fuel, or rations)</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Common use items
<p>11. Movement</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Airheads <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Alternates (2) Facilities (3) Ships (4) Equipment (5) Refueling b. Ports <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Alternates (2) Draft (3) Bunkering/fueling (4) Repair c. Road and rail movement <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Personnel (2) Equipment (3) Security (4) Traffic control d. Pipeline movement 	<p>13. Water</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. Production/purification capability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Municipal (2) Other water treatment systems b. Distribution capability <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Trucks (2) Pipeline (3) Hoseline c. Storage capability d. Receipt and issue capability e. Available water sources <ul style="list-style-type: none"> (1) Wells (2) Surface (3) Subsurface f. HN water quality standards
	<p>14. Transportation Equipment</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. HN military vehicles, equipment, ships, aircraft b. Locally hired vehicles and equipment, ships, aircraft c. Policy on drivers and handlers for b above

Figure 5-1. Host Nation Considerations (Continued)

MUTUAL SUPPORT AGREEMENTS

5-21. Participating nations have the option of developing support agreements, bi-and multi-laterally with other nations for provision of logistic support to their forces. The coalition headquarters must be given an overview of these arrangements to understand their implications on the coordination of the overall support plan. These agreements are done at national government level.

THIRD PARTY LOGISTICS SUPPORT SERVICES

5-22. Third party logistics support services (TPLSS) is the use of preplanned civilian contracting to perform selected logistic support services. In a coalition, this support is a national

responsibility to implement. However, nations should share vendor information, lessons learned, and contacts with the coalition command and other nations. The coalition headquarters must understand the role of this enabler, just as any other logistic capability. TPLSS is the 'preplanned' element of organized, advanced preparation and that distinguishes it from ad hoc contracting activity that is widely conducted by nations both in peace and during operations.

AD HOC CONTRACTING

5-23. Ad hoc contracting is a means to acquire locally available logistic support for immediate use by deployed units at staging locations, interim support bases, or forward operating locations. Contracting may be conducted with foreign governments, commercial entities, or civilian agencies. Contracting does not replace HN support or existing supply systems where these systems are available or operational, but when properly used, is an essential tool for supporting the mission. Deployments in remote AOs are most likely to require contingency contracting support. The commander or his G/S4 must prioritize available contractor resources in the AO. Contracting can—

- Bridge gaps that may occur before sufficient organic or HSS is available.
- Reduce dependence on a nationally based logistic system.
- Improve response time and reduce footprints.
- Augment the existing logistic support capability for critical supplies and services.
- Be used to transition from military to civilian-controlled operations.
- Manage limited resources by using contractors instead of calling up reservists.
- Reduce demands for military resources and improve relationships with the populace.

5-24. Contracting is valuable where no HN support agreements exist, or where HN support agreements do not provide for required supplies or services. Contracting can be expensive. Funding guidance is required and close coordination with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support is essential. Upon mission termination or redeployment, the command must close out all records or files and submit them to the appropriate authorities for disposition. The same economic considerations apply for contracting as for HN support (see above). Contractors external to the AO may be used, but the logistic staff must

consider such issues as taxes, cross border fees, and landing fees. The command must have a comprehensive contracting support plan to ensure the force uses proper legal methods when getting supplies and services. The plan should meet the following requirements:

- Include procedures and policies for contracting support in the AO, assuring full use of HN support and contracting resources.
- Ensure contracting receives consideration during logistic planning and becomes part of the operation order (OPORD) or operation plan (OPLAN).
- Identify subordinate command's requirements for HN support or contracting support.
- Develop an area database containing all available data concerning local resources from area studies, foreign service personnel, civilian agencies, and locally developed logistic support data. It should also contain a list of contracting and HN support agreements in the AO. A source of information on current global complex emergencies is the UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs' relief Internet site (<http://www.reliefweb.int/>) that contains maps and current field reports from civilian agencies.
- Address security performance measures and quality control aspects of contracting to include inspection of goods received to ensure against sabotage, poisoning, or other terrorist-style actions.

5-25. The command should establish a coalition contracting office (CCO). The CCO, working with the coalition logistic procurement support board (CLPSB), coordinates contracting requirements for and assists in acquiring local logistic support. It is staffed by highly trained contracting personnel, linguists and interpreters, and representatives from all the coalition forces. If more than one contracting office is required, contracting officers will be assigned to provide support on an area basis. The contracting office should—

- Provide coordination and cooperation among nations that maintain parallel contractors in the AO to avoid competition for local services and obtain the best prices through consolidated requirements.
- Coordinate with CA, finance and accounting activities, and legal support.
- Provide contracting representatives to subordinate logistic organizations.

BROAD-BASED ORGANIZATION

5-26. The logistic organization should include specialists from all logistic functional areas. Some or all logistic responsibilities will follow single-nation channels so the logistic staff should have representatives from each coalition nation. Representatives should have sufficient expertise in logistics to interface with their national channels.

5-27. The G/S4 should assign one officer to prepare the daily logistics status report (LOGSTAT) for the command. One point of contact becomes the command expert for logistic status and issues. The capabilities of any civilian agency logistic organizations should be incorporated into the LOGSTAT. The LOGSTAT should clearly identify what critical shortfalls exist and are anticipated, what actions are being taken to resolve the shortfalls, and if any assistance is required.

5-28. The coalition headquarters must establish effective logistic coordination and communications links with coalition forces and civilian agencies. Links to civilian agencies should be established in cooperation with the civil-military operations center (CMOC). Much of this coordination can be accomplished when establishing a logistics readiness center (LRC) that will—

- Monitor current and evolving coalition force logistic capabilities.
- Coordinate logistic support and maintain total assets visibility.
- Prioritize logistic resources.
- Determine logistic sustainment requirements for planning and execution.
- Provide a central point for logistics-related boards, offices, and centers.

5-29. Additionally, the following positions in the LRC require personnel with coalition experience:

- Postal personnel to coordinate transportation of bulk mail.
- Supply and contracting officer(s) with appropriate warrants.
- Explosive ordnance disposal personnel for mines and other unexploded ordnance.
- Transportation officer(s).
- Materiel support officer(s)
- Customs official(s).
- Engineer(s) or facility manager(s).

- Bulk liquid specialists—water and POL.

BOARDS, OFFICES, AND CENTERS

5-30. While not all of the following organizations may be required, the logistic staff should evaluate the need for each to assist in coordinating logistic efforts:

- Coalition petroleum office coordinates POL planning and execution, as well as the supply of common bulk petroleum products.
- Coalition civil-military engineering board (CCMEB) establishes policies, procedures, and priorities for civil-military construction and engineering requirements.
- Coalition facilities utilization board evaluates and reconciles requests for real estate, facilities, interservice support, and construction in compliance with the CCMEB.
- CLPSB coordinates contracting operations with national authorities and HN for acquiring supplies and services.
- Coalition materiel priorities and allocation board modifies and recommends priorities for allocating materiel assets for coalition forces.
- Coalition movement center establishes taskings and priorities for movement and coordinates the employment of all transportation assets in the AO, to include movement into and out of the air- and seaports of debarkation.
- Coalition mortuary affairs office plans and executes all mortuary affairs programs and provides guidance to facilitate mortuary programs and maintain data.
- Coalition deployment agency deconflicts the movement of forces into the AO and create the deployment plan.
- Coalition contracting office(s) is explained in detail in the contracting section above.

TRANSPORTATION

5-31. The G/S4 must understand the roles and functions and capabilities of all mobility assets used in deployment, sustainment, and redeployment of the coalition force. Accurate, up-to-date transportation information is vital to effective operations. The coalition force must be able to track coalition assets into and within the AO. Logistic flow priorities should be established in the initial assessment and continually updated during operations.

5-32. Commanders must integrate the strategic and theater movement requirements to prevent congestion at seaports and

airports. Establishing an in-theater hub maximizes cargo throughput and improves theater distribution. Nations must provide movement data to the coalition force theater movement control system. This data provides information for the direct delivery or for transloading passengers and cargo and can be used to deconflict strategic movements with other theater movements.

5-33. Civilian agencies, in an effort to help by shipping relief supplies, will likely cause transportation “choke points” en route to and within theater. A G/S4 link with the CMOC may help provide a solution to this type of circumstance.

5-34. The coalition force should designate a Director of Mobility Forces (DIRMOBFOR). The DIRMOBFOR is normally a senior officer familiar with the AO with an extensive background in airlift operations. The DIRMOBFOR serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the AO and for other duties as directed.

WASTE AND DISPOSAL PLANS

5-35. Inadequate waste disposal plans cause conflicts with public and international law and increase costs. Waste and disposal must be addressed in the OPLAN or OPORD from initial planning to redeployment. When cost becomes paramount during redeployment, waste and disposal are particularly important. These commodities may require disposal:

- Usable property and scrap.
- Munitions list and strategic list items.
- Captured and confiscated weapons.
- Hazardous materiel and hazardous waste.
- Rations and food.
- Ammunition, explosives, and dangerous articles.
- Radioactive materiel.
- Medical waste.
- Classified items.
- Drugs, biological substances, and controlled substances.

UN SYSTEM

5-36. The UN logistic system requires member states to be self-sufficient at the unit level, normally for 60 to 120 days. This allows the UN to organize a logistic structure, acquire real estate and facilities, and establish contracts and local memorandums of understanding and letters of assist to provide support for the coalition. Once established, the UN logistic structure provides continuing support through a system of lead nations, civilian con-

tracts, a UN force logistic support group (FLSG), or a combination of the above.

5-37. A UN survey and assessment team will evaluate operational requirements and develop planning data for sustainment. When participating in UN missions, the command should send a logistic representative with the UN survey team if possible. The coalition force should coordinate with UN forces to improve the unity of effort and reduce potential conflicts.

LEAD NATION CONCEPT

5-38. A lead nation is a nation assigned to provide the UN support to other nations under a reimbursable agreement. The lead nation would assume responsibility for providing an agreed upon list of logistic support for itself and other troop contributing nations. Supported nations then rely on the lead nation for the agreed level of support. National contingents must have representatives within the lead nation's logistic organization.

FORCE LOGISTICS SUPPORT CONCEPT

5-39. In most cases, the UN will ask a member state, or states, to form a FLSG. The FLSG incorporates logistic units from participating nations. A state accepting the FLSG role will be responsible, along with the chief logistic officer at the force headquarters, for establishing local contracts to support the force. Even with an FLSG, member states remain responsible for unique national elements of resupply—such as repair parts, clothing, food, and major end item replacements—unless an agreement is established between nations to provide this support. This would be on a reimbursable basis under either a wet or dry lease arrangement agreed before deployment between the UN and the contributing nation's government.

CIVILIAN CONTRACTOR CONCEPT

5-40. The UN will attempt to economize the logistic support by using civilian contractors. The goal is to achieve the most economical logistic organization that both meets the demands of the force and releases military manpower for redeployment. Force headquarters will coordinate the process. UN contracting does not fall under the logistic division but rather the purchasing and transport services division. The UN procurement process can be bureaucratic and slow. It is decentralized, with each agency using its own procedures. The interagency procurement services office of

the UN development program is slated to create a standard procurement system.

5-41. The UN chief administrative officer (CAO) does not work for the force commander, but reports to the special representative of the secretary general. The civilian logistic infrastructure, to include the budget officer, reports to the CAO. Logistic problems will not be resolved unless the CAO is involved in the process. Maximum liaison between military and civilian counterparts is required to allow synchronization of effort.

5-42. The UN normally coordinates such logistic areas as bulk supplies and services. National standards may exceed UN standards such as consumption rates, space requirements, and safety levels. Sophisticated coalition military equipment may require different standards of support than what the UN has agreed to provide or fund. UN standards must be clearly understood concerning level and quality of support provided and funded. Logistic support that significantly extends beyond what is outlined in the UN agreement may not be reimbursable. The coalition must be prepared to bring its own support in the areas where the UN-provided support is deficient.

MEDICAL

5-43. Effective C2 of medical operations is critical to mission success. The coalition commanders should appoint a command surgeon and staff a medical coordination center with representatives from participating nations. The center will facilitate coordination of HSS, regionalization, standardization and interoperability; review HSS plans; and coordinate the evacuation of casualties to non-national medical facilities.

5-44. The commander and the senior medical officer of each nation must understand the legal limits concerning the use of non-national medical treatment facilities and supplies, especially blood, by their nations' forces. Exchanging blood between nations is a sensitive issue and must be coordinated as early as possible. Mutual medical support must be in accordance with existing legal authorities. Coordination for any lead nation, role specialization, or mutual support authority must be addressed during the coalition planning process. Casualty evacuation, especially outside the AO, and the use of non-national medical facilities requires careful planning and an agreement.

HEALTH SERVICES

5-45. How HSS is delivered in the field may be a factor in a particular nation's decision to participate. Differences in medical standards, customs, and training require careful coordination and planning. The command must assess HSS requirements and capabilities both quantitatively and qualitatively and provide guidance to enhance the effectiveness of HSS through shared use of assets. See Chapter 11 for details.

COMMAND SURGEON

5-46. The command surgeon is responsible to the commander for medical support in the AO. He should have direct access to the commander as chief medical advisor. He must understand the medical capacities and capabilities of all coalition nations. The surgeon should plan to deploy medical personnel early so they can establish, monitor, and evaluate command of HSS. The surgeon's staff should have representatives from all nations.

5-47. The surgeon prepares the HSS plan and medical annex to the OPLAN or OPORD. This plan should define the scope of medical care to be delivered in detail, allocate resources, determine the number of medical personnel required to staff the coalition surgeon's office, and detail the medical resources required to support the operation. The surgeon coordinates HSS provided to or received from coalition forces and the appropriate reimbursements. He advises the commander on HSS to the operation; intra-theater rest, rotation, and reconstitution; preventive medicine; dental and veterinary medicine requirements; and other medical factors that could affect operations.

5-48. In addition, the surgeon—

- Informs the commander on the status of HSS units and assistance required by and provided to the civilian populace and coalition nationals.
- Reviews health programs of civilian agencies in the AO and advises on humanitarian and civic assistance activities within the AO.
- Establishes and coordinates a comprehensive medical logistic system for medical materiel, blood, and fluids.
- Supervises the activities of any medical cells, boards, and centers established by the coalition. For example, he would supervise a patient movement center to identify bed space requirements and the movement of patients within and out of the AO.
- Coordinates medical intelligence support for HSS organizations.

Logistics

- Develops a preventive medicine program, to include pre- and postsurveillance programs; evaluates infectious disease risks; and determines the requirements for an entomologist for vector control.
- Provides technical assistance and advice to the CMOC.
- Ensures liaison is established with each nation's surgeon.
- Resolves the coalition medical equipment and supply requirement since medical items frequently require long-lead times and special handling.

CHECKLISTS

SUPPORT AND CAPABILITIES

1. What areas will come under coalition control and what areas will remain national issues?
2. What logistic support is the available?
3. What are the unique logistic capabilities of each member of the coalition? Understanding these capabilities is essential to effective and efficient logistic planning and support.
4. What are the logistics requirement for the coalition and its troop contributing nations?
5. What is the anticipated duration of operations and when do they begin?
6. What logistic preparation of the AO products and information are available and how can it be shared with the nations?
7. What are the logistics information requirements and who will find the information? Are there information requirements for logistics that the commander might consider for CCIR?
8. Have the relationships between the coalition and national logistics elements been clearly defined? Are the command and support relationships clear?
9. What legal restrictions do national laws impose on logistic support?
10. Do national legal authorities permit the provision of logistic support among coalition nations?
11. What logistics support options best suit each CSS function for coalition operation?
12. Which nation are responsible for what support to other nations?
13. Are mutual logistic support agreements in accordance with existing legal authorities?
14. Is there a need to establish multinational or integrated logistics staff, formations or units and, if so, has its organization been determined? Can it be manned, equipped, and validated prior to employment?
15. What is the system for property accountability?
16. What are the special clothing and equipment requirements that may require a long lead time to obtain, for example, non-military supplies or riot control gear?
17. What are the procedures for providing support such as transportation, housing, and meals to diplomats and distinguished

- visitors? What coordination is there with the joint visitors bureau on this?
18. What is the system for preventing fraud, waste, and abuse?
 19. How does the command assess logistic requests, requirements, and actions to ensure that they are valid with respect to the operation and authority given to the command?
 20. How does the command adequately secure logistic assets?
 21. Will the command establish a common retail store? A well-stocked retail store will not only provide personnel support items, but will also serve as a morale booster.
 22. How will the intelligence staff gather information from logistic sources such as truck drivers and engineers?
 23. What are the mutual support agreements procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations?
 24. What are the common supplies and services that one nation or a multinational organization might provide?
 25. Is there an agreement that authorizes forces to exchange mutual logistic support of goods and services and that accounts for the amounts received?
 26. Will there be, and if so when and how, a transfer of authority over national logistic assets to the coalition?
 27. What is the coalition's authority to redistribute or cross-level logistic assets and services under routine and emergency conditions?
 28. How will the command maintain national asset accountability from the national sustaining base to the front line units?
 29. How will the command ensure compatibility and interoperability of communications and information systems, to include automated data processing interfaces, between the coalition and national logistic support systems?
 30. How will the command prioritize, allocate, and use common infrastructure capabilities (ports, airfields, roads) to support military and civil operations?
 31. What are the existing standardization agreements that will facilitate coalition logistic support?
 32. What is the logistic support structure? How will it identify capabilities and responsibilities of contributing nations?
 33. Does the coalition have acquisition and cross-serving agreements among coalition nations?
 34. Does the logistic structure have one officer in charge or a main point of contact for C2 of contract personnel?

35. Have contractor procedures been established to allow total coalition participation in contracts let by national personnel and used by coalition personnel?
36. Is there a need to establish a coalition logistic command or element and, if so, has its manning been determined?
37. Has the relationship between the coalition and national logistic elements been clearly defined?
38. Have lead nations been designated where appropriate?
39. Have logistic reporting procedures been established throughout the force?
40. Do all forces know and comply with the infrastructure repair plan?
41. Is there duplication of effort in the support plan for the operation?
42. What is the composition of coalition logistic command or element? Have coordinating centers been established for movements, medical, contracting, infrastructure engineering, and logistic operations?
43. What is the transitional plan for operational assumption of in-place contracts, equipment, facilities, and personnel belonging to another agency or alliance?
44. Are coalition legal representatives available to provide counsel on international law and legal agreements?
45. Has a certification process been established?
46. Have standards been identified for logistic support and is there a plan to conduct, inspect, and ascertain compliance with these standards prior to deployment?
47. What is the division of responsibilities between coalition, national, and HN logistic support?
48. How will each class of supply be handled?
49. What are the coalition forces' capabilities to receive, store, and issue dry cargo, fuel, and water to include water production and purification capability?
50. Do coalition forces have the means to communicate requirements to the coalition logistics management center?
51. What materiel handling equipment is available within the coalition?
52. Do coalition forces have a basic load of ammunition and what are their ammunition procedures?
53. What are the coalition force's special requirements to include tents, cots, reverse osmosis water purification units, laundry, latrines, and batteries?

54. What are the military assistance program requirements for coalition forces?
55. What is the best method for providing potable water? Be sure to consult with engineers, medical personnel, and other staff officers on this issue. Using bottled water may have an added advantage of enhancing troop morale.
56. What is available in lessons learned databases for unique requirements, planning factors, and potential problem areas?
57. Has liaison been established with other coalition nations and civilian agencies to obtain the most up-to-date logistic information on the AO?
58. What are the personnel augmentation requirements and equipment needed for mission support?
59. Have basing rights and diplomatic clearances critical to mobility been secured?
60. What are in-theater capabilities and resources of civilian agencies in the AO?
61. What current agreements exist with other participating nations that provide for logistic support? Does this include agreements governing logistic support with representatives of other nations?
62. What quality controls have been established for all coalition-provided services and supplies such as POL, water, and food? How will they be monitored?
63. What are the procedures to ensure in-transit visibility (ITV) at all transportation nodes? Lack of ITV will cause loss of confidence in the supply system and lead to unnecessary reordering, further clogging the supply lines.
64. For UN operations, what standards are to be followed concerning support?
65. What is the support plan for redeployment of forces, materiel, and equipment?
66. What logistic infrastructure, materiel, capabilities, and equipment will remain in country for use by follow-on forces or organizations?
67. What are the possible environmental impacts upon the AO? What reconstruction, clean up will be required?
68. What will be the environmental implications for the coalition? What must be done to clean personnel, equipment and material prior to redeployment?

FUNDING

1. Has it been determined if or to what extent operational-related expenses will be reimbursed from common funding or sources external to national funding by the participating nations?
2. Has funding been identified to support operations or to reimbursement expenditures and what are the limits on funding authority?
3. What is the availability of and procedures for use of common funding for contracting, establishing coalition headquarters, and general or common support?
4. What are the procedures to account for and reimburse nations for services and supplies exchanged between nations, to include replacement-in-kind procedures?
5. Has the probable cost of the coalition operations been determined? Is the probable cost acceptable?
6. What are the funding requirements for renting facilities to support operations?
7. Does the command have funding codes from all coalition nations? What methods and documentation are required to record all expenditures?
8. How will the command capture cost associated with providing support to coalition forces?

HOST NATION SUPPORT

1. What policies and agreements are required to facilitate the best use of local resources, including HNS and local contracting, to prioritize requirements, reduce competition and thus inflation, and reduce the negative impacts on the local economy?
2. Has HN support been evaluated to determine the logistic support available to include law enforcement, sanitation, medical services, facilities, storage, and materiel?
3. What are the capabilities of existing infrastructure, to include water treatment plants, power stations, reservoirs, and bulk and retail fuel storage? Engineers or facility managers can provide critical information on the availability of existing facilities.
4. Have negotiations to secure support either been established or completed?
5. What is the impact of obtaining HN support on the host country's national economy?
6. What are the possible environmental impacts on the HN providing this support?

7. What specific technical agreements—such as environmental clean-up; customs duties and taxes; and hazardous material and waste storage, transit, and disposal—must be developed to augment agreements that may have been concluded with HN support?

MAINTENANCE

1. Do coalition forces have maintenance support?
2. Do coalition forces have the means to order and receive repair parts?
3. Do coalition forces have wreckers, stake and platform trailers, or heavy equipment transporters?
4. Do coalition forces have communications repair facilities?

MEDICAL

1. Are medical facilities identified to support the operation?
2. Are chemical weapon threats known, and are troops and medical facilities prepared to cope with their possible use?
3. Are graves registration and mortuary procedures in place to service coalition casualties to include recognizing cultural differences in dealing with casualties and procedures and policies for local civilians? Coordinate with national commands.
4. What are the other coalition element capabilities, both air and ground, and procedures for medical evacuation, both intra- and intertheater, that coalition forces will be supported by, or required to support?
5. What are the sources of medical supply and payment options?
6. What are the procedures for tracking patients and coordination requirements for return-to-duty transportation?
7. What forces have organic Echelon I, II, or III combat health support? For those that do not have this support, what level will other coalition forces provide?
8. What are the policies and procedures for medical personnel to use on coalition forces Echelon II through V medical treatment facilities to provide medical treatment for coalition forces?
9. Who is eligible for medical care, both routine and emergency, and under what conditions? This must be coordinated with other staff sections.
10. What is the blood policy and distribution system?
11. What is the mass casualty response plan?

12. Is there a medical surveillance program to follow disease trends and detect disease outbreaks?
13. What is the public health policy?

NBC DEFENSE

1. What infrastructure exists for assisting coalition forces to deal with low level radiation or toxic industrial chemical hazards like medical treatment facilities or detection equipment supply houses?
2. Is the necessary nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) protection, detection, and reconnaissance equipment available to troops to counter the threat?
3. Are adequate theater stocks of chemical over-garments available?
4. What plans exist to protect locally hired civilians against weapons of mass destruction threats?

TRANSPORTATION

1. What is the coalition transportation command structure?
2. What are the available coalition air and sea lines of communications?
3. What are the movement priorities for coalition operations?
4. What are assigned airlift and sealift capabilities and allocations? Keep in mind the requirements to support both military and civilian agencies.
5. What are the requirements for and capabilities, limitations, and availability of airfields, seaports, and inland transportation systems in the departure, intermediate staging, and objective areas? What resources are required for new construction or necessary improvements to existing facilities?
6. What is the coalition reception, staging, onward movement, and integration process?
7. What is the ability of the HN to receive personnel and equipment at ports and airfields?
8. What are the access rights in the AO? The command must coordinate diplomatic efforts to arrange for support, country, and diplomatic clearances, overflight rights, and basing for forces in transit from one locality to another.
9. What is the capability of transportation systems to move forces once they arrive in theater?
10. Do coalition forces have tactical rotary- and fixed-wing assets for intratheater supply?

11. Who supplies transportation supply throughput for coalition forces from the coalition logistic center?
12. Do coalition forces have transportation assets for moving troops?
13. How will the command control movement into and out of air-fields and seaports?
14. How will transportation facilities be shared with civilian agencies and contractors?

Chapter 6

Transition Planning

USE OF TRANSITION PLANNING

6-1. Most coalition operations end in a transition from coalition control to UN, host nation military, or host nation civilian control. Transition planning is an integral part of operational planning and must extend throughout the planning process and into operations and redeployment. It must be as detailed as any other planning. It should be done in cooperation with the organization taking control. The coalition force will be most vulnerable during transition and redeployment; therefore, force protection is likely to be the most important consideration.

6-2. Staff sections should highlight in the transition plan how they are organized and how they function. Checklists should be developed to facilitate the transition. Staff sections should recommend how to organize the incoming staff. Staff sections should develop turnover files. These often are forgotten in the haste to redeploy.

6-3. Planning should link the departure of the force with the anticipated arrival of the organization taking charge. Knowledge of the incoming force or organization is paramount. Funding can be a major obstacle, especially when working with the UN. Another concern in working with the UN is to ensure that enough UN staff and officers are deployed for the transition process. The incoming headquarters should co-locate with the coalition force headquarters. This will enhance the assimilation of the incoming staff with the outgoing staff.

TYPES OF TRANSITIONS

6-4. Described below are the types and some of the key planning aspects of transition operations:

- **Coalition military relief in place** (with normal military operation emphasis on military mission and force protection). The relief would use doctrine from lead nation relief in place.
- **Coalition military to civilian or UN authorities** (with normal UN civilian support type mission with emphasis on

military support to the civilian and UN missions). Both the military and authorities would need to—

- Identify the conditions suitable for handover.
- Identify and agree on responsibilities for command and control of operation.
- Identify the necessary phases of the operation.
- **Escalation or de-escalation by UN chapter or the rules of engagement (ROE) situation** (with the situation's military aspects of escalation or de-escalation with emphasis on ROE and force protection). The command must—
 - Confirm coalition members.
 - Identify national differences of ROE.
 - Identify force protection issues.
- **Coalition military handover to a national government.** A withdrawal conducted in peaceful conditions having achieved the desired end state with emphasis on fully handing over responsibilities and allowing the government to assume power and authority. The command must identify those capabilities that will need to remain behind to ensure that a seamless handover of authority and support to the government occurs.

CHECKLIST

1. What are the issues and key coalition force events (past, present, and future) that lead to the current situation?
2. What work is required to accomplish the transition?
3. What force or agency is taking control of the operation?
4. Has contact been made with counterpart planning staffs?
5. Who will determine when the transition begins or is complete?
6. Who will fund the transition?
7. What is the coalition force policy for transition and redeployment?
8. What issues exist before the transition and what potential issues will exist for the transition force once the transition is complete? Have these been provided to the incoming transition force?
9. Has the coalition force's end state been accomplished? If not, will this have a bearing on the incoming force?
10. If there is a new mission, can the coalition force assist the incoming force in preparing for it?
11. What coalition forces, equipment, or supplies will remain behind?
12. What is the disposal plan to facilitate disposal of commodities?
13. What will be the command relationship for coalition force during the transition and for those coalition forces remaining behind?
14. Who will support coalition force remaining behind?
15. What will be the communications requirement for the coalition force remaining behind?
16. Will the coalition provide communications capability to the incoming force?
17. Can information be shared with the incoming transition force or organization?
18. Will new ROE be established for the transition?
19. Will ongoing operations be discontinued or interrupted?
20. Will the incoming force use the same headquarters facility as the coalition force?
21. What agreements have been developed with civilian agencies that may impact the incoming force?
22. Have points of contact been developed for the incoming force?
23. What will be the requirement for liaison personnel?
24. Will sufficient security be available to provide force protection? Who will provide it?

25. How will the turnover be accomplished?
26. Who will handle public affairs for the transition?
27. What command and control arrangements are for departure?
28. What are the customs, immigration, and quarantine implications for the incoming and outgoing forces?
29. What are the identities of all stakeholders and their level of involvement in the transition operation?
30. What are the outgoing coalition forces' obligations with respect to employed local labors and contractors?
31. What are the incoming coalition forces' obligations with respect to employed local labors and contractors?
32. What are the functions and appointments that the outgoing force should maintain during the handover period?
33. Is it the intention to proceed with the transition upon achieving military end state or not?
34. What ongoing obligations has the outgoing force left to the incoming force?
35. Is this an in-contact (hot) transition operation or an administrative (cold) peaceful transition operation?

Chapter 7

Communications

ESTABLISHING COMMUNICATIONS

7-1. The capability to communicate and communication assets are fundamental to successful coalition operations. Key to successful communications is the preparation during planning. The mission analysis and assessment process provide the opportunity for the communications officer to identify communication requirements and evaluate in-country capability.

INITIAL CONSIDERATIONS

7-2. Many communication issues can be resolved through equipment exchange and liaison teams. Continual liaison between communication planners helps alleviate interoperability issues. Communication requirements vary with the mission, composition, and geography of the area of operations of the coalition force. Interoperability is often constrained by the least technologically advanced nation. The coalition force should address the need for integrated communications among all forces early in the planning phase of the operation.

7-3. In coalitions, a primary communication link is between the lead nation and the national contingent headquarters. In military operations other than war (MOOTW), it is equally as important to be able to communicate with civilian agencies. The transition to follow-on units, commercial communications, or to agencies like the UN must be considered early in the operation.

7-4. The coalition should plan for adequate communications to include the ability to communicate using voice (secure and non-secure), data, and video conferencing. It needs a deployable communication capability and enough trained operators for sustained operations, with multiple means of communications to avoid the possibility of a single point failure.

ADEQUATE EQUIPMENT

7-5. In addition to problems of compatibility and security, many units do not have enough communication equipment to meet

mission requirements. During initial planning stages, planners must identify required communications, issues of spectrum management, and controls on access to information. Liaison teams, with adequate communication gear, can reduce the severity of some of these problems. Satellite communications may be needed to provide communications between the higher-level coalition force headquarters. Other space-based services, such as weather reporting and use of global positioning systems, may also be needed.

7-6. Communications planners must anticipate these requirements during initial planning, evaluate host nation communication resources, and integrate them into the communication plan. However, these means must satisfy operational requirements. Common user communications may be used for operations, provided there is sufficient capacity to ensure acceptable reaction times. Although many combined communication doctrine and procedures exist, there are some differences in operating standards.

AGREED PROCEDURES

7-7. The following list of publications includes agreed ABCA communication procedures:

- ACP 100 - *Allied Call Sign and Address Group, System Instructions and Assignments.*
- ACP 110 - *Tactical Call Sign Book.*
- ACP 113 - *Call Sign Book for Ships.*
- ACP 117 - *Allied Routing Indicator Book.*
- ACP 121 - *Communications Instructions - General and Supplements.*
- ACP 122 - *Communication Instructions Security.*
- ACP 123 - *Common Message Strategy and Procedures.*
- ACP 124 - *Communications Instructions - Radiotelegraph Procedures.*
- ACP 125 - *Communications Instructions, Radio Telephone Procedures.*
- ACP 126 - *Communications Instructions, Teletypewriter Procedures.*
- ACP 127 - *Communications Instructions - Tape Relay.*
- ACP 128 - *Allied Telecommunications Record System (ALTERS).*
- ACP 129 - *Communications Instructions - Visual Signaling Procedures.*

- ACP 130 - *Communications Instructions - Signaling Procedures in the Visual Medium.*
- ACP 131 - *Communications Instructions, Operating Signals.*
- ACP 132 - *Field Generation and OTAD of COMSEC Key in Support of Tactical Operations and Exercises.*
- ACP 133 - *Directory Services.*
- ACP 134 - *Telephone Switchboard Operating Procedures.*
- ACP 135 - *Communications Instructions, Distress, and Rescue Procedures.*
- ACP 136 - *Communication Instructions - Panel Signaling.*
- ACP 150 - *Recognition and Identification Instructions - Air, Land, and Sea Forces.*
- ACP 160 - *IFF/SIF Operational Procedures.*
- ACP 165 - *Operational Brevity Code.*
- ACP 167 - *Glossary of Communications - Electronic Terms.*
- ACP 168 - *Pyrotechnic Signals.*
- ACP 176 - *Allied Naval and Maritime Air Communications Instructions.*
- ACP 177 - *Land Forces EW Instructions.*
- ACP 178 - *Maritime EW Instructions.*
- ACP 179 - *EW Instructions for Air Forces.*
- ACP 180 - *EW Instructions General (Replaces 177/178/179).*
- ACP 190 - *Guide to Frequency Planning.*
- ACP 191 - *Ionospheric Sounder Operations.*
- ACP 198 - *Instructions for the Preparations of ACPs.*
- AHP 1 - *Allied Navigation Information in Time of War—"Q" System.*
- APP 1 - *Allied Voice Procedure Manual.*
- ATP 1, Volumes I and II - *Allied Maritime Tactical Instructions and Procedures.*
- ATP 4 - *Allied Spotting Procedure for Naval Gunfire Support.*
- ATP 10 - *Search and Rescue.*
- AXP 1 - *Allied Maritime Above Water Warfare Exercise Manual.*
- AXP 3 - *Allied Naval Communication Exercises.*
- COMBEXAG V - *Combined Exercise Agreement Between the Navies and Air Forces of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.*

CHECKLIST

1. What areas come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
2. What is the requirement for portable communication devices such as cell-phones?
3. Will commercial companies establish telephone service for use by coalition forces?
4. If the coalition force establishes a coalition visitors bureau, what communication capability is required?
5. Do national laws require agreements defining payments for using the information systems networks or military satellite communication assets?
6. Who is responsible for funding additional communication capability?
7. Will nations be expected to provide communication capability to other nations' military forces or civilian agencies?
8. What are the plans for expanding the communication system, if needed?
9. What is the policy on morale calls? Who supports them?
10. What steps have been taken to ensure procedural compatibility?
11. What is the common identification friend or foe procedure?
12. What are the data-link protocols?
13. What is the communication equipment capability between forces?
14. Has coordination been accomplished regarding frequency assignment?
15. What command and control (C2) systems are required to support diminishing coalition force presence?
16. Will command channels be used only for execution and national channels for reporting status and requesting support?
17. Are there a means and a plan to provide all forces with a common tactical picture?
18. Do coalition partners with a lesser C2 capability have appropriate liaison officers, interpreters, operators, and maintainers to enable adequate C2 within the coalition?
19. Is there a policy or plan for the control, release, and dissemination of sensitive information and cryptographic materials, especially to civilian agencies that may require some access to classified material to accomplish their missions?

20. Has the language exchange point been determined?
21. Are there sufficient interpreters available for both planning and execution?
22. Has the terrain and environment been considered while planning for the command, control, and communications (C3) network?
23. Has the rapid dissemination of targeting materials been provided for?
24. Have arrangements been made for staff communications?
25. Have common databases been provided for?
26. Has the nation most capable of providing an integrated, interoperable C3 network been selected to serve as network manager for the coalition C3 infrastructure?
27. Have arrangements been made to allow contract host nation employees to work on C2 staffs without exposing them to automated data processing and classified information used in daily operations?
28. Has the coalition established a standard datum? Will all products be on that datum?
29. Is there a coalition geospatial information and services (GI&S) plan that designates all mapping, charting, and geodesy GI&S products for use?
30. Have the command relationships, locations of headquarters and the type of services required such as tactical satellite, telephone, facsimile, AM, and FM been determined?
31. What are the frequency requirements and planning ranges for equipment?
32. Have frequencies been requested from the coalition communication coordinator?
33. How will the coalition conduct spectrum management? In MOOTW, this must account for frequencies already in use by civilian agencies.
34. How will the coalition achieve automated data processing software compatibility to facilitate file transfers?
35. How will the coalition achieve communication interoperability? Will the system satisfy communication requirements from the national authorities to the lowest information exchange requirement?
36. If civilian agencies have separate communication networks, and the coalition force provides security for these agencies, how will they request assistance during emergencies?

37. How will the coalition ensure adequate redundancy? Multiple assets must be available and used during operations to ensure information flow.
38. How will the coalition handle noncompatibility of communication equipment among organizations and coalition forces?
39. What communication support will be provided to civilian agencies? Will it be provided through the civil-military operations center?
40. How and when will the coalition establish its communication architecture?
41. How will the coalition account for and utilize communication networks established by civilian agencies, to include commercially leased circuits, commercial satellite services, as well as high frequency and very high frequency radios?
42. How will the coalition address the need for secure communications?

Chapter 8

Training

The success of the operation may well depend on the training the command does before and during the operation. Most components of the force likely will not have trained together or if they have, it will be of limited frequency. The importance of training together should therefore be stressed to participating nations. Training is the best way to develop an effective coalition force formed from national units. It should be a continuing process for both personnel and units. The predeployment and in-theater training programs should be based on assessments of the mission and area of operations (AO). The command may be presented with national contingents from different cultural backgrounds that are at different states of training. The more that coalition forces and civilian agencies that participate in the training, the more the command will learn about how these organizations think and operate. This participation will also enhance team building and staff member's perceptions of one another.

STRENGTHS AND WEAKNESSES

8-1. Training teaches the participants about the strengths and weaknesses of coalition partners and about how to integrate them into an effective force. Training should be conducted at all levels of command and include all staffs. Before deployment, command post exercise simulations can be used for staff training and solving problems in the coalition force command structure.

8-2. Training continues once the command arrives in the AO, based on specific requirements and functions. Training should include exercises to rehearse operational tasks, the operation order, or new missions. They may also be used to advertise the command's capabilities and serve as a deterrent.

8-3. Command post and field training exercises can be used with simulations. Distributed simulation can enhance training between remotely separated forces. A comprehensive training program helps commanders identify weaknesses and helps build troop cohesion. Whenever possible, commanders should arrange seminars to develop or stress SOPs and tactics, techniques, and procedures. Force protection requirements may impact on areas available for training. Some exercises and training such as live firing will require host nation approval.

IDENTIFY PROBLEMS

8-4. Some nations possess doctrine that fully addresses strategic, operational, and tactical issues. Other nations focus primarily on the tactical level. Some nations prepare for highly mobile, mechanized operations while others focus on counterinsurgency or light infantry operations. A few nations stress rapid, agile operations—emphasizing ingenuity, creativity, and improvisation within the commander’s intent—while some nations regard this approach as too risky. Because of these variations, commanders must carefully consider which units are best suited for particular missions. When the situation permits, commanders should seek to improve the contributions of national forces by providing training assistance and sharing resources such as radios, vehicles, or weapons. Training assistance and dedicated liaison teams can not be overstated, particularly when working between a force with digital war fighting capability and a force that works with analogue means. Coalition exercises are essential to training and doctrine refinement. Coalition exercises should include robust logistic play to exercise logistic support mechanisms and identify possible problems in providing logistic support with forces from other nations.

PROPER CONDUCT

8-5. All it takes is one soldier or small unit acting improperly to undo weeks of effort building goodwill in an AO. Inappropriate individual statements and actions may offend forces from other nations or civilians in the AO, creating negative perceptions. Individuals should not assume that others would not understand derogatory statements made in their own language, slang, or gestures. Training on proper personal conduct and continued emphasis may prevent this.

8-6. All personnel, especially junior and noncommissioned officers, should receive instruction on understanding the methods of operating in coalitions. Commanders must—

- Ensure that all augmentees participate in their host formation training events.
- Provide training to all units or individuals that receive equipment from other nations.
- Evaluate training opportunities offered by each nation, such as training offered by the 7th US Army Training Command in Germany, the UN Operational Training and Advisory Group in the United Kingdom, and the Swedish Armed Forces International Center.

These all have extensive experience in training units and individuals for operations.

PREDEPLOYMENT FOCUS

8-7. Predeployment training should focus on the following areas:

- Individual military skills.
- Individual and collective preventive medicine procedures and practice.
- First aid, both individual and “buddy.”
- Terrorism awareness and prevention.
- Education lessons in the coalition structure, mandate, chain of command, and division of responsibilities to include non-governmental organizations and international agency structures.
- Unit training (rehearsals should be mandatory) based on projected operations.
- Team building and staff training to include training with coalition forces and nonmilitary organizations.
- Liaison officer training to ensure that personnel are knowledgeable representatives
- Customs, culture, religious practices, political situation, geography, economic, and historical background of the situation and population of the AO.
- Adversary capabilities.
- How to effectively communicate to the public through the news media.
- Negotiation and mediation.
- Language training, especially key phrases. Although ABCA armies all speak English not all operational terms have the same meaning to each army.
- Situational awareness to include mine, booby trap awareness, and weapons recognition.

- Rules of engagement.
- Law of armed conflict.
- Crowd control and the use and employment of nonlethal riot control agents.
- Employment and use of nonlethal weapons capabilities.
- Training drivers and vehicle commanders on in-theater driving conditions and skills.

IN-COUNTRY TRAINING

8-8. The coalition commander may need to evaluate the level of training of each troop contributing nation (TCN) to determine if it is ready to commit to the AO or if additional training may be necessary prior to commitment. This training may be related to cultural or other issues related to the host nation.

CHECKLIST

1. What predeployment training has been conducted by TCNs?
2. Have designated troops from a TCN trained previously with other troops from TCNs?
3. What predeployment or in-country training will be necessary before the commitment or deployment of troops into the AO?
4. What level of training is posed by each of the TCNs?
5. Does each of the TCNs have some form of training for liaison officers or will the coalition headquarters need to establish a program?

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Chapter 9

Civil-Military Cooperation

As with many areas discussed in the *Coalition Operations Handbook*, civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) does not have a single doctrinal focus that all the nations share. For example, some nations see CIMIC and civil affairs supporting the commander's mission. Others believe that CIMIC is wider than that; that it supports the commander's mission in so far as it helps the military troops play their part in a wider response to a crisis. For the later nations, CIMIC funding may come from other government departments rather than from their defense establishment. Therefore, CIMIC for those nations does not support the military mission alone.

INTRODUCTION

9-1. The concept of CIMIC was developed to allow the commander to interface effectively with all parts of the civilian environment within the joint operations area (JOA). CIMIC is the relationship of interaction, cooperation and coordination, mutual support, joint planning, and constant exchange of information at all levels between military forces, civilian organizations, agencies, and in-theater civil influences needed to achieve an effective response in the full range of operations.

9-2. It is a function of operations conducted by staff who are fully integrated into headquarters at every level. CIMIC activity begins at the highest political levels, becomes integrated into the campaign plan, and should remain coherent throughout the operational levels. CIMIC, therefore, contributes to achieving the over-all political mission as well as the commander's mission.

9-3. The campaign plan, as agreed by all coalition nations, will direct the commander on his legal obligations to the civilian sector, prioritize the major tasks, provide the necessary funding, ensure consistency across zones of national responsibility within the JOA, and outline the relationships with the strategic decision makers.

Commanders should consider the CIMIC dimension of the operation early in the planning process.

9-4. This chapter aims to provide commanders and staffs with an overview of various terminology, general principles for using CIMIC, the key military and civilian players, and assistance in the overall planning and support of CIMIC operations. It focuses on the military role while acknowledging a greater overall role for these types of operations.

PURPOSE

9-5. The purpose of CIMIC is to establish and maintain full cooperation between the military and civilian populations and institutions within the JOA. This helps to create civil-military conditions that maximize advantages for commanders in accomplishing their missions. The long-term purpose of CIMIC is to achieve mission success and then create and sustain the conditions to support a lasting solution to a crisis. CIMIC is the interface between military and civil authorities, agencies, and populations and must be considered integral to any military operation.

DEFINITIONS AND TERMINOLOGY

9-6. Each of the ABCA armies has adopted different terminology as this area has developed. The US uses *civil-military operations* (CMO), which is not the same as CIMIC. While both terms share similarities, they also differ. CIMIC is a NATO term used by the United Kingdom, Canada, and Australia but is understood by the US Army. Both definitions have been provided. The current NATO definition of CIMIC is currently being revised. The following definitions provide some of the differing terminology used with CIMIC operations:

- **Civil-military operations (CMO).** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces, governmental and nongovernmental civilian organizations and authorities, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile operational area in order to facilitate military operations, to consolidate and achieve operational US objectives. Civil-military operations may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of the local, regional, or national government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations. Civil-military operations may be

performed by designated civil affairs, by other military forces, or by a combination of civil affairs and other forces. The US term *civil-military operations* is most closely related to the NATO term *civil-military cooperation*.

- **Civil-military cooperation (CIMIC).** The coordination and cooperation in support of the mission, between the NATO commander and civil actors, including national population and local authorities, as well as, international, national and nongovernmental organizations and agencies (NATO MC 411).
- **Civil affairs.** Designated Active and Reserve component forces and units organized, trained, and equipped specifically to conduct civil affairs activities and to support civil-military operations. (The US term *civil affairs* is most closely related to the NATO term *CIMIC groups*.)
- **Civil affairs activities.** Activities performed or supported by civil affairs that (1) enhance the relationship between military forces and civil authorities in areas where military forces are present; and (2) involve application of civil affairs functional specialty skills in areas normally the responsibility of civil government to enhance conduct of civil-military operations.
- **Civil-military operations center (CMOC).** An ad hoc organization, normally established by the geographic combatant commander or subordinate joint force commander, to assist in the coordination of activities of engaged military forces, and other United States government agencies, nongovernmental organizations, and regional and international organizations. There is no established structure, and its size and composition are situation dependent. The US term *civil-military operations center* is most closely related to the NATO term *CIMIC center*.

SPECTRUM OF OPERATIONS

9-7. CIMIC applies to and has utility across the full range of operations from general war, through peace support operations, to providing relief in humanitarian and disaster relief operations. CIMIC must have coherence throughout the operational levels so the agreed civil-military policy at the strategic level is correctly reflected and interpreted down through military command chains and to the civilian organizations concerning CIMIC activities conducted at the tactical level.

MANAGEMENT OF COOPERATION

9-8. Fundamental to successfully applying and conducting CIMIC is the establishment and maintenance of sound working relationships with organizations operating within the civil sector. These relationships range from high-level interorganizational to less formal relations that stem from ongoing working interactions. These relationships will form the bedrock on which effective cooperation can occur.

9-9. It will be neither practicable nor necessary to have the same degree of cooperation with all civil agencies. Many mechanisms and activities will underpin this process. These may include general liaison, regular meetings, and standing for an agency collaboratively manned by both civil and military representatives.

9-10. These mechanisms and activities will facilitate various levels of cooperation ranging from basic information sharing to integrated planning.

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

9-11. The headquarters CIMIC staff should carry out the following core functions:

- **Civil-military liaison.** This provides the coordination necessary to facilitate and support the planning and conduct of operations. Such liaison early in the planning process and immediately following the deployment of forces provides the basis for the other two core CIMIC functions.
- **Support to the civil environment.** Support to the civil environment can involve a wide range of military resources: information, personnel, materiel, equipment, communications facilities, specialist expertise, or training. Decisions on depth, duration, and extent of this support should be made at the highest appropriate level taking into account political as well as military and civil factors. Nations will likely have different national agendas as to their extent, type, and purpose of support to the civil environment. The coalition commander will need to understand these positions .
- **Support to the force.** Commanders, depending on the circumstances at the time, may require significant civilian support within the JOA. As well as coordination of efforts to minimize disruption to military operations, such as population and resources control, the force may be partially dependent on civilian resources and information from

civilian sources. Commanders will also seek as much tacit civilian support for operations as possible.

9-12. The following are suggested as appropriate CIMIC staff responsibilities:

- Liaison with civilian bodies at all levels.
- Perform ongoing assessments of civilian population needs to identify the extent of any vacuum and how that vacuum might be filled.
- Participate fully in the commander's decision making process and provide input to the campaign plan.
- Conduct an ongoing analysis of the civil situation and comment on the implications for military operations.
- Engage in integrated planning with appropriate civilian bodies.
- Oversee the conduct of civil-related activities by military forces to include generating and deploying CIMIC assets and functional specialists, where necessary.
- Work towards a timely and smooth transition of civil responsibilities to the proper authorities.
- Coordinate with other staff branches on all aspects of operations and ensure CIMIC continuity within the JOA.

AVOIDANCE OF DEPENDANCY—SUGGESTED GUIDELINES

9-13. CIMIC implies neither military control of civilian organizations or agencies nor the reverse. It recognizes that—

- The military normally will only be responsible for security related tasks and limited logistic, communication, or other support. It may be possible to support the appropriate civil authority for implementing civil tasks, but only if the mandated civil authorities, if applicable, and the appropriate military commander have agreed in accordance with the campaign plan.
- In exceptional circumstances subject to political sanction by the governments of troop contributing nations, the force may be required to take on tasks normally the responsibility of a mandated civil authority.
- These tasks should only be accepted where the appropriate civil body is not present or is unable to carry out its mandate.
- The military should be prepared to undertake such tasks necessary to maintain momentum towards a lasting

solution to a crisis until the mandated civil authority or agency is prepared and able to assume them.

- Responsibility for civil related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil authority, organization, or agency as soon as is practical and in as smooth a manner as possible.

FUNDAMENTAL PRINCIPLES OF CIMIC

9-14. The following principles are provided to assist nations in conducting CIMIC operations:

- **Coordination.** CIMIC is a key strand of the overall operational plan and not an activity apart. It requires close coordination with other military capabilities and actions. It facilitates creating interfaces with the civil environment necessary for the conduct of other functions such as host nation support or engineering activities.
- **Unity of effort.** Unity of effort is essential to achieve effective CIMIC. Activities in theater should have central direction, be closely coordinated, and where necessary be deconflicted without prejudicing the needs of lower levels of command. Subordinate commanders should clear any low-level CIMIC tasks with the coalition commander's CIMIC staff.
- **Minimize the impact.** Commanders should strive to minimize the military impact on the civil environment and minimize the civil environment impact on military operations. The military often requires access to local civilian resources. In such circumstances every effort should be made to avoid adversely impacting local populations, economies, or infrastructure. The military should take on civil tasks only where no other practical solution exists, where an otherwise unacceptable vacuum would arise, and where it has the resources to available. Creating a "dependency culture" is likely to prejudice the successful achievement of the overall mission. Responsibility for civil related tasks should be handed back to the civil sector as quickly and as smoothly as possible. Likewise, every effort should be made to reduce the civil environment impact on military operations. An example of this includes the impact of dislocated civilians on the main routes for providing supply and relief aid. This will require careful planning.
- **Impartiality.** Not only should strict impartiality be shown towards all sections of the local population when conducting CIMIC activities, but also every practical effort should be made to avoid compromising the neutrality of civil humanitarian agencies. This may often be difficult, but

commanders and staffs must be sensitive to the issue and exercise their judgment.

- **Transparency.** Tension within a civil military relationship is detrimental to the overall goal. Transparency in all CIMIC activities is the best way to minimize potential tension.
- **Identification of common goals.** To maximize the effectiveness of CIMIC, military and civilian organizations should try to identify and share common goals. Such goals should be established early in planning, incorporating political guidance.
- **Primacy of the military mission.** Ideally, no conflict will exist between military objectives and those of most of the civilian organizations working in the JOA. Nonetheless, only the commander can decide how much to commit military resources to CIMIC tasks. Indeed, additional tasks should not be assumed without assessing the resources, in coordination with civilian agencies, and prioritizing military tasks.
- **Economy of effort.** Commanders should aim to minimize the use of military assets in civil tasks and encourage maximum use of civil resources. Equally commanders must avoid creating long-term civilian dependence on military resources by the local population, government, international organizations (IO), or nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). Once provided, withdrawing or reducing resources may strain civil relations, or retard the growth of civil-military relations, and cause lasting damage to public confidence in the military force.
- **Relationships.** Commanders must establish close working relationships between the key decision-makers, military and civilian, thus developing mutual respect and understanding. As the operation matures, commanders must recognize the impact made with the turnover of civilian and military staff.

LEGAL PARAMETERS

9-15. *General.* One of the key aspects of CIMIC is the role that it plays in winning the battle for moral authority and legitimacy. In this respect, legal parameters and frameworks that form the basis for CIMIC elements of the overall campaign plan can be used to win the battle for moral authority. In addition there are significant legal issues that will have a bearing on various planning factors, particularly as concerns logistics. The overriding feature of

CIMIC operations is that they are integral to meeting the obligations arising from the legal principle of command responsibility.

9-16. Legal parameters will vary according to the type of operation and its position in the full spectrum of operations. The domestic legal restrictions that apply to coalition partners will vary in the extent and nature of their involvement in CIMIC. Coalition partners may also interpret differently the international law applicable to all the partners. It is critical that out of operation consultation be ongoing to illuminate these differences and, where possible, resolve or provide for them in operational planning. Legal staff of coalition partners must be involved in developing CIMIC plans and able to consult amongst themselves at the earliest opportunity.

9-17. *Key Factors.* If an operation is taking place under a UN Security Council Resolution, then the terms of the resolution are binding on all UN members. Where the terms of the resolution specifically or indirectly authorize CIMIC activity or initiatives, the resolution takes precedence over impediments that may have otherwise existed arising from the law of the affected nation in which operations are occurring. This will be the case particularly in Chapter VII operations where “all necessary means” are authorized to achieve such tasks as securing humanitarian relief activities or restoring peace and order.

9-18. To varying degrees an operation may be affected by host nation (HN) law such as relate to customs and contracting. Such issues should be flagged in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process when developing the CIMIC plan. As part of dealing with the HN or in dealing with states that are hosting forward operating bases, status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) may also clarify issues relating to logistic activity and jurisdiction. The terms of the SOFA will significantly impact CIMIC planning and should be well known to CIMIC planners. SOFAs are also discussed in Chapter 13.

9-19. The logistic aspects of CIMIC operations could also be affected or assisted by cross-Servicing agreements existing amongst coalition partners. These agreements can materially facilitate standardization and streamlining of procurement and supply. Chapter 5 discusses logistics in detail.

9-20. Domestic law considerations for coalition partners can greatly affect the activities that a particular contingent or national personnel may undertake. For example, the National Foreign Assistance Act may contain certain provisions that govern

national involvement in issues such as the raising and training of foreign police forces. These provisions may impact on the activities that coalition partners undertake and should be understood as early as possible before beginning an operation.

9-21. The most significant legal factor that may need to be considered in CIMIC operations is the possible application of International Humanitarian Law (IHL). The law of this class which has the most direct bearing on CIMIC operations is the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 (GC IV) and related instruments. This body of law sets out in detail the rights and obligations which may be relied upon to authorize a wide spectrum of CIMIC operations which may be deemed important to mission success.

9-22. *Administration in Hostile or Occupied Territory.* Alliances, coalition forces, or nations may be required to conduct civil administration activities across the range of military operations and particularly in the collapsed state context, acting on the authority of a nation, alliance, coalition of nations, or the United Nations. The territory under administration is effectively under military control. The occupying force has rights and obligations under IHL to ensure public order and safety as well as the just and effective administration of and support to a hostile or occupied territory.

9-23. Within its capabilities and subject to the principle of military necessity arising from any ongoing combat or security operations, the occupying force must maintain an orderly administration and must have as its ultimate goal the handover to an effective civilian administration as soon as possible. Subject to the requirements of the military situation, the commander, joint task force (CJFC) must analyze military activities likely to increase tensions as well as those likely to facilitate and accelerate a return to civil administration. This is especially important in multiethnic, or multicultural environments where a chosen course of action will almost invariably be seen as partisan by one or more of the parties to a conflict.

9-24. Many differences of opinion may exist amongst coalition partners as to when aspects of IHL may apply. It is also critical that policy applying CIMIC action under an IHL regime should be centrally coordinated and monitored by the CJFC. Action should be taken in the out of operation environment to find common ground on such issues.

KEY CIMIC PLAYERS

9-25. Civilian organizations perform for a wide range of activities encompassing humanitarian aid, human rights, protection of minorities, refugees and displaced persons, legal assistance, medical care, reconstruction, agriculture, education, arts, sciences, and general project funding. CIMIC staff and personnel must fully understand the mandate, role, structure, methods, and principles of these organizations. Collectively, with local populations and their representatives, they represent the other half of the CIMIC equation. It will be impossible to establish an effective relationship with them without this understanding.

CIVIL SECTOR PRINCIPLES OF HUMANITARIAN ACTION

9-26. Quite apart from the requirement to understand the different roles and mandates of the various civilian organizations, commanders must understand the four humanitarian principles to understand the civil-military relationship. The international community adopted these four principles, under which most civil aid organizations operate and upon which humanitarian action is based. The four principles are—

- **Humanity.** Human suffering is to be relieved wherever it is found. The dignity and other human rights of individuals and groups must be respected.
- **Impartiality.** Humanitarian assistance must be provided without discrimination. Relief is given without regard to nationality, political or ideological beliefs, race, religion, sex, or ethnicity, but only on the basis of the urgency of the need.
- **Neutrality.** Humanitarian actors may not take sides in hostilities or engage at any time in controversies of a political, racial, religious, or ideological nature.
- **Independence.** Humanitarian actors maintain the right to independence of their own actions and will resist any attempts to place conditions on their actions or movements in return for cooperation with military authorities.

LEAD AGENCIES

9-27. *Lead agency concept.* A lead agency is one that has been mandated by the international community to initiate the coordination of the activities of civilian organizations that volunteer to participate in an operation. It is normally a major UN agency such as UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), United Nations Children's Fund (UNICEF), or—increasingly likely—the

UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), part of the UN Secretariat. Specific responsibilities of a lead agency are to—

- Act as a point of contact for other agencies, particularly in the areas of planning and information sharing.
- Coordinate field activities to avoid duplicating effort and wasting resources.
- Act as an interface with the military at the theater level.

9-28. *Lead agency concept in practice.* Often the lead agencies will coordinate field activities through field offices of another agency or organization. Although the latter will usually be from UNHCR or the World Food Programme (WFP), NGOs such as Save the Children have in the past filled this role. Lead agencies have also contracted other IO and NGOs to implement health, food, or transportation programs or to operate refugee camps. The International Organization for Migration (IOM) has assisted in these areas. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) has conducted its activities with the other agencies in this field. In such situations, NGOs will operate under legal agreements involving them as partners with the host nation government and a UN agency. The relationship between the coalition and the lead agency is critical. A memorandum of understanding between the coalition force and the lead agency can provide a useful tool in making the relationship work.

TYPES, ROLES, AND MANDATES

TYPES

9-29. Three principal types of civilian organizations operate outside formal national government structures: international organizations, NGOs, and international and national donor organizations. A brief description of each follows.

International Organizations

9-30. International organizations are established by intergovernmental agreements and operate at the international level such as the various UN organizations and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE). The major UN organizations that are most likely to be involved in humanitarian relief are the UNHCR, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs, the UN High Commissioner for Human Rights (UNHCHR), the WFP, and the UNICEF. This group also includes organizations such as the IOM.

9-31. Separate mention should be made of the International Committee of the Red Cross, which, unlike those IO mentioned above, was not established by intergovernmental agreement. The ICRC is an impartial, neutral, and independent organization whose exclusively humanitarian mission is to protect the lives and dignity of victims of war and internal violence and to provide them with assistance. It directs and coordinates the international relief activities conducted by the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement in situations of conflict and their aftermath. The ICRC has a unique status. It fulfills a role conferred upon it by international treaties the Geneva Conventions of 1949 (and their additional protocols of 1977), to which virtually all countries in the world are party, and the Statutes of the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement adopted by the States Parties to the Geneva Conventions in 1986.

Nongovernmental Organizations

9-32. NGOs are voluntary organizations that are not always funded by governments. The term is used in Article 71 of the UN Charter. They are primarily nonprofit organizations independent of government, international organizations, or commercial interests. While many NGOs come to the area of operations (AO) from foreign nations, local NGOs may also be operating. They legally differ from UN agencies and other IO in that they write their own charter and mission. They may fall into one of two categories:

- **Mandated.** A mandated NGO has been officially recognized by the lead international organization in a crisis and authorized to work in the affected area.
- **Nonmandated.** A nonmandated NGO has had no official recognition or authorization and therefore works as a private concern. These organizations could be contracted or subcontracted by an international organization or a mandated NGO. In other cases they obtain funds from private enterprises and donors.

Implementing partner is a term used to denote those NGOs local or international mandated and contracted by a UN lead organization to carry out work on its behalf.

9-33. The number of NGOs is increasing as well as their levels of sophistication. In any potential AO they could be numbered in the hundreds. They generally remain strongly independent from political control to preserve their independence and effectiveness. In many cases, their impartiality has been of great benefit, forming the only available means of rebuilding relations when political

dialogue has broken down. They are often highly professional in their field, extremely well motivated and prepared to take physical risks in appalling conditions. NGOs will usually be accredited by the host nation before being authorized to operate within the country. However, some NGOs may not be accredited and this can create local tensions.

International and National Government Donor Agencies

9-34. International and national government donor agencies—such as the US State Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM); US Agency for International Development (USAID); Department for International Development (DFID) (United Kingdom); Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA); Australian Agency for International Development (AusAID); European Commission’s Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO); and World Bank—have responsibilities for the funding, monitoring, and evaluating development programs. In humanitarian emergencies these donors may be present and may be working with the lead agency or civil administration.

OTHER GROUPINGS

9-35. Within the above generic types, the following groupings are also important to note:

- **Civilian development agencies.** Some civilian organizations are concerned mainly with reconstruction. Their mandates are to provide technical assistance to developing countries. The UN Development Programme (UNDP) administers and coordinates most development technical assistance provided through the UN system. These agencies normally spend a longer time in the affected area than the military. In these cases the CIMIC will identify any need for military involvement in reconstruction with the local government and, when possible, lead agencies, to enable the organizations to begin work and continue under the most favorable conditions. The reconstruction agencies will usually have allocated resources to plan and develop projects throughout the affected area on the basis of need.
- **Human rights and democratization agencies.** The primary agencies in this area are the UNHCHR and the Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODHIR) of OSCE, although the latter only operates within Europe. These agencies seek to protect human rights in states where abuses may be rampant. They seek to instill democratic values and the rule of law at all levels of government.

Additionally, the OSCE has the ability to arrange for and monitor elections and coordinate programs instilling democratic institutional values.

RELATIONSHIPS BETWEEN CIVIL ORGANIZATIONS , GOVERNMENTS, AND MILITARY

9-36. *General.* Governments have the primary responsibility for handling humanitarian needs within their own countries. Civil organizations will establish contacts with government and local authorities to develop their activities. The role of CIMIC is to work closely with the civil organizations, national governments, local authorities, or a combination of these organizations. In some cases, the military will only play a supporting role. In other situations, CIMIC participation and coordination will be the main focal point for the establishment and development of the necessary initial contacts. This type of situation can occur when no civil authority is in place, which is a common occurrence.

9-37. *Organizational cultures.* Military forces, IO and NGOs, government donors, and the UN contain their own organizational cultures characterized by their own national, professional, and institutional differences. The degree of involvement, liaison, and influence of each organization may vary greatly depending on the situation. Cooperation and consensus between the various organizations may be difficult to achieve due to the requirement for each to maintain relationships on three levels. The levels at which relationships must be maintained are in the field at the tactical level; with the national parties (host government or authorized governmental body) at the operational level; and the international community and supporting donors at the strategic level.

9-38. Where the law of occupation applies, the military commander has a legal responsibility and will be held accountable for matters relating to the relief activities in the JOA. With this responsibility comes the legal authority to regulate the activities of relief and civil agencies. A commander may also have this authority in operations conducted under Chapter VII of the UN Charter where “all necessary measures” are authorized and humanitarian assistance is part of the mandate. At all times however, the principle will be to conduct CIMIC as a consultative and cooperative process as far as possible.

UNDERSTANDING NGOs

9-39. NGOs are most concerned about protecting civilians during conflict. They become frustrated when the military is not able to

afford adequate protection to all civilians, particularly if there is a perception that force is being applied selectively. At times they also feel that the military uses inappropriate tactics, techniques, or procedures to support the humanitarian mission and on some occasions may compromise the NGO by association.

9-40. Common problems shared by both the military and NGOs include—

- Working in an environment with limited or no overarching international political or strategic direction.
- Operating in a very crowded operational theater where little or no infrastructure exists to support operations.
- Making difficult moral choices.
- Experiencing frustration over an inability to fix serious problems.
- Concern for the safety of their personnel.
- Competing for local resources.

9-41. *Contrasting perspectives.* The military and NGO communities often see each other from their own colored perspectives. They have been distilled from expert commentators who emphasize that it is critical that relationships between the parties are based on mutual respect and understanding. Many NGOs have considerable resources that can support the mission and avoid creating any long-term dependency on the military forces.

9-42. The military may view itself as a structured and well-resourced organization with a good understanding of the large political picture and whose presence is the only means of stopping the violence, thereby setting the conditions for ending the crisis. The NGO may see the military as politically compromised and not neutral, deployed on a basis of strategic interests rather than humanitarian need, with hidden political and economic interests and using mandates that can be seen as uselessly restrictive or narrowly interpreted. Force protection can sometimes be viewed as being the first priority, with no interest in developing the competence of the local public security structures. The military may be seen as not understanding the local cultural context, with a propensity to be confrontational. The CIMIC center can be seen as one-way communication, military to civilian, peripheral to military decision making, and with limited information to share. The presence of the military in an area may bring with it the possible perception of corruption, trafficking, and prostitution with the potential to severely compromise humanitarian aid.

9-43. The NGO community emphasizes its self-mandating and idealistic view; they believe that they are efficient and close to the people, thus representing the people. The view of NGOs from the military may conclude that some NGOs are highly competitive and self interested, unable to speak with one voice or through one forum, lacking discipline with no understanding of the broader issues. They may also be seen as opportunistic rather than principled, sometimes wasteful and amateurish, playing with danger and lacking in cultural sensitivity applying what are perceived as simplistic (inadequate) fixes to complex problems. The mere presence of NGOs can also involve them in a conflict, notwithstanding a self view or mandate of impartiality and neutrality.

9-44. *Security.* Security adds complexity to the military civil relationships in PSO. There are many NGO players and no one speaks for them all. NGOs believe that in security management, the military should not be seen as the sole authority. Most NGOs have security plans and processes. The military normally characterizes these as poor quality, lacking drill and discipline. In certain circumstances, NGOs will use the military for emergency rescues on an opportunistic basis. NGOs are developing more competence in security management. This is because the 1990s saw a rapid increase in security incidents and there have been casualties in most danger zones where aid workers have been present. However, the cause of most incidents is crime. Using armed protection by peacekeeping forces is seen as controversial in the aid community. NGOs see the need for security information sharing to be of value for threat and incident analysis. Contemporary challenges in security management for the NGO community include field training and headquarters expertise.

9-45. In relations to the military, there are three possible security strategies for NGOs. Developing their own security plans and accepting risk is seen as the preferred option. Most NGOs see this as offering a long-term solution that meets their needs of remaining close to people. NGOs may rely on local security forces for protection. Finally, the coalition force may be asked to provide protection. These latter two strategies do not reduce the threat and have the risk of disrupting relationships with the local population. Military deterrence as a strategy is seen as posing a risk to the image of humanitarian aid and it may increase the risk to aid workers.

9-46. *Inter-NGO relationships.* There is a perception, due to the need for funding, of increased competition amongst the NGOs. This perception accentuates the idea of a lack of structure in the

NGO community. NGOs may cooperate at the local level and this needs to be developed further. NGOs need to be persuaded by argument, not by authority, with an emphasis on networking and building coalitions.

9-47. *IO and NGO structure.* Integral players in these initiatives are the international and nongovernmental organizations that may already be operating in the coalition's area of responsibility and influence. These organizations may have long-standing relationships within the coalition area of responsibility, may have been conducting their operations well before coalition operations began, and may continue during and remain after coalition operations conclude.

9-48. International and nongovernmental organizations may either support the coalition's mission or be neutral or hostile. Their disposition towards the coalition's mission and initiatives may be inconsistent or fluid. It is useful to understand that these attitudes are driven in part by how their organizations are structured, managed, and financed.

9-49. International organizations tend to have vertical management structures. They tend to be large and have well established and long standing managerial chains of command and corporate institutional social structures. Their personnel, generally speaking, started with the organization at an entry-level position and worked up a progressive chain of responsibility with an increased loyalty to the principles and practices of the IO corporate culture. They tend to have larger budgets and resources than NGOs. Due to their institutional size and procedures, IO are not as apt to be as flexible and responsive to fluid and dynamic situations as an NGO may.

9-50. Alternatively, because of their size, structure, and institutional systems, IO are less susceptible to fluctuations or shifts in public opinion and financial support.

9-51. NGOs tend to have horizontal management structures. They tend to be small and have less established managerial chains of command and corporate institutional social structures. Their staffs, generally speaking, are more independent. They tend to have smaller budgets and fewer resources than the IO. Due to their size and independence, they also will more likely be very flexible and responsive to fluid and dynamic situations. However, they are very sensitive to the attitudes of their financial contributors. Because they tend to not have smaller reserve assets, their contributors have more influence on how to allocate contributions.

9-52. Commanders should consider these capabilities, limitations, and influences of organizational structures when working alongside or with IO and NGOs. Commanders, and any civilian on the battlefield, should remember that regardless of the person or organization, a commander's legal responsibility is to provide protection. Commanders and planners should also be aware that there may not be NGOs to fill significant gaps in CIMIC operations; there are aspects for which no voluntary donor base exists such as rehabilitating prisons and re-establishing police forces and judiciaries. There may also be issues involved in a particular environment that may cause the NGO relief to focus its effort towards one set of victims or party to a conflict. These gaps may unavoidably fall to the military element to fill on an interim basis.

UNITED NATIONS

9-53. In addition to the coalition military mission, the UN is likely to have a mandated mission operating alongside the coalition force. The respective mandates will establish the relationship between the coalition and the UN. In some cases, the UN mission will include assuming responsibility for the AO from a transiting coalition force. The UN mission's capabilities and mandate must be factored in to the planning of CIMIC activities. The UN mission will normally have a civil affairs component. This should not be confused with military civil affairs forces and activities. For more information on the UN, go to <http://www.un.int> on the Internet.

LOCAL AUTHORITIES

9-54. Local authorities are of prime importance to the CIMIC effort. They are the prime contacts in coordinating civilian support to military operations and providing military support directly to the local civilian community. The role of local authorities must also be factored into the relationship between the military and the humanitarian actors in the JAO.

MILITARY CIMIC FORCES

9-55. Military forces bring capability to the CIMIC effort that are the main resource for the implementation of the commander's CIMIC plan. These forces are CIMIC staffs and general troops.

CIMIC STAFFS

9-56. Each headquarters should have a CIMIC staff cell that coordinates the planning and execution to the commander's CIMIC plan. It includes—

- **CIMIC groups.** A CIMIC Group is a CIMIC unit that may be part of a national organization. It is likely to contain or be able to call upon expertise in the following areas:
 - Civil administration (including security and law and order).
 - Civil infrastructure.
 - Humanitarian aid.
 - Economic and commercial structures.
 - Cultural affairs.
- **Functional specialists.** Functional specialists are hired to carry out specific tasks that have been identified through the assessment process (see Appendix B). Again, their number and area of expertise will vary according to both need and availability. They should only be employed for the duration of the specified task. These specialists may be either military or civilian. The terms under which the latter are employed will be determined by the legal requirements of the donor nation. However, they must be under readiness states that enable them to deploy when required. CIMIC groups are likely to contain many military personnel capable of carrying out specific CIMIC functional activities. Nations have sources of functional specialists who together may provide a pool of expertise.

GENERAL TROOPS

9-57. The commander may also task units under his command to carry out CIMIC tasks.

MILITARY SUPPORT TO CIVILIAN COMMUNITY

MILITARY SUPPORT CAPABILITIES

9-58. Military forces have a wide range of protection, mobility, and survivability capabilities that enable the force to carry out its mission. These include fighting troops for protection and survivability tasks; naval and air assets for protection tasks; transportation of people and vital stores; and using engineers to provide essential services such as water, electrical power, sanitation, and shelter and mobility tasks including demining. Additional capabilities include medical elements for saving lives and limiting the

spread of disease. Logistic units to provide road transport and vital stores such as food and medical supplies, and communication units to enable the passage of information. Military police and legal elements enforce the rule of law in accordance with international law, rules, and conventions. Some of these capabilities could be employed on CIMIC tasks.

TYPICAL TASKS

9-59. Depending on the nature of the military activity, civilian agencies could require any of the aforementioned capabilities for CIMIC activities. However, the military will normally only be responsible for providing security related tasks and emergency relief to support the appropriate civil authority—and only within the available military capacity. In the first instance, military support tasks could include—but are not limited to—protection of helpless population; transport to safe havens; provision of essential services such as clean water, sanitation, and shelter; and provision of limited medical life-saving support.

9-60. Military support can only be provided when the resources to do so are available, and its provision is in concert of the military commander's overall plan and mandated civil authorities if applicable. Moreover, providing military support should not be at the expense of achieving the overall military objectives for which the military forces have been deployed. The responsibility for civil related tasks will be handed over to the appropriate civil authority or agency as soon as practical and as smoothly as possible.

9-61. Experience has shown that the demand for military services will normally exceed the resources available. Thus, limited resources must be applied to the highest priorities. To ensure that scarce resources are applied to the higher priority tasks, agencies seeking military support must then understand and apply the agreed mutual guidelines for the provision of support. This includes giving early warning to allow the necessary planning to take place in a timely and efficient manner.

GUIDELINES FOR THE PROVISION OF MILITARY SUPPORT

9-62. Military assets will be used primarily in support of military missions, but under certain circumstances these assets can be deployed to support other missions when a need consistent with accomplishing the military mission is demonstrated. This includes saving lives and essential infrastructure.

9-63. The civil population can become dependent on the military. Likewise the NGOs can become dependent on the resources

provided by the military forces, particularly security and logistic resources. Military forces must discourage this dependency. Military forces should provide advice and technical assistance rather than taking ownership of the problem. Military forces can achieve this by acting primarily as coordinators, channeling military support as a last resort through a CIMIC organization such as CIMIC centers, CMOC, or liaison officers.

9-64. Military resources can be made available, but they usually require early notice. Military forces are less flexible than other providers are because resources must be redirected from their primary tasks to provide CIMIC support. CIMIC staffs must anticipate requests and know the concept of operations to ensure that required resources can be made available without detriment to other aspects of the mission.

MILITARY PLANNING

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

9-65. CIMIC planning must occur within the pre-operational, operational, and transitional stages of any coalition operation. These planning phases may be concurrent. Consideration for the transition phase should occur during the pre-operational stage. Early engagement of the transitional authority is imperative. CIMIC staff must be included in both the commander's operation planning staff and the initial reconnaissance.

Pre-Operational Stage

9-66. At the earliest opportunity, CIMIC staff will be involved in preparing the coalition force to deal with the civil dimension. This will include planning, advice and education, and training. CIMIC staff must be involved in the CIMIC input to the main operational plan by analyzing the courses of action and producing a CIMIC annex. Inputs will be based, where possible, on reconnaissance and detailed assessment. Planning factors for CIMIC may include—

- Food and water.
- Public health.
- Shelter.
- Movement of civil population (such as displaced persons, refugees).
- Detainee handling and public security.
- Infrastructure support and rehabilitation.

- Interim administrative support and action.

9-67. Coordination and information exchange also needs to occur with the following specialist areas. The order of the following should start with the essential elements and move to the less so, for example:

- Information operations.
- Public relations and affairs.
- Engineers.
- Health.
- Logistics.
- Intelligence.
- Legal.
- Police.
- Chaplains.
- Relevant government departments.

Operational Phase

9-68. The core CIMIC task throughout operations is to secure effective civil-military cooperation in support of the commander's mission. To do this, relations with a wide range of civil bodies will have to be established and maintained. These relationships, along with numerous CIMIC tasks, will be identified through the continuous assessment process. Centralized coordination (through the J3) of CIMIC tasks across the AO will ensure that he relationships do not conflict with the commander's mission.

Transition Phase

9-69. The overarching objective of CIMIC is to achieve civil primacy. In the transition stage, CIMIC should assist the civil authorities to function without coalition forces in the AO. As the military force reduces the number and scope of its responsibilities, CIMIC will continue to assist in transferring any civilian responsibilities that the force may have assumed. Transition will normally be to either an international—United Nations—or local civil authority. The effective transfer of responsibilities will depend on the deployment of an international capability or standing up of a local capability.

PREDEPLOYMENT TRAINING

9-70. Before they deploy to the area of operations, troop contributing nations need to be trained in CIMIC, especially in assessing

their country's capability requirements. These requirements may include—

- CIMIC awareness to all troops. All soldiers must be aware of the force CIMIC policy to ensure that assistance is provided in accordance with that policy and not in greater or lesser support than is authorized.
- Staff capability. This is an enhanced level of training in that staffs are trained to plan and coordinate CIMIC tasks.
- Tactical capability. This involves using dedicated units at the tactical to execute CIMIC tasks.
- Levels of training that will vary between nations as well as between regular (active duty) and reserve forces within nations.

If there is a perceived need for a CIMIC capability, commanders should not train all personnel. It is essential to focus on jobs identified as involved in the coordination, planning, and execution of CIMIC tasks. Training should begin with the higher levels headquarters and proceed to lower levels as the need and the resources become available. Establishing a cadre for educating others from the initial personnel trained can expand resources.

CIMIC SUPPORT TO INFORMATION OPERATIONS AND TARGETING

9-71. CIMIC personnel will be required to support both information operations and the targeting process.

9-72. *Information sharing.* Each of the CIMIC players is a source of information sharing. Each player will be reluctant to share information with the other players. The military will be concerned about compromising sources and information. The other players will be concerned about compromising their neutrality. Information will be shared when the players perceive a common interest. CIMIC personnel must build on these common interests and work to ensure that information sharing is both a receiving and giving process. Each group's concerns need to be addressed and respected. Properly executed, information sharing can be a multiplier for operations. Chapter 10 discusses information operations.

9-73. *Targeting support.* The CIMIC staff will assist the targeting process by ensuring that additional problems are not created as a result of targeting. The CIMIC staff will make the commander aware of the locations of all the other CIMIC players in his AO, thereby playing in the IPB process. A tactical action can have strategic impact or sometimes the sum of seemingly insignificant

tactical actions can have strategic impact. The CIMIC staff will interact with other CIMIC players and the civilian community in maintaining the moral authority of the commander in relation to targeting. The CIMIC staff can gauge the moral impact of targeting on these groups. Additionally, the CIMIC staff will provide areas of cultural and religious significance that must not be targeted except under extreme circumstances because of the negative moral impact that will be created. Chapter 16 further discusses targeting.

LESSONS LEARNED AND POTENTIAL PROBLEM AREAS

9-74. Each of the nations and the ABCA Armies Program maintain a database with lessons learned. You can access these over the Internet. Start at the ABCA Armies Standardization Program Home Page at <http://abca.hqda.pentagon.mil> under the Coalition Operations Lessons Learned Database.

CHECKLIST

1. Is there a comprehensive campaign plan and does it address CIMIC issues?
2. Have CIMIC planners been included in the assessment team for the operation?
3. What areas of CIMIC come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
4. What are the political and civil implications of the desired strategic and operational end states?
5. What are the civil end states implied by the military end states?
6. What are the civil centers of gravity that need to be addressed? What are the associated decisive points?
7. What are the CIMIC culminating points?
8. Have measures been established to synchronize the civil-military cooperation activities with the campaign plan's line of operation?
9. What are the required civil and military resources to achieve the operational objectives?
10. What key civil organizations will be operating in the AO? Has an analysis been conducted on their respective end states, culture, objectives, and methods? How will they affect military operation?
11. What structures, reinforcements, policies, committees, and liaison are needed at the strategic level to support the operational commander?
12. Where the operational commander is to be reliant on HN support, are sufficient resources available to sustain his force and are memorandum of understandings and technical agreements in place? What will be the impact on the local economy as human and personnel resources are drawn to military HN support?
13. Is the national civil-military plan coordinated with the other governmental departments?
14. Have national civil-military plans been coordinated with coalition force headquarters?
15. Has the coalition force headquarters established a relationship with coalition ambassadors and, if a UN operation, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General?
16. Is the civil administration sound, or will one be established? If the latter, what resources will be required?

17. What are the requirements for restoring, or rebuilding the local infrastructure?
18. What are the requirements for restoring or providing essential services in the short, medium, and long term? The short-term tasks may become military tasks, and the military will need to plan accordingly—such as urgent provision of shelter, water, sanitation, and power.
19. What coalition force support is required to assist or establish the HN civilian law and order system?
20. Has a CIMIC operational estimate been conducted?
21. Are there adequate CIMIC personnel available to assist planners?
22. Have CIMIC center been established at appropriate levels to coordinate civil-military operations?
23. Is there a lead agency or lead agencies for humanitarian assistance such as UN or ICRC?
24. What IO, NGOs, and international and national donor agencies will be operating in the JOA?
25. Is there a process in place for the commander to deal with ‘rogue’ NGOs? Is it linked to a lead agency?
26. What is the policy for dealing with IO or NGOs that are political or economic fronts to corporations, to political action groups, to rogue nations, to allies of the combatants, to criminal organizations, and to terrorists groups?
27. What legal authority does the commander have to take a more prescriptive approach to CIMIC operations if this should be necessary?
28. Is there a coalition synchronization plan that articulates a common operational effect across boundaries (such as military, social, political, cultural, or economic boundaries)?
29. What areas of CIMIC support can nations provide and what areas can nations not provide?
30. Do all participating nations have an understanding of CIMIC?
31. Do all NGOs subscribe to the Code of Conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and NGOs in disaster relief?

Chapter 10

Information Operations

Each of the ABCA armies embraces a concept of information operations (IO). Figures 10-1 through 10-4 provide an overview of the components of IO used within ABCA armies. The coalition force commander must resolve potential conflicts between each nation's individual IO and those of the coalition, as a whole. If some coalition members do not have IO capabilities, it may be necessary for the coalition force headquarters (HQ) to assist the subordinate coalition force formation commanders and staff in conducting IO to achieve the coalition force IO plan goals.

Information operations are actions taken to affect adversary decision making processes, information and information systems while protecting one's own information and information systems.

Information operations are shaping operations that create and preserve opportunities for decisive operations. IO are both offensive and defensive.

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENTS

10-1. The global information environment (GIE) includes all individuals, organizations, or systems, most of which are outside the control of the military or government. The military information environment (MIE) is that portion of the GIE relevant to military operations. The national information environment (NIE) is that portion of the GIE that pertains to one particular nation.

10-2. The value of IO is not in the effect on how well an adversary transmits data. The real value can only be measured by its effect on the adversary's ability to execute successful military actions. Commanders drive the tempo of operations to gain and maintain the initiative and exploit success. They use IO to attack adversary

decision making processes, information, and information systems and to slow the adversary's tempo. Effective IO allow commanders to mass effects at decisive points more quickly than the adversary. IO are used to deny, destroy, degrade, disrupt, deceive, exploit, and influence the adversary's ability to control his forces. To create this effect, friendly forces attempt to influence the adversary's perception of their situation through any number of means.




Figure 10-1. American Approach to Information Operations




Figure 10-2. British Approach to Information Operations




Figure 10-3. Canadian Approach to Information Operations




Figure 10-4. Australian Approach to Information Operations

10-3. Successful IO require a thorough and detailed intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process. This process includes an understanding of a adversary’s capabilities and decision making style, information systems, attitudes, culture, economy, demographics, politics, personalities, and the impact of the media. The ultimate objective is to influence the perceptions, decisions, and will of enemies and others. A primary goal is to produce a disparity in adversary commanders’ minds between reality and their perception of reality and disrupt their ability to influence actions by their subordinates.

OFFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

10-4. The desired effects of offensive information operations are to destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence adversary functions. Using the elements of IO offensively, ABCA

army forces can either prevent the adversary from exercising effective command and control or leverage it to their advantage. Ultimately, the targets of IO are the human leadership and human decision making processes of an adversary or other people in an AO.

DEFENSIVE INFORMATION OPERATIONS

10-5. Defensive IO protect friendly access to relevant information while denying adversaries the opportunity to affect friendly information and information systems. Defensive IO lessens the vulnerability of friendly decision makers.

10-6. Offensive and defensive operations use complementary, reinforcing, and asymmetric effects to attack adversary forces and protect friendly forces. On a battlefield where massing forces create dangerous vulnerabilities, IO can provide the leverage necessary to reduce friendly vulnerabilities and exploit adversary weaknesses. The resulting effects destroy, degrade, disrupt, deny, deceive, exploit, and influence the adversary's ability to control his forces. These systemic effects undermine both the adversary's capability and his will to fight. In an environment where the use of force is restricted or not a viable option, IO can influence attitudes, reduce commitment to a hostile cause, and convey the willingness to use force without actually employing it.

INFORMATION OPERATIONS ELEMENTS

10-7. Successful information operations depend on integrating offensive and defensive IO. Many activities or operations compose the IO elements. Each operation may have an offensive or defensive information application and the elements may vary in each ABCA nation.

10-8. **Military deception.** Military deception includes measures designed to deceive adversaries by manipulation, distortion, or falsification. Military deception aims to influence the adversary's situational understanding and lead the adversary to act in a manner that favors friendly forces.

10-9. **Operations security.** Operations security (OPSEC) denies the adversary information critical to the success of friendly military operations and contributes to the secrecy, surprise, and security of Army forces. OPSEC identifies routine activities that may telegraph friendly intentions, operations, capabilities, or military activities. It acts to suppress, conceal, control, or

eliminate these indicators. OPSEC includes countersurveillance, signal security, and information security.

10-10. **Physical security.** Physical security prevents unauthorized access to equipment, installations, and documents. Physical security safeguards and protects information and information systems.

10-11. **Electronic warfare.** *Electronic warfare* (EW) is military action involving the use of electromagnetic and directed energy to control the electromagnetic spectrum or to attack the enemy (DOD). NATO defines EW in more detail (see Glossary). EW can cause an adversary to misinterpret the information received by his electronic systems.

10-12. **Information assurance.** Information assurance protects and defends information systems. Threats include physical destruction, denial of service, capture, environmental damage, and malfunctions. Information assurance provides an enhanced degree of confidence that information and information systems possess the following characteristics: availability, integrity, authentication, confidentiality, and nonrepudiation. Computer network defense is part of this element.

10-13. **Physical destruction.** Physical destruction is the application of combat power against IO-related targets. Targets can be information systems, EW systems, or command posts. Physical destruction must be synchronized with the broader plan. For example, destroying an adversary command post that has poor OPSEC and reveals adversary intentions may be counterproductive.

10-14. **Psychological operations.** Psychological operations (PSYOPS) are planned operations to influence the behavior and actions of foreign audiences by conveying selected information and indicators to them. PSYOPS strive to create desired behaviors that support US national interests and the commander's objectives. PSYOPS are closely integrated with OPSEC, military deception, physical destruction, and electronic warfare. Together they create a perception of reality that supports friendly objectives.

10-15. **Counter PSYOPS.** Counter PSYOPS includes activities directed at an adversary who is conducting PSYOPS against friendly forces. Counter PSYOPS can contribute to situational understanding and expose adversary attempts to influence friendly populations and military forces. Preventive actions include PSYOPS awareness programs that inform US forces,

friendly forces, and friendly populations of the nature of hostile PSYOPS.

10-16. **Counterintelligence.** Counterintelligence consists of activities that identify and counteract threats to security posed by espionage, subversion, or terrorism. It detects, neutralizes, or prevents espionage or other intelligence activities. Counterintelligence supports the commander's requirements to preserve essential security and protect the force.

10-17. **Computer network attack.** Computer network attack consists of operations that disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in computers, computer networks, or the computers and the networks themselves. Normally, theater or national elements conduct computer network attack, but the effects may be evident at the corps and below.

RELATED ACTIVITIES

10-18. Public affairs and civil-military operations are activities related to IO. Both communicate information to critical audiences to influence their understanding and perception of military operations. They are distinct from IO because they do not manipulate or distort information; their effectiveness stems directly from their credibility. They are the link between military operations and civilians and are prime sources of information. They also assess how military operations impact on civilians, neutrals, and others within the battlespace. There are other related activities that have a distinct effect on IO, too.

10-19. **Public affairs.** Public affairs operations influence populations by transmitting information through the news media. The dissemination of this information is desirable and consistent with security. Information distributed through public affairs counters the effects of adversary PSYOPS and misinformation.

10-20. **Civil-military operations.** Civil-military operations are activities that establish, maintain or influence relations between military forces and civil authorities-both governmental and non-governmental-and the civilian populace to facilitate military operations. Civil-military operations coordinate the restoration of the indigenous communications infrastructure and engage the cultural, social, political, and economic sectors in the AO.

10-21. **Communications and information systems.** Communications and information systems (CIS) strive to provide the infrastructure that allows an ABCA coalition force to operate

within the MIE and interface with the GIE. Commanders use CIS to integrate all activities. The major roles of CIS are to—

- Support the decision making process.
- Transmit information, including orders and reports.
- Link sensors, commanders and shooters.
- Provide a multidimensional and relevant common picture.
- Enable efficient sustainment of the force.

10-22. **Relevant information.** Relevant information (RI) is information drawn from the military information environment that significantly impacts, contributes to, or relates to executing the operational mission at hand. RI has a direct relationship with the MIE in two important ways:

- It collects, processes, or disseminates relevant information and serves as the principal criterion that a commander applies, to include an individual, organization, or system as part of the MIE.
- It is the product or medium drawn from or used by those same players that serves as the basis or currency of information operations.

10-23. RI includes most of the other elements mentioned so far as well as the entire realm of intelligence, including human intelligence.

10-24. Developing IO and supporting activities requires close coordination between coalition members. The key to effective IO within the coalition is coordinating the information-related activities of all coalition force formations to achieve the coalition forces' aim.

10-25. Planning, preparing, and executing coalition IO is difficult due to differences in doctrine and training, complex security issues, and interoperability of equipment. The need to produce IO products in unfamiliar languages compounds these difficulties. The coalition force size, composition, and mission—as well as diplomatic considerations—influences how coalition IO are planned, prepared, and executed. Centralized planning, preparation, and execution by the coalition force HQ IO cell are essential for conducting successful IO, especially since coalition formations below force HQ level may not deploy their own IO cells. It would therefore be beneficial for force HQ IO cell to represent all coalition force formations. Direct representation ensures that coalition IO assets are efficiently used and that the coalition IO plan is coordinated with all other aspects of the coalition operation.

10-26. IO must consider the impact of public opinion on policy makers to modify their participation in the coalition mission. Thus, the impact of media coverage of force activities is a vital consideration.

10-27. Listed in the checklist at the end of this chapter are IO questions that will aid in achieving the requirements outlined in the paragraphs above for planning, preparing, and executing of coalition IO.

10-28. Civil-military operations and public affairs are related activities of information operations, but are not components of information operations.

CHECKLISTS

INFORMATION OPERATIONS

1. How does each coalition nation view population, neutrals, adversaries, and civilians?
2. What is coalition members' understanding of global information environment?
3. What are coalition members' understanding of NIE and is the NIE accessible to the other coalition members?
4. What do coalition members understand about the military information environment?
5. How interoperable are IO between coalition members?
6. What is the coalition member's definition of IO?
7. What is the respective army's doctrine for exploiting the elements of IO?
8. How does each of the coalition members manage information? Is the process open to other coalition members?
9. What are the threats to IO common to all coalition members? What threats to information operations are specific to any one army?
10. What common solutions can be applied across ABCA armies to negate the threats to IO?
11. What mission essential task lists must be modified to accommodate coalition IO?

COMMANDER

1. How do commanders examine the vulnerability of their soldiers and systems to exploitation or attack by an adversary capable of employing EW, physical destruction, military deception, and propaganda?
2. How does the commander's intent and concept of the operations provide sufficient guidance for IO planning?
3. Are there anomalies between coalition members in how commanders synchronize IO with other military operations?

STAFF ORGANIZATION

1. Do coalition members use an IO cell for coordination, synchronization, and deconfliction?
2. Does the IO cell or some other staff element contribute to planning, preparing, and executing the IO portion of the plan?
3. How does the commander provide guidance concerning IO during the planning process?

4. Are the elements of offensive and defensive IO deconflicted?
5. Is the IO annex reviewed for compliance with rules of engagement (ROE) and legal restrictions?
6. How are IO commander's critical information requirements (CCIR) integrated into the collection plan?
7. What are the roles and responsibilities of the staff in planning and conducting IO?
8. Do IO cell personnel understand the planning process and employ effective and efficient models and tools?
9. Do coalition members use an IO coordinator?
10. Does the table of organization and equipment of coalition members require augmentation to perform its IO mission?
11. Does the IO cell accomplish the following tasks:
 - Focus the commander's intent to gain information superiority.
 - Establish IO priorities to accomplish planned objectives.
 - Determine the availability of IO resources to carry out IO actions.
 - Synchronize, coordinate, and deconflict offensive and defensive IO.
 - Integrate IO actions into the operations plan.
 - Recommend tasking to the G3 for the assets needed to execute IO.
 - Nominate targets for physical destruction into the targeting meeting.
 - Publish the IO annex to an operation plan (OPLAN) or operation order (OPORD).
 - Coordinate IO input into an OPLAN or OPORD.
 - Coordinate intelligence support from the all source intelligence cell.
 - Ensure that a solution is provided to the command to reverse IO vulnerabilities.

IO ASSESSMENT

1. Is IPB reviewed and incorporated into the IO estimate?
2. Are potential courses of action analyzed for IO supportability?
3. Are all IO elements considered throughout the mission analysis process?
4. How does IO support all potential courses of action?

5. How does the staff integrate and synchronize the actions included in the related annexes with each other and the OPLAN?
6. Are CCIR, information requirements, and battle damage assessment requirements developed to support the plan and annexes?
7. Do the intelligence capabilities and resources request cycle support IO requirements?
8. Are the IO, civil-military operations, and public affairs annexes fully deconflicted and synchronized?
9. How does the staff integrate and synchronize IO actions?
10. Is a synchronization matrix employed?
11. Does the higher headquarters intend to synchronize and coordinate the implementation of IO support within the force?

INFORMATION, PLANNING, PREPARING, AND EXECUTION

1. Are information operations plans supportable by organic and nonorganic assets?
2. Is the target development process appropriate to produce IO targets?
3. Does the target development process adhere to doctrine and follow established procedures in support of IO?
4. Is information superiority over the adversary the criteria for target selection?
5. Do the targets selected support the IO?
6. Are potential targets evaluated for vulnerability and accessibility as well as fratricide avoidance?
7. Are selected targets and engagement methods reviewed for ROE compliance?
8. Is the command and control structure analyzed to identify critical friendly nodes and systems?
9. Is a threat assessment done to determine adversary offensive IO capabilities?
10. Is a vulnerability assessment of critical friendly nodes and systems conducted and are protection measures recommended and executed?
11. Are IO resources and capabilities sufficient to execute the OPLAN?
12. What security policy, guidance, and implementation procedures need to be modified to effectively conduct defensive IO?
13. Are security policy, guidance, and implementation procedures effective in protecting command, control, communications, and

computers (C4) intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) systems from information compromise, data corruption, and denial of service?

VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT

1. Can the unit protect its equipment and personnel from threat IO?
2. Is the IO threat to the unit's equipment and personnel identified and validated?
3. Is the unit's critical C4 systems, nodes, and networks identified and validated?
4. Has a vulnerability assessment been done on IO elements from:
 - Malicious software?
 - Insider threats?
 - Intrusion?
 - Unauthorized users?
 - Signals intelligence?
 - EW?
 - Physical destruction?
 - Electromagnetic pulse directed energy weapons?
 - Obscurants?
 - Biological and chemical weapons?
5. How interoperable are the elements of information systems between coalition partners?
6. Can the unit's defensive IO posture be improved by identifying and correcting component-level vulnerabilities in its information systems?
7. Have the components of the information systems been identified?
8. Have the critical components been isolated?
9. Are countermeasures being incorporated to correctly identify the components of the information systems?
10. Are security polices, guidance, and implementation procedures effective in protecting division C4 ISR from information compromise, data corruption, and denial of service?
11. Has the vulnerability of C4 ISR been assessed versus friendly and adversary IO capabilities?
12. Have the critical nodes or networks identified?
13. Has a vulnerability assessment been conducted?

Information Operations

14. Has the accessibility of vulnerable nodes or networks assessed?
15. Are security policy, guidance, and implementation procedures in place to protect critical information systems?
16. Are instances of adversary IO accurately identified and reported?
17. Are instances of IO fratricide accurately identified and reported?

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Chapter 11

Health Service Support

Coalition health service support (HSS) plays a key role in developing and maintaining combat power and can be a major factor in achieving strategic goals. The health services mission is promoting health, preventing casualties, and providing medical units capable of responding to the challenging worldwide deployments in coalition operations.

The coalition forces commander must ensure that forces deliver medical care rapidly, effectively, and efficiently without interfering with the coalition forces mission. This requires coordinating all HSS assets, a detailed health plan, and effective liaison between the senior health service officers of each nation. The concept of one nation's forces being treated by another nation's medical personnel or in another nation's treatment facilities should be achievable.

COALITION PRINCIPLES

11-1. For effective and efficient coalition medical support, personnel must adhere to long established principles. These principles should be the focus of each nation's health service. The following principles are discussed in depth in the QAP 082, *ABCA Medical Interoperability Handbook* (MIH):

- Conformity with operations and administrative plans.
- Proximity to forces being supported.
- Flexibility to change with the tactical picture.
- Mobility to maintain contact with supported units.
- Continuity of treatment through the casualty management system.
- Force protection and prevention to minimize the incidence of avoidable casualties.

- Command and control of health assets clearly defined at an appropriate level.

MEDICAL STAFF

11-2. Early identification of a command surgeon, responsible to oversee and coordinate HSS activities and advise the coalition forces commander, is a necessity. This surgeon should be involved in all planning and provide a representative to the assessment team (see Chapter 1).

11-3. The coalition forces surgeon's office, staffed with representatives from participating nations, must be established to facilitate the development of the HSS plan.

11-4. Specific responsibilities of the coalition forces surgeon during the force generation process include—

- Identifying HSS assets required to support the planned operation.
- Determining the disease and nonbattle injury (DNBI) rate for planning purposes.
- Obtaining the casualty rates from the operations officer.
- Developing the coalition forces health plan.
- Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other service sources.
- Advising the coalition forces commander on health risks relevant to the operation.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

11-5. As a coalition matures, the members will centralize their efforts by establishing a lead nation command structure. Subordinate national commands will maintain national integrity. The lead nation command establishes integrated staff sections with the composition determined by the coalition leadership. A national commander commands all of his elements including the supporting combat HSS system. For command purposes, the commanders normally delegate command of their assigned HSS resources to their senior HSS officer, located in the national support element. At each level of command, the senior HSS officer must possess the right of direct access to his commander on matters affecting the health of the command.

11-6. The command relationships of the HSS components must be clearly defined when the coalition forces are organized and embodied in the command directives issued by the authority creating the coalition forces to each national component commander.

Operational (technical) control of national HSS resources may be delegated to the senior HSS officer to facilitate overall coordination of resources in the theater of operations (TO). It may not be possible to establish command and control over all participants. Some nations may have specific requirements that limit how much command authority the multinational or national commanders can exercise over their forces. Command in its formal sense may not exist and a system of cooperation may exist in its place.

11-7. During operations, the responsibilities of the senior HSS officer at each level include—

- Advising the commander on the health of the command.
- Informing the commander and staff on matters affecting the delivery of health care.
- Developing, preparing, coordinating, and monitoring HSS policy and procedures with commanders of national health service units.
- Exploiting medical intelligence data and information derived from national and other service sources.
- Monitoring the activities of HSS assets assigned to their command.

SUPPORT PLANNING

11-8. HSS planning is done at all levels. The process aims at developing a system that provides for the best possible use of HSS resources in a given situation. Details of the HSS planning process are contained in the MIH. Considerations include the operational situation (commander's overall mission) and basic medical threat information including endemic diseases and climate appropriate to the TO. Issues specific to the operation also should be identified and considered in planning.

11-9. The following factors are normally critical aspects of HSS planning:

- Mission and type of operation.
- Operation concept or plan.
- Anticipated duration of the operation.
- Evacuation policy from the combat zone to the TO.
- Selection and consideration of the HSS aim.
- Health threat assessment, including medical countermeasures.
- Health surveillance.

- Provision of casualty estimate by the staff and effects on health care delivery.
- Availability of and restrictions on resources.
- Availability and access to host nation (HN) facilities.
- Command and control requirements and limitations.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

11-10. The health threat assessment is a composite of ongoing or potential enemy actions and environmental conditions that might reduce the effectiveness of the coalition forces through wounds, injuries, diseases, or psychological stressors.

11-11. The medical threat is a composite of—

- Infectious disease.
- Environmental conditions.
- Occupational health threats.
- Conventional and irregular warfare.
- Biological warfare.
- Chemical warfare agents.
- Directed-energy weapons.
- Blast effect weapons.
- Combat stress.
- Flame and incendiary weapons.
- Nuclear warfare.

POLICIES AND ISSUES

11-12. Force HSS policies must be established to cover the many facets of HSS in coalition operations. The coalition forces surgeon establishes policies with senior health services officers of contributing nations.

11-13. Subject areas for force policy and coordination include—

- Eligibility for medical care including noncombatants, contractors, displaced persons, refugees, and HN civilians plus appropriate reimbursement for nations.
- Coordinating HSS provided to or received from the coalition forces or other friendly nations to include using HN facilities.
- Mass casualty response plan.
- Establishing liaison with each nation's surgeon.
- Medical regulations, to include evacuating casualties to non-national medical facilities.

- Policies on medical countermeasures and vaccinations.
- Policies on the exchange of medical equipment accompanying patients.
- Policies on transferring a patient from one nation's evacuation system to another.
- Mechanism for returning patients to their parent nations after medical treatment in another nation's medical facility.
- Establishing an evacuation system for the TO, to include defining the TO holding and evacuation policy, mission responsibility, and evacuation control system.
- Determining HSS reports and returns required, including format, content, and frequency.
- Clinical documentation, policy format, and the exchange of clinical records that should include—
 - Medical records of the clinical condition with treatment of each patient so that continuing treatment may be related to past events and post deployment actions.
 - Information to notify the patient's next of kin.
 - Information to units for preparing personnel strength returns.
 - Statistical data for planning purposes and historical records.
 - Materials for medical research.
 - Information to track patients whose whereabouts is unknown.

DNBI COUNTERMEASURES

11-14. Historically, disease and nonbattle injuries have rendered more soldiers combat ineffective than actual battle casualties. Countermeasures must be taken to reduce DNBI. The capability to assess the soldier's health continuously and improve soldier sustainability is required to protect the force.

11-15. The following countermeasures ensure effective force medical protection:

- A comprehensive medical intelligence system.
- Continuous health surveillance.
- Countermeasure, prophylaxis, and immunization policies approved by the coalition forces commander and implemented by all contributing nations.

STANDARDS OF CARE

11-16. The coalition HSS must ensure continuity of patient management at a standard acceptable to all nations. Achieving the desired degree of patient management depends on the successful interoperability of treatment principles and clinical policies. Patient management is a continuous process of medical care, increasing in complexity by roles (levels) of capability to deal with the clinical needs of the patient. While optimal patient management is never compromised unless dictated by the combat situation, it is also a balance between many conflicting factors, such as—

- Treatment.
- Evacuation.
- Resources.
- Environmental and operational conditions.

11-17. Dental support is arranged in roles (levels), reflecting an increase in capability at each succeeding role. The functions of each lower role of dental support are contained within the capabilities of each higher role. A preventive dentistry program and more definitive dental care can be provided in the TO.

REQUIRED CAPABILITIES

11-18. The health support plan will address the following HSS functional areas, as described in the MIH:

- Preventive medicine.
- Combat casualty care.
- Hospital, surgical, and dental services.
- Ground and air evacuation.
- Stress management.
- Outpatient services.
- Veterinary services.
- Medical nuclear, biological, and chemical considerations.
- Health surveillance.
- Medical logistics.
- Blood.

CHECKLISTS

MEDICAL STAFF

1. Has a command surgeon been appointed?
2. Is there health services representation on the assessment team?
3. Have contributing nations provided staff or liaison to the coalition forces surgeon?

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. Have national elements appointed senior health service officers?
2. Are the command and control relationships of health service assets clearly defined?
3. Are there adequate arrangements for coordination and liaison between health service elements?

SUPPORT PLAN

1. Does the HSS plan conform to the operation and administrative plans?
2. Are all forces in reasonable proximity to HSS?
3. What flexibility is there in the HSS plan? Are there health assets available for surge situations?
4. Are the HSS assets sufficiently mobile to provide support to the force?
5. Will a casualty receive continuous treatment while in the health care system?
6. Have the following medical force protection issues been addressed?
 - Health threat assessment.
 - Medical countermeasures and vaccination.
 - Health surveillance system.
7. Who is entitled to treatment? Are cross-Servicing provisions in place?
8. What responsibility do the coalition forces HSS assets have to noncombatants?
9. What is the response to a mass casualty?
10. How will casualty evacuation be coordinated?
11. Are there sufficient evacuation assets?
12. How will medical regulations, both in and out of theater, be affected?

13. What are the coalition forces obligations and responsibilities under the Geneva Conventions?
14. What HSS reports and returns will be available to the commander coalition forces?
15. What are the arrangements for preventive medicine measures?
16. Are there adequate dental services available?
17. What provisions are there for combat stress management?
18. Who will inspect food stuffs from a health perspective?
19. How will units obtain Class VIII supplies?
20. How will medical equipment get repaired?
21. What is the blood supply system?

Chapter 12

Force Protection

As with information operations, each of the ABCA armies has a concept of force protection. In a coalition environment, philosophies of force protection may vary. The armies must coordinate at the earliest opportunity to ensure cohesion. The coalition commander should develop and coordinate force protection guidelines for the coalition as a whole. Effective force protection makes the command more credible as a coalition force. Within each national unit, national commanders will conduct force protection in accordance with their own national concept and coalition guidelines.

ASSYMETRIC THREATS

12-1. In warfighting, force protection minimizes, as far as is practical, the threat from information operations components overhead attack systems, weapons of mass destruction, and environmental hazards to rear operations in general and reduces interference by the civil population with military operations. This allows the commander to concentrate on his mission.

12-2. In addition to attacks by conventional forces, irregular extremist forces frequently threaten to attack. This may be indigenous or from a third party, and could manifest itself in a number of ways: from guerrilla and terrorist action to civil disturbance. In operations other than war (OOTW), such activity may be the main threat. One of force protection's primary aims is to protect the force from these attacks and to reduce civil population interference with operations, minimizing casualties and reducing loss of materiel. Using counterintelligence and human intelligence operations provides valuable security intelligence and aids force protection activities.

POTENTIAL FOR FRATRICIDE

12-3. A significant problem facing coalition force commanders is the potential for fratricide. Different operational procedures and languages compound this risk. Commanders must make every effort to reduce fratricide. They must know what situations can increase the risk of fratricide and, with other coalition forces, institute appropriate preventative measures. The measures include command emphasis, disciplined operations, close coordination across national commands, rehearsals, enhanced situational understanding, and the use of liaison officers to assess the fratricide risk and recommend potential solutions. Antifratricide measures should be included in the command's SOPs and other directives. The command must coordinate these measures with other coalition forces to ensure that all forces understand and follow them.

FIVE PRINCIPLES

12-4. The five force protection principles are common for national, coalition, and subordinate commanders:

- **Balanced threat assessment.** A threat assessment based on accurate and timely all-source intelligence must be conducted as the basis for selecting force protection measures.
- **Risk management.** Force protection is based on risk management (RM), not risk elimination. Casualties are a reality of military operations. Thus, commanders must balance the risks and balance them in the context of the campaign end state. The commander should ensure that RM is fully integrated into planning and execution with special emphasis on the hazards related to coalition operations. Safety in training, planning, and operations must be stressed. RM applies to all levels of military operations. The coalition commander must ensure that all nations are involved in this process.
- **Joint and multinational.** Force protection must embrace all force components, joint and multinational, within the area of operations and address all aspects of the threat.
- **Prioritization.** Notwithstanding that force protection must embrace the whole force, the capability to protect all force elements to the same degree probably will not exist. Priority should be given to centers of gravity, both tangible—like intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets or combat service support (CSS)—and intangible such as coalition cohesion or political will as influenced by public opinion.

- **Flexibility.** The force protection policy and measures must be flexible and capable of responding to a rapidly changing threat.

INCORPORATION OF CONCEPT

12-5. Force protection is not an issue that can be addressed separately or in isolation. It is an integral part of operations and must be incorporated into the coalition force commander's plan from the outset. The commander should include force protection in his estimate and directive to subordinate formations, stressing the priority. The lead nation headquarters may have to negotiate with national command elements to arrive at forcewide, force protection measures that satisfy national political imperatives, the coalition commander's intent, and the ability of the force to act cohesively. Subordinate formations' mission analysis must include force protection, incorporating the guidance given in the coalition force commander's directive.

12-6. Force protection is, primarily, a RM process shown as a diagram in Figure 12-1 on page 12-4. By producing an accurate and comprehensive threat assessment and covering all the constituent elements in the section above, the staff can produce an initial set of measures that address the actual threat. Force protection measures can be offensive or defensive. Examples are given in Appendix D. The proposed measures are balanced against the commander's mission and operational requirements and then tempered in application by RM. For example, measures that could be perceived as aggressive, such as patrolling in armored vehicles or hard-targeting, could impair a force's mission in many peace support operations (PSO) environments.

12-7. The lead nation headquarters distributes the final selection of force protection measures in an annex to the operations order. Implementing some measures may not be forcewide. The threat, particularly in OOTW, may not be uniform and may be subject to frequent review and change. Subordinate commanders, in consultation with the coalition force commander, may implement additional local measures.

12-8. The threat assessment is a continual process. As the situation changes or new intelligence is received, the staff will review force protection measures and adapt them to the new situation. As part of mission command, subordinate commanders will be directed to conduct local reviews, although the overall coordination of force protection will remain under the control of the lead nation headquarters.




Figure 12-1. Force Protection Process Diagram

NONMILITARY AGENCIES

12-9. Nonmilitary agencies may request some form of protection. As these threats may not always be transparent, these agencies may provide help in identifying them. The protection afforded to these agencies may enhance military credibility and thereby provide the coalition with an opportunity to advance a cooperative environment. However, the protection provided must be in proportion to mission requirements.

BALANCED CONSTITUENTS

12-10. There are two constituents of force protection. They are a balanced threat assessment and the derived measures. Together they provide collective security of the coalition force.

THREAT ASSESSMENT

12-11. Force protection is based on the threat assessment, the results of which determine those measures addressing collective protection, security, and health and safety. Overprotection, to counter an improbable threat, can divert scarce resources from achieving the mission. As part of the planning process, the national command authority should conduct a threat assessment. The national command authority may receive political guidance on which priority to take to avoid casualties. Where multiple adversaries exist, their varying intents, threats, and capabilities must be included in the threat assessment. An overall assessment of force protection requirements based on this threat assessment should be incorporated into the national military directive. Appendix B gives an example of a threat assessment format. It includes—

- The lead nation's national assessment that will provide the basis for the coalition force commander's estimate, directive, and start point for negotiations with the other troop contributing nations.
- National or local assessments that may reveal a threat to the civilian population of troop contributing nations or their forces in other theaters. This may include nonviolent activities such as psychological operations (PSYOPS) and other associated tactics aimed at influencing international perceptions. Countering such threats will be a national responsibility.

SELECTION OF FORCE PROTECTION MEASURES

12-12. Following the threat assessment, commanders can decide on appropriate protective measures. The threat assessment also informs the targeting process—the best or, indeed, only form of defense against certain threats may be attack. Force-level protection is those elements, normally the responsibility of the lead nation headquarters, which protect the whole force although responsibility may be devolved to subordinate commanders. Force protection measures fall under several broad categories:

- Theater missile defense.
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) defense.
- Air defense.

- Information operations.
- Countersurveillance.
- CSS protection.
- Physical protection (equipment and standards).
- Traffic regulation.
- Counterfratricide.
- Security.

12-13. Within an American-led coalition force, the US would probably provide theater missile defense. Coalitions without US coverage would have to rely not only on destroying surface-to-surface missiles (SSMs) and ground launchers, but also on preventing the adversary from neutralizing or destroying their associated command and control (C2) structures.

12-14. The threat assessment will determine the need to deploy specialist NBC assets and additional medical resources.

12-15. The coalition force airspace control commander (CFACC) will normally coordinate air defense (AD), including offensive and defensive, for the coalition force. The functions and responsibilities of the CFACC, airspace control authority, and the air defense commander must be integrated to unite joint air operations, airspace control, and AD operations in support of the coalition plan.

12-16. Information operations (IO) must be related to protecting the integrity and capability of the force. These operations must also physically protect the headquarters and communications assets, particularly isolated communications outstations. Specific measures—such as physical destruction, electronic warfare, PSYOPS, operations security, and deception that fall within an IO or C2 warfare plan—may be exercised nationally or in coalition.

12-17. Effective countersurveillance protects all force elements by making the locating and targeting of friendly forces harder. Countersurveillance measures should be part of each formation's SOPs, but direction should come from the lead nation headquarters, via subordinate commanders, based on the adversary's ISTAR capability from the threat assessment.

12-18. CSS units require specific protection in warfighting as they lack a self-defense capability against anything other than small-scale infantry attacks. The threat assessment should determine the likely level, scale, and warning time for attacks on CSS units. This will determine the allocation of additional forces to the rear area commander, coalition force logistics commander, or both.

12-19. The physical protection of the force has three aspects. They are structures, vehicles, and individuals. Structural specifications for field defenses are an engineer responsibility. Decisions on additional armor protection and other vehicle modifications will be made by national command authorities and implemented before deployment or in-theater. The subordinate commanders will control some personal equipment, such as general-purpose laser goggles and fragmentation vests, within lead nation headquarters guidelines. Decisions on protective dress policy should normally be delegated to subordinate commanders.

12-20. Military police monitor traffic regulations. Military police, working with local police authorities where appropriate, should advise on and implement measures such as route controls and enforce road discipline.

12-21. A counterfratricide policy covers areas such as weapons-tight zones and combat identification. The lead nation headquarters should formulate and coordinate this policy.

12-22. Security covers the physical and procedural measures, directed at lead nation headquarters level and integrated into the overall plan, but mainly applied at the local level. Security aims to minimize direct and indirect attacks on personnel, equipment, installations, and lines of communication by other than the adversary's main forces. In OOTW and PSO, where the adversary may not possess an air, SSM, and NBC capability, security is probably the main constituent of force protection. Some security measures will affect the civilian population. Such measures must be subject to appropriate legal advice that may need to incorporate the requirements of international law, host nation law, and any extant status-of-forces agreements or memorandums of understanding. Security incorporates—

- **Personnel security**, to include standing physical and procedural measures to protect personnel.
- **Positional or installation security**, to include physical and procedural measures to protect positions or installations from attack, sabotage, and theft.
- **Lines of communication defense**, to include patrols, mine clearance, overwatch, and bridge guards that ensure safe and secure lines of communications.
- **Security of information**, to include physical and procedural barriers to protect friendly information.
- **Liaison with host nation security forces**. Where the host nation security forces retain some operational

capability, liaison is vital to coordinate actions. In some cases host nation security forces may have primacy; in nearly all cases, they can provide intelligence and other related information about conditions in-theater.

- **Civil population control**, to include refugee and displaced persons controls, border and port controls, curfews, and other restrictions that minimize civil population interference with operations.
- **Prisoners of war and detainees**, to include providing secure accommodations and guard forces to contain prisoners of war and detainees.
- **Health defense** that aims to minimize casualties from disease and environmental hazards, such as pollution, poor sanitation, and climatic extremes. It incorporates—
 - Proactive measures, to include vaccination against endemic and biological warfare pathogens, acclimatization, medical surveillance, and clinical presentations.
 - Health education, to include advising personnel on prevalence of, and measures to prevent, endemic, and sexually transmitted diseases; measures to prevent casualties from climatic extremes, transmission of biological warfare agents, and persistent or residual chemical and radioactive agents.
 - Local environment advice, to include dangerous wildlife, hazardous terrain, and industrial and other pollution hazards.
- **Mine defense**, to include mine, unexploded ordnance, improvised explosive device, and bobby traps marking; clearing and awareness; and out of bounds areas.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

12-23. Force protection is a cyclical process, which assesses the threat and prescribes appropriate measures to reduce the vulnerabilities at risk from elements of that threat. It is not a separate staff function, but an implicit part of the operation plan. Coalition force construction should address the required elements or components of force protection and their C2 functions to implement the plan. All these elements must be brought together in a single coordination process at senior J3 staff level with joint coherence. As with all other aspects of military operations, responsibility for force protection rests with the coalition force commander. Nevertheless, day-to-day responsibility for force protection should be exercised by the chief of staff through the J3.

12-24. If the threat to rear operations is anything other than low, and particularly if adversary main forces threaten rear operations, then the coalition force commander may need appoint a rear operations commander separate from the force logistics head-quarters.

12-25.

COMBAT IDENTIFICATION

12-26. A significant problem facing coalition force commanders is the requirement to ensure common combat identification procedures and equipments that will reduce the potential for fratricide. Differences in operational procedures, languages and equipment compound this risk. Commanders must make every effort to ensure the integration of all coalition forces and hence reduce fratricide. They must know what situations can increase the risk of fratricide and, with other coalition forces, institute appropriate integration and preventative measures. All ABCA Commanders have the responsibility to ensure that all personnel under their operational command are trained in the recognition of both friendly and enemy forces likely to be met on the battlefield. This includes 'cross component' training and recognition. The measures include command emphasis, disciplined operations, close co-ordination across national commands and components, training, rehearsals, enhanced situational understanding, technical solutions and the use of liaison officers to assess the fratricide risk and recommend potential solutions. Commanders must understand the implications of anti-fratricide measures that need to be included in the command's SOPs and orders. The command must coordinate these measures with other coalition forces and across components to ensure that all forces understand and follow them. The command must also consider CID and fratricide issues early in the campaign planning cycle in order to allow to effective training and implementation prior to and during the campaign.

12-27. Because the difficulties in recognising forces increase as distances become greater and in conditions of reduced visibility, the principal means of preventing misidentification and fratricide, especially above the unit level, will be through effective command and control measures.

12-28. Commanders are responsible for prescribing the challenges and replies, and for the combat identification configurations to be used in both operations and training. Verbal and non-verbal

challenges and replies and combat identification configurations are decided upon at the highest applicable level of command, and notified in advance to subordinate formations and units.

12-29. Friendly land forces may identify themselves on the battlefield by the use of some of the following control methods and procedures that should be detailed in orders:

- Agreed Lines/Control Measures.
- Visual Signals e.g. Coloured Smoke, Lights and Pyrotechnics.
- Ground/Air Marking Panels.
- Manual and Automatic Challenge and Reply Systems. These will include verbal and non-verbal methods of challenging and replying including:
 - Use of coloured smoke, lights, pyrotechnics, panels/tapes or other signals;
 - Electronic methods, including radio calls on stipulated frequencies;
 - Electro-optic methods, including lasers.
 - Agreed methods of challenging to be used by guards and sentries.

Combat identification devices affixed to vehicles, personnel, equipment or installations to give them a distinctive signature when viewed through observation, surveillance and acquisition devices.

12-31. Identification may be established and recognition effected through:

- Appearance of personnel and equipment.
- Behaviour.
- Time.
- Sound.
- Electronic Emissions.
- Thermal Emissions.
- Signals.
- Location/Position Reporting (automatic or manual)

12-32. There is always a risk that combat identification measures may become compromised. They are therefore to be regarded as evidence but NEVER as proof of friendly character. Conversely, friendly personnel may not, in all instances, know the current reply to a challenge. The use of recognition or identification signals establishes the originator's friendly character to a friendly unit, and immediately indicates his hostile nature to an enemy. Normally, visual emergency identification signals are a low

security means of indicating friendly character. Emergency identification signals must be verified by the prescribed signals if practicable.

12-33. An example of a combat identification operational factors matrix is depicted on the next page.

EXAMPLE COMBAT IDENTIFICATION OPERATIONAL FACTORS MATRIX

FACTOR	SITUATION	EMPLOYMENT
Mission	<p>Attacking Forward Passage of Lines Advance to Contact</p> <p>Defending Rearward Passage of Lines</p>	<p>CIP: Mark toward front until passage of lines is completed then, mark sides and rear. TIBs: On, front arc shielded.</p> <p>Mark sides and rear, front as required for CAS. TIBs: Off to reduce chance of detection; On for CAS. CIP: Mark sides and areas facing friendly line. TIBs: On, front arc shielded.</p>
Enemy	<p>Few using Near IR sensors</p> <p>Most using Near IR sensors</p> <p>Few using Far IR sensors enemy side</p> <p>Most using Far IR sensors</p> <p>Capable of mounting CIP/TIB like -devices</p>	<p>Use BUDD Lights with caution</p> <p>Do NOT use BUDD</p> <p>CIP: On sides and rear - off to front. TIBs: On, front arc shielded.</p> <p>CIP: on rear only - off to front & sides and areas facing enemy. TIBs: On for specific purposes only, (e.g. convoy drills, CAS); front and/or side arcs shielded as necessary.</p> <p>Mount own CIP/TIBs with caution.</p> <p>Off</p>

Coalition Operations Handbook

FACTOR	SITUATION	EMPLOYMENT
	Probably mounting CIP/TIB like -devices	
Troops	Joint / Combined / Multinational Force	Rehearse with devices - co-ordinate use. Include COMBAT IDENTIFICATION use in EMCON and STAP orders.
Terrain (Weather)	Warm to Hot Clear, Dry	TIBs, CIP and BUDD performance good.
	Clear, Humid	CIPs and TIBs good, (Use White Hot Thermal Polarity); BUDD may have Halo effect.
	Cloudy, Humid - Wet	
	Cool to Cold Clear, Dry	TIBs good. CIP performance significantly degraded. BUDD may have Halo effect.
	Clear, Humid	
	Cloudy, Humid - Wet	TIBs and CIP performance good
	Wet & Windy	TIBs and CIP good; BUDD may have Halo effect. TIBs and CIP good; BUDD may have Halo effect. TIBs may be degraded, (shield from wind). CIP good; BUDD may have Halo effect.
Time	Day	TIBs, CIP, and Combat Vehicle Marking System
	Night	TIBs, BUDD, CIP

Key:

TIB – Thermal Identification Beacon

CIP - Combat Identification Panel

CAS – Close Air Support

BUDD – A compact an active IR source normally helmet mounted.

CHECKLISTS

1. Has a threat assessment been carried out?
2. Has the lead nation headquarters coordinated force protection measures for the coalition force?
3. Has the mission, to include the commander's intent, been disseminated? Do elements two echelons down understand it?
4. Who is the designated staff officer for force protection at the lead nation headquarters and subordinate headquarters?
5. What does force protection mean to each nation in the coalition?
6. Do rules of engagement (ROE) support force protection?
7. What are the force's antifratricide measures?
8. Do commanders at all levels understand how to apply RM?
9. Will any formation be required to carry out a local threat assessment?
10. Are countersurveillance measures included in formation SOPs?
11. What nonlethal technology is available, how is the force is trained to use it, and do the ROE authorize its employment?
12. What controls exist on using personal equipment?
13. What units are available to the command and when are they available?
14. What are the coalition airspace control measures?
15. What training is required once deployed?
16. Has a PSYOPS program been developed to support the operation?
17. Have PSYOPS assets been requested?

GROUND BASED AIR DEFENSE FORCE PLANNING

The Army air defense artillery is to protect the force from enemy interference from the air. This checklist assumes that the coalition air force has not neutralized a credible air threat.

OPERATIONS

1. OOTW and PSO may not have a credible air threat. If that is the case, is there a real need for ground based air defense (GBAD)?
2. Which GBAD package does the warfighting, low to high intensity conflict, require?

FORCE STRUCTURE

1. What is the coalition force structure?

2. What maritime and air assets will support the coalition force?
3. What is the desired GBAD orbit for early entry forces?
4. What is the desired order of arrival of GBAD assets?

COMMAND AND CONTROL

1. What is the commander's intent?
2. What is the coalition command structure for GBAD?
3. What airspace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aerial vehicle use?
4. Is there a requirement for a coalition airspace management cell at division or force level?
5. What will be the command relationships for GBAD assets in operational control versus tactical control situations?
6. What national sensitivities exist concerning the use of national GBAD assets?
7. What international procedures will apply during the operations—for example, AUSCANZUKUS, NATO, or ABCA?
8. What national GBAD command arrangements are required to support the coalition command structure?
9. What are the national requirements for liaison officers?
10. Will there be a coalition GBAD command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence (C4I) system? If not, how will national systems such as forward area air defense; command, control, communications, and intelligence; and air defense communications and information systems be integrated?
11. What coalition bearer communication system will be used? Examples include mobile subscriber equipment and PTARMIGAN.
12. Will the low level air picture interface be used?
13. What are the coalition real estate procedures for GBAD assets?
14. What battlefield coordination detachment requirements are available to coordinate land component commander requirements in the air operations center?

INTELLIGENCE

1. Has a coalition intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB), including air IPB, and estimate process been conducted? What factors were deduced by coalition force headquarters?

2. Is there a coalition G3 geoterrain database to assist in defining likely air avenues of approach and, consequently, the GBAD deployment plan?
3. What coalition force assets will need protection—seaport of disembarkation, aerial port of disembarkation, lines of communication, force logistic areas, force concentration area, forward battle area, a combination of these?

AIRSPACE CONTROL SYSTEM

1. Will the joint force air component commander concept be employed by the coalition? If so, who is the coalition air component commander and where is he located?
2. Will the coalition air component commander produce the airspace control plan, the airspace coordination order, and the air tasking order and act as the airspace control authority for the operation? If not, who will?
3. What interface will there be with the host nation civil aviation authority prior to the commencement of hostilities?
4. Where will the combined air operations center for the force be located?
5. Will the airspace control system aim for positive control or will national GBAD C4I limitations force it back to procedural control?

SITUATIONAL UNDERSTANDING

1. What type of recognized air picture (RAP) and local air picture systems be available?
2. Will there be a RAP?
3. How will maritime, land, and air units contribute to it?
4. What tactical data link system will be used?
5. Who will be the identification authority for the RAP (E3D, coalition air operations center, or sector operations center)?
6. Who will be the identification authority for situational understanding?

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. What will be the coalition ROE before hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?
2. Will the policy on pre-emptive air strikes be contained within the coalition ROE?
3. Who will define weapon control statuses such as weapons free, weapons tight, and weapons hold?

4. What mechanism will exist to update ROE during the operation?

IDENTIFICATION, FRIEND OR FOE

1. What identification, friend or foe (IFF) systems will be used?
2. What IFF types are fitted to GBAD systems?

ELECTRONIC COUNTERMEASURES

1. What electronic countermeasures (EMCOM) policy will be put in place by the force J6?
2. Does the EMCOM policy minimize potential suppression of enemy air defenses against the force GBAD assets?

LOGISTICS

1. What major equipment will coalition partners bring to theater?
2. What is the logistic structure?
3. What arrangements will be in place for coalition resupply of common ammunition?
4. What is the coalition policy on the scale of war reserve GBAD systems, by equipment type?
5. What will be the in-theater repair policy? What mutual support is planned for common equipment?

TRAINING

1. When will training take place either at home, en route to operation, or in concentration area?
2. Will in-theater ranges be available?
3. What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems in-theater?
4. What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?
5. What collective training will take place?

COMBAT IDENTIFICATION

The following questions/factors should be considered early in the campaign and constantly reviewed as operations develop:

1. What is each nation's policy regarding combat identification and fratricide avoidance?
2. What combat identification equipments and capabilities are used within each nation's forces?

- 3 How is cross component combat identification to be implemented?
- 4 What situational awareness capability exists within each nation's forces?
- 5 How do nations share situational awareness?
- 6 What combat identification procedures can be used across or throughout the coalition given time and resources?
- 7 What surveillance, target acquisition, night observation and counter surveillance (STANOC) capabilities exist within each nations forces?
- 8 What differences in national combat identification capabilities could influence the employment of those forces?
- 9 What capability does the enemy possess to identify coalition combat identification measures?
- 10 What additional control measures need to be put in place during operations?
- 11 What standards of combat identification /recognition skills do national forces have?
- 12 What combat identification related training have coalition forces conducted prior to arrival in theatre?
- 13 What combat identification related training is needed in theatre?
- 14 What are the combat identification issues associated with non-combatants in the battle-space e.g. NGOs, journalists, civilians and other security forces?

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Chapter 13

Legal

It is vital that commanders and planners of coalitions to understand the legal basis for all operations. All applicable laws must be obeyed. Even coalition forces conducting operations under UN mandates have no overall immunity under the law.

JURISDICTION

13-1. Jurisdiction applicability will be the national laws of the country sending the troops, as far as they have extraterritorial application outside the country concerned.

13-2. Status-of-forces agreements (SOFAs) for operations other than war (OOTW) grant total exclusion of host state jurisdiction, thereby providing a legal framework for the strictly international and neutral status of the coalition forces. The coalition force cannot be subject to the jurisdiction of any of the parties engaged in the conflict. To do so would lead to an undermining of impartiality. Additionally, the ability to arrest, detain, and try members of the coalition could directly influence the activities of the operation.

13-3. The consensual basis for the coalition's presence in the host country, its mandate, and the privileges and immunities of any civilians should be established. This should be provided in a document of treaty status. In most cases, an international organization, such as the UN, will perform this task. However, when the operation is an exercise in regional peacekeeping, it is incumbent on the participating nations to establish a legally sound basis for such an operation, which is sustainable under international law.

13-4. Most OOTW SOFAs allow members of the coalition to be exempt from local jurisdiction in civil proceedings for acts 'related to the official duties of the member.' A claims regime compensating for damages arising from such acts will almost always be a feature of any SOFA or other agreement with the receiving state. In matters not related to official duties, coalition members are

subject to local jurisdiction, with only a few minor concessions in favor of the force. If service members are involved in any incident while on leave, they may be sued for any damage they do or injury they cause.

13-5. International law applies to all operations. Coalition partners will be bound to comply with obligations which arise from the treaties to which they are party. As not all coalition members will be party to the same treaties, this may create a marked disparity between partners as to what they can or cannot do. Some obligations under international law arise from customary international law and are binding on states whether or not they have entered into a treaty on the subject. Most of the major rules relating to humane treatment of persons within the power of the force fit within this category.

13-6. The law of armed conflict (LOAC) will be binding on the coalition partners in any operation where a state of armed conflict exists to which the coalition members are a party. Some aspects of the LOAC, such as prohibitions on the use of certain weapons, may bind coalition partners even though no state of war exists. Even when not strictly applicable, the LOAC may provide guidance and may be applied as a matter of national policy. International human rights law is also relevant. In particular, treaty and customary international law prohibitions—such as those in respect of genocide, slavery, torture, inhuman treatment, arbitrary detention, and deprivation of civil rights—are binding on the force and its members.

13-7. The question of what element of international law is applicable may be a complex depending on several factual considerations. It is an issue on which expert legal advice may need to be sought. However, such operations will never be conducted in a legal vacuum and the major international law norms requiring humane treatment, respect for the life, rights, and property of noncombatants remain constant even when the treaty or customary basis for those protections differ.

PRISONERS OF WAR

13-8. Troops involved in peacekeeping operations under a UN mandate are in a special position. While such troops are expected to respect the laws in relation to the use of force, they are not parties to the conflict where they maintain peace. Thus, if they are taken prisoner by one of the warring factions, they are not prisoners of war, but are illegally held and must be immediately released. Although not a party to the conflict, members of the

coalition must comply with the spirit of all provisions of the LOAC.

13-9. In many operations, persons may be detained by the force who are not entitled to prisoner of war (POW) status. Either the situation has not reached the threshold of international armed conflict or the individual is not a combatant or otherwise entitled to enjoy POW status under Geneva Convention III. The force may also need to detain common criminals who pose a threat to the force or to law and order.

13-10. The status of a person who has been captured may not be known immediately. This is particularly so where opposing forces comprise or include irregular militia, there are civilians accompanying the force or acting as unlawful combatants, or a spontaneous uprising has occurred.

13-11. Similarly, there may be a question as to whether the situation has reached the point of being an armed conflict for the purposes of the LOAC or of being an international armed conflict. Detainees are often taken in circumstances, such as UN or other peace support operations, where the LOAC may not strictly apply. However, international law has developed to the point that no person who is in the power of a force is without legal protection.

13-12. International rules of humane treatment must be applied to any persons captured, arrested, interned, retained, or otherwise detained by coalition personnel. It does not matter whether the persons are POWs, retained personnel, internees, or detainees or whether captivity arises out of international armed conflict, armed conflict not of an international character, or during peace support operations.

ROE SUPPORT

13-13. All nations in the coalition will be provided with rules of engagement (ROE) by their respective chains of command. Coalition force ROE will be developed during the planning process by the force headquarters. Subsequently, subordinate formations, from nations other than that of the force headquarters, must develop supporting ROE. It is probable that some subordinate ROE will be at variance with the lead nation's ROE in compliance with national legal requirements and the parameters of national ROE provided by national chains of command. Subordinate ROE for any given national contingent must also provide clear national guidance on other coalition nations' weapons usage that would be prohibited by law or restricted in usage for that contingent.

Commands should also be aware that using another nation's capability that is prohibited by the command's national ROE may place the command at risk of national prosecution.

ENVIRONMENTAL CONSTRAINTS

13-14. Coalition members must be aware of the environmental constraints placed on coalition operations, particularly OOTW, by host country and participating nations' national environmental legislation. Military materiel restrictions, by one or more armies or the host nation (HN)—such as the use of depleted uranium rounds—may also limit the method by which forces conduct operations. Additionally, HN cultural and historical sensitivities must be considered as a factor in the operational planning sequence. The force headquarters should produce an environmental constraints and factors checklist for the force.

LEGAL ADVISOR

13-15. Legal support is essential to operations. Operations involve a myriad of statutory, regulatory, and policy considerations, both foreign and domestic. Therefore, a commander may call on his legal officer as often as a commander may call on his operations officer. The legal advisor can help him understand the problems of coalition operations and should be a vital part of the planning team before deployment. However, adherence to the law is the responsibility of command at all levels; legal advisors will not be those called to account if the coalition force carries out an illegal act. Operations may require subordinate commanders to become involved with local governments and conduct negotiations among competing factions. They will need a legal advisor of sufficient rank to influence the decision making process. National laws can limit permissible support. Invariably, the International Committee of the Red Cross or other international organizations will monitor coalition actions. The legal officer should be their single point of contact and responsible for—

- Advising the commander on operational law including the LOAC, ROE, law of the sea, airspace law, SOFA, and general international law, military justice, claims, legal assistance, and administrative law that encompasses environmental, contracts, and fiscal law.
- Reviewing operational plans for legal sufficiency and issues.
- Drafting basic policy for the force, regarding prohibited and permitted actions while deployed.

- Serving as a member of the ROE planning cell, providing advice and counsel on the development and promulgation of ROE.
- Negotiating with local governments concerning procurement, property seizure for military purposes, and scope of foreign criminal jurisdiction, although a SOFA or other international agreement provides for these areas.
- Ensuring all adverse actions are properly administered.
- Advising the commander on international directives that form the basis for the coalition. International agreements may cover such issues as HN support, diplomatic status, and foreign criminal jurisdiction; ROE; environmental matters; and medical treatment of civilians.
- Providing legal advice on refugees; displaced and detained civilians; psychological operations and civil-military cooperation (CIMIC); local culture, customs, and government; military and political liaison; investigations; the legality of landing fees; and interpretation of transit agreements.
- Establishing liaison as early as possible with coalition and HN legal officials, local police, authorities, and court officials who administer the judicial system handling thieves and trespassers.
- Implementing a system to pay for claims arising from inadvertently injuring people or damaging property, incidental to the operation.
- Advising the force on legal and fiscal restraints involving logistics assistance to nonmilitary organizations and multinational forces. The constraints are often technical and statutory in nature.
- Advising on the detention of personnel who attack or otherwise disrupt the force. The force must be sensitive to apprehension and turnover procedures, especially where there are distinct cultural differences in the area of operations (AO).

CIVILIAN POLICE FUNCTION AND ROLES WITHIN PEACE OPERATIONS

13-16. Involving civilian police adds a different dimension to the traditional peacekeeping model involving the military and diplomacy. It is a dimension that provides for a civilian and unarmed interaction within the community. It also provides for the independent and professional investigation of alleged breaches of

human rites and, through working with the community, the training and supervision of local police officials.

13-17. An analysis of recent peacekeeping operations will identify that most operations relate to internal rather than external conflict. Internal conflicts have consistently displayed that the rule of law, the legal system, is either weak or has collapsed. Civilian police can contribute to the nation building in this regard. Specifically, civilian police have certain skills to use: (1) establish the presence of civilian authority and (2) encourage a peaceful environment conducive to holding elections.

13-18. There are distinct differences between civilian police and military personnel; a failure to identify these differences means an under-utilization of skills on joint operations. One of the main differences is the police command structure whereby police in developed nations are empowered legally and organizationally to discharge responsibilities at the lowest level. In the exercise of police powers relating to a dispute between an offender and a victim, the constable is not subject to the direction of a senior officer. The formal accountability process is through the law—the court and not a senior officer.

13-19. A police officer's first duty is to cooperate with others in maintaining a normal state of society or keeping the peace. Civilian police cannot, and should not, take a military role in peace operations, but rather should be seen as an essential component for a peace operations resource inventory along with diplomacy and the military.

13-20. The core responsibilities of policing are—

- Prevention of crime.
- Protection of life and property.
- Preservation of the peace.

13-21. The most suitable environment for civilian police to be used in the police making process is when—

- All parties to the conflict have consented to and are prepared to cooperate with the peacemakers.
- The peace operation has the full backing of the international community.
- There is a willingness to contribute resources and properly finance the operation.

LONG-TERM BENEFITS

13-22. Long-term benefits can be achieved for countries emerging from peacekeeping operations (PKO) by using experienced civilian police. These include—

- The ability to identify potential criminal threats from countries emerging from PKO. For example, a growing body of evidence indicates that criminal interests are quickly exploiting vulnerable governments and communities. Similarly, countries with immature or ineffective police services can unwittingly provide safe havens for criminal operations.
- The development of contacts within emerging societies and reinforcement of the new police networks with solid principles.
- The development of police skills from newly emerging communities, giving officers heightened awareness of human rights requirements.

DEPLOYMENT PRINCIPLES

13-23. There should be—

- Clear and achievable goals.
- Clear time tables.
- Supportable and sustainable equipment.
- Minimum but effective use of force to achieve the mission goals.
- An acceptable level of risk to the police personnel.

13-24. In PKO, civilian police should maximize the use of local skills and resources to provide the most effective form of intervention. This should be supplemented by deploying small professional teams, rather than large numbers of often inadequately and inappropriately equipped and trained international police personnel.

13-25. In short, civilian police in the PKO environment should not be seen as a numbers game but rather as base that can organize and enhance indigenous resources towards a sustainable police outcome.

CAUTION

13-26. Military commanders should be cautioned that the ability of civilian police to perform their duties varies greatly from nation to nation. Police must be trained and prepared to undertake their basic police tasks before deployment.

COMMAND AND CONTROL

13-27. These arrangements vary from mission to mission and police are sometimes tasked under the operational control of the military or the Special Representative to the Secretary-General (SRSG) through an independent police commander. Command of a national contingent for domestic purposes—such as discipline and administrative matters—remains the responsibility of the national contingent commander. Military commanders may request police assistance, but the police should decide how to best achieve that task.

PLANNING CONSIDERATIONS

13-28. It should be recognized that to facilitate police taskings in peace operations and gain acceptance of the local community, it is preferable if the civilian police conduct their business unarmed. In fact, some troop contributing nations will not provide civilian police to a peace operation if there is an armed policy.

13-29. Police expertise needs to be utilized in the earliest planning of PKO. Policing intervention would ideally follow when forces had contained an organized armed conflict, and there is a need to harness community resources and protect it from disaffected elements—criminal or otherwise. Ideally the military and police can work together from the operation's outset to ensure that effective and sustainable peace is restored and maintained. Military commanders should consider from the beginning of the PKO whether they need a police liaison officer (LO), police advisor, or full contingent of civilian police.

13-30. In the early phases of peace support operations (PSO), coalition forces are likely to provide a certain level of police support. As the PSO mature, an international police force should replace the military personnel. International police forces will play an important role in training an indigenous police force so that this function can eventually be handed back to the host nation.

13-31. The military forces are likely to be the only law and order available until an international police force arrives. On arrival, international police forces will play an important role in maintaining law and order. The international force will also be a key participant in the training of a postconflict international police force.

13-32. The SRSG needs to take the lead and oversee forming a civilian police. The necessary process would be to impose a framework through military action and return to a civilian police force

as soon as possible. The SRSG should ensure that the civilian police policy corresponds with the overall intent. The UN force provides a coordination role. The local population needs to be involved.

13-33. Police officers usually must volunteer for missions. Before they volunteer, they must meet the language restrictions and any other imposed restrictions for the mission.

13-34. Police officers are not part of a unit or subunit and may need more logistic support from the military. This is made worse in that they generally arrive in theater individually or in small groups. In recent history, civilian police are one of the last groups to arrive in theater, increasing the difficulty in providing sufficient infrastructure and resources.

13-35. Civilian police with the skill areas in planning, logistics, and training should be involved in the planning cell. Furthermore, it would be beneficial if a civilian police officer is employed as a liaison officer in the G2 cell.

13-36. Another distinct difference is that police are trained to the doctrine of minimum force across the full spectrum of force application. When the military seeks assistance from police to carry out taskings, the request should be based on a desired outcome. It is up to the police as to how to deliver the outcome.

FUNCTIONS AND RESPONSIBILITIES

13-37. The operational functions and responsibilities are—

- Investigating criminal offenses.
- Performing specialist investigations including human rights and genocide investigations as well as election fraud.
- Providing police advisors.
- Providing scientific and forensics support to investigations.
- Preserving civil order through planned and implemented security operations (crowd control).
- Resolving disputes between civilians.
- Controlling and apprehending civilians in UN protected areas.
- Monitoring or controlling host country police.
- Escorting civilians through disputed areas.
- Maintaining public order at major incidents to include the security of the election process.

13-38. The training functions and responsibilities are—

- Training local police officers in general policing, investigations, and specialist areas such as close protection and scientific support.
- Training of UN military in crowd psychology and crowd control functions.

13-39. The humanitarian functions and responsibilities are—

- MEDEVAC transfers.
- Family reunions.
- Civilian prisoners and body escorts.
- Facilitation of civilian visits.
- Pharmaceutical delivery in disputed areas.
- Escort and patrols to assist aid distribution.
- The identification of deceased persons.

CONCLUSION

13-40. The success of a peacekeeping operation will be judged in the length of time that peace can be sustained regardless of whether mission objectives were achieved. In time, the significance of achieving mandate goals will blur if the rule of law again collapses. Analyzing current problems and planning for the future are considered essential elements for long-term peace. Civilian police are becoming more and more in demand for deployment to PKO; however, police in their own environments are being asked to do more with less. It is highly undesirable to deploy police personnel straight from recruit training to peacekeeping missions. In fact, the UN require that police have at least five years service prior to deployment. This means that if police are to be taken away from their home environment, their own communities may suffer from the loss of resources and experience.

CHECKLISTS

LEGAL (PRE- AND POSTDEPLOYMENT)

1. What areas come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
2. Do legal advisors understand national policies?
3. Are there force guidelines on the use of indirect fire as a demonstration of intent?
4. Has the SOFA been established with the receiving nation?
5. What are the key differences in SOFAs, if any, across the coalition?
6. What are the environmental constraints and factors that may affect the conduct of operations?
7. Is there a system to pay for claims arising from inadvertently injuring people or damaging property, incidental to operations?
8. What are the legal and fiscal restraints involving logistic assistance to nonmilitary organizations and other nations' forces?
9. What are the coalition force's obligations to war crimes' investigations and indictment?
10. What are the coalition force's obligations to the HN police forces, international police force, or both forces deployed within the coalition AO?
11. Is the coalition operating to standard codes of military conduct?
12. What are the estimated bounds of civil rights in the AO?
13. Are HN military judicial infrastructures intact? If so, has liaison been affected? If not, what resources and procedures are required to establish them?
14. What is the legal status of enemy prisoners of war?
15. What is the legal status of displaced persons or refugees?
16. What is the national policy for using antipersonnel mines?

RULES OF ENGAGEMENT

1. Are there generic ROE that all nations have agreed to?
2. What is the impact on each participating nation of the ROE?
3. How does each nation disseminate ROE to its soldiers?
4. Have the ROE been distributed to the soldiers and training conducted prior to deployment?
5. What are the key differences in ROE across the coalition?

6. Are there national “red cards” or points of contention concerning ROE that the commander must know?
7. Are there ROE on the use of indirect fire?
8. Is there a dichotomy between force ROE on the use of indirect fire and national force protection?
9. Does each nation have a common or clear understanding of the terms used in the ROE?
10. Has the use of certain systems or equipment—such as defoliants, riot control agents, land mines—been evaluated for its impact in relation to the ROE?

CIVILIAN POLICING

1. Will civilian police be required? When?
2. Is there a civilian police planner involved in planning?
3. Does the commander have a civilian police advisor, liaison officer, or planner?
4. What is the civilian police mandate?
5. What support will the police require?
6. Has coordination been established at all levels of command with the police?
7. What basic drills for the military can civilian police train for in crime scene quarantining and marking?
8. Is there a requirement for a police LO in the coalition headquarters (G2 cell).
9. Does the plan take into consideration the provision of civilian police LOs in the CIMIC environment?

Chapter 14

Engineers

Coalition forces may require coalition force level engineers to support coalition operations. These engineers will be responsible for a broad range of technical and dispersed, operational and tactical level, engineer tasks including geomatic support to meet the commander's intent. Significant engineer tasks include providing operational and tactical level mobility and counter-mobility support, as well as survivability tasks such as force protection, hazard reduction, and deception.

To ensure that engineer effort throughout the coalition is efficient and effective the coalition headquarters may require a coalition force engineer and staff to plan and coordinate engineer effort in support of the coalition commander's plan. The force engineer and staff may also command and control force-level designated engineer units on behalf of the coalition commander. This includes planning; setting engineer standards; supervising, coordinating, and controlling engineer support to the force and when necessary the local population. Engineers must also manage civilian engineer contractors who are engaged to complete tasks in the area of operations. Control of engineer support will be in accordance with the coalition commander's priorities and intent. Engineers will also be responsible for managing civilian engineer contractors that are engaged to complete tasks in the area of operations. For further details on employing engineers, refer to the *ABCA Coalition Engineer Handbook*.

GENERAL PRINCIPLES

14-1. All coalition commanders should consider several general principles when planning to employ engineers. Of these principles, a force engineer commander should adhere to both centralized

control and early warning to give engineer operations the best opportunity to succeed.

CENTRALIZED VERSUS DECENTRALIZED

14-2. When employing engineers, an important principle is that of centralized command with decentralized execution of tasks. This allows the force engineer assets to be optimized against the coalition commander's priority of tasks. These tasks could range from support to the combat units, combat support or combat service support units in such areas as bridging, roads, minefields, or hospital sites or to tasks directly for the coalition commander.

EARLY WARNING

14-3. Due to the long lead times necessary to plan, coordinate, purchase, and assemble the necessary engineer assets, including specialist personnel, engineer planning must have early and well informed warning. Since much of the necessary information will often not be available, contingency engineer planning will be essential, especially for critical issues and items. Therefore, commanders and staff need to provide as much guidance as possible, and the engineer commander and his staff will need to be proactive and seek guidance regularly. This results in an iterative planning process with engineer estimates initially being $\pm 50\%$, and aiming to reduce to $\pm 5\%$, as more reliable information becomes available. For example, engineers may need to consider redeployment issues early—possibly before deployment takes place—to ensure that critical path items are considered in a timely manner.

PRIORITY OF WORK

14-4. Since it will seldom be possible to execute all the required engineer tasks simultaneously, the force commander must lay down a clear priority of work after receiving staff and engineer advice. Engineers can then plan appropriately and avoid wasting scarce resources on low priority tasks.

CONCENTRATION OF EFFORT

14-5. Greater efficiency is obtained by concentrating engineer effort in turn on high priority tasks than by dispersing resources over several tasks.

ECONOMY

14-6. Engineers are trained and equipped to carry out technical tasks. It is costly to employ them on tasks that can be carried out by other arms. Similarly, it is also costly either to apply more engineer effort than necessary to complete tasks in the required time or to use engineer labor on the unskilled aspects of engineer tasks.

CONTINUITY

14-7. As handovers between engineer units will always increase the time to complete a task, and may also result in some minor points being overlooked, the unit which starts the job should be allowed to complete it where possible.

PROTECTION

14-8. Engineers cannot work effectively and protect themselves at the same time. Where possible, protection should be provided for engineers wherever necessary.

ENGINEER SUPPORT

14-9. The role of engineers is to provide geomatic, mobility, countermobility, and survivability support for the land force. The following paragraphs provide a summary of the typical tasks performed by engineers in a theater. All ABCA armies have differences with regard to the specific responsibilities of their engineers. For further detail, refer to the *ABCA Coalition Engineer Handbook* or liaison with force engineer staff is recommended.

GEOOMATIC SUPPORT

14-10. The successful conduct of land operations relies on commanders at all levels appreciating the terrain over which operations are to be conducted. The better the appreciation of this terrain, the greater the degree of certainty of successful prosecution of these operations. Up-to-date and accurate geospatial information enhances geospatial knowledge and hence situational understanding as well as assists commanders in gaining a better appreciation for the influence of terrain on operations. Engineers can provide specialist advice on the effects of terrain, climate, and weather through geomatic support.

14-11. Force operations will generally be characterized by only a basic level of geospatial information available to commanders and their staffs. This information may come from the host nation

(HN), by one or more coalition partners, or more probably a combination of sources. Furthermore, potential adversaries will likely have access to the same basic level of geospatial information plus a far more intimate knowledge of the chief administrative officer. Focused operational and tactical-level topographic support, using available geospatial information, can provide the force commander with decision support aids often unavailable to an adversary. This information could contribute significantly to minimizing the adversary's advantage gained by local knowledge. These decision support aids assist the force commander to visualize, operate on, and exploit the battlespace. Timely and relevant topographic support therefore has the potential to be a significant combat multiplier in coalition operations.

14-12. Quickly acquiring and providing appropriate and relevant geospatial information is generally a resource intensive undertaking requiring specialist capabilities. Topographic support relies on a fundamental layer of geospatial information being available. While the responsibility for providing topographic support to national component forces ultimately resides with their nations, efficiencies and synergies can be gained from coordinating this support. This is particularly true with acquiring and providing the geospatial data set. As a guiding principle, one nation should be assigned the lead responsibility for acquiring and providing geospatial information with other nations assigned supporting roles. This division of responsibilities is a high priority requirement and should be addressed early in the planning.

14-13. Given the complexities involved with acquiring and providing geospatial information, it should be coordinated at the highest possible level and the responsibility for coordination should be assigned to the force engineer commander. Longer-term information densification and maintenance responsibilities also need to be addressed early in the planning process. The force engineer commander should have access to an appropriate level of topographic advice within the engineer staff so he can aptly assign responsibilities.

MOBILITY SUPPORT

14-14. *Mobility support* is the action taken to enhance the tactical mobility of the force thereby allowing the commander the freedom to physically maneuver. Examples are—

- Breaching and clearing complex obstacles.
- Crossing rivers.
- Constructing roads and airfields.

COUNTERMOBILITY SUPPORT

14-15. Countermobility support is the action taken to deny the enemy freedom to physically maneuver thereby allowing the commander to select the time and place to engage the enemy. Examples are—

- Constructing tactical obstacles.
- Advising on the construction of protective obstacles.
- Conducting demolitions.

14-16. Survivability support is the action taken to enhance the force's ability to survive hazards created by the enemy or by nature. Examples are—

- Advising on countersurveillance.
- Constructing physical force protection measures.
- Constructing and operating essential services such as water and electric power.
- Assisting with a chemical, biological, or radiological hazard.
- Managing real estate.

CIMIC

14-17. Engineers play an important role in supporting civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) operations. This support may involve bridging and demining critical civilian areas or routes to enhance mobility; providing essential services such as power, water, sewage, and decontamination; firefighting; or providing shelter. Engineers must satisfy the needs of the force as a priority before offering any residual capacity to civilian authorities. Engineers may be limited to only providing advice to the civilian authorities and population on works being completed.

14-18. The force commander thus needs to provide clear priorities once he has received technical advice from his engineer commander or advisor. As with other engineer operations, early and informed warning for CIMIC operations is vital. Therefore, engineers need to be involved with the CIMIC planning cell to ensure that commanders and planners receive timely concerning what is possible and achievable—and what is not. Chapter 9 provides further guidance on CIMIC requirements.

CHECKLISTS

14-19. To assist commanders and staff in planning operations, an engineer planning checklist is provided.

PLANNING PHASE

Preparation

1. What are the engineer coalition tasks and the division of responsibilities to achieve those tasks?
2. What is the engineer command and control structure for the mission?
3. Has a force engineer been appointed? What is his command, control, and coordination authority?
4. What are the mission-specific training requirements and responsibilities?
5. What are the engineer coordination interfaces?
6. When will these coordination measures take effect?
7. What are the capabilities of the allies' engineer forces? Have these capabilities been passed on to other coalition forces?
8. Who is the lead nation and what force engineer capabilities are they providing?
9. What capabilities is the HN providing?
10. What coalition documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as QSTAGs?
11. What are the technical standards for the mission and who is the technical authority?
12. What are the unique area of operations characteristics that affect interoperability, such as severe climactic conditions?
13. Who is the lead nation for mapping? Who is maintaining the common map database?
14. What is the threat assessment for the enemy engineer force?
15. Are engineers involved in the targeting process to assess or estimate the work required to repair infrastructure and utilities and to clear the area and route of mines and unexploded explosive ordnance at the end of the hostilities?

Deployment

1. What are the phases and flow of engineer units, capabilities, and materiel to the mission area to support the plan?
2. Is this flow reflected in the coalition time-phased force and deployment list?

3. Is there any unique coalition engineer capabilities that could facilitate deployment?
4. Is there a clear coalition engineer command and control structure to facilitate force deployment and reception?

Lodgment

1. What are the force protection requirements?
2. Has a common coalition facilities survey been conducted and coordinated at the force engineer level?
3. Is an engineer materiel management system in place?
4. What is the agreed command critical engineer resources list?
5. What are the coalition funding arrangements for coalition engineer tasks?
6. Is there any specific engineer contracts with the HN or other contractors?
7. What is the HN actually providing in terms of engineer services?
8. How is engineer effort coordinated within the theater?
9. What is the coalition engineer priority of work?
10. What are the command and control mechanisms to affect common engineer tasks within the coalition?

EXECUTION PHASE

1. Has the engineer mission, tasks, or both changed?
2. Have there been any modifications to the engineer command and control structure?
3. What are the ongoing new engineer support agreements?
4. What coalition documents and agreements apply to the mission, such as QSTAGs?
5. What is the engineer information and intelligence collection and dissemination plan?
6. What, if anything, is the impact of nongovernmental organizations (NGO) and CIMIC activity in-theater on the engineer plan?
7. What is the interoperability disconnects between coalition engineer partners? Are they being addressed?
8. What are the in-theater engineer coordination mechanisms? Are they capturing lessons learned and informing all nations to allow in-theater adaptations to doctrine and new problems?
9. Are there any HN cultural constraints and restrictions that are or could impact on coalition engineer operations?

REDEPLOYMENT PHASE

Post Hostilities

1. What are the environmental considerations?
2. What is the remediation plan?
3. How do engineers plan to hand over projects, facilities, and resources?
4. What HN support or NGO will be receiving projects and facilities?
5. Is there any change to engineer command and control?
6. Is mission creep occurring in terms of engineer reconstruction tasks?
7. What engineer tasks will be required to facilitate redeployment?
8. What are the legal considerations for facilities and structures handover, taking cognizance of international agreements and protocol?
9. What are the CIMIC considerations?

Redeployment

1. What is the plan for phasing engineer redeployment?
2. Have the engineer lessons learned been captured, documented, and recorded?

Chapter 15

Public Affairs and the Media

The modern battlefield has changed dramatically and so has the ability of the media to report from the battlefield. Technological advances ensure that future operations will unfold on a global stage before a worldwide audience, with tactical actions and the hardships of soldiers and civilians alike having an increasing impact on strategic decision making. Real-time visual images of operations, both positive and negative, will continue to influence public understanding and support.

Media presence on the battlefield is a reality that commanders must consider during mission planning. They must understand and account for media capabilities and requirements. Failure in this regard will not prevent the media from covering coalition operations, but it will ensure that the media will use alternate sources for information, and coalition forces will have lost the ability to influence the outcome of the story.

INFORMATION ENVIRONMENT

15-1. The global information environment (GIE) contains those information processes and systems that are beyond the direct influence of the military, but which may directly impact on the success or failure of military operations. The media, international organizations, and even individuals are players in the GIE. Coalition operations can be influenced through planned or inadvertent messages communicated via the GIE. Media coverage of coalition operations can be broadcast in real-time, or near real-time, to our troops, our national publics, our allies, and our adversaries.

15-2. The military information environment (MIE) consists of information systems and organizations, both friendly and enemy—or belonging to one of the belligerent factions in operations other than war (OOTW)—military and nonmilitary, that support, enable, or significantly influence military operations.

Information superiority is a key factor in the GIE and essential in the MIE for a commander to achieve success.

15-3. Commanders must understand the pervasiveness and capability of the media, not only in its ability to report on an operation, but also on its ability to influence target audiences with respect to the *legitimacy* of that operation. Commanders must anticipate how an adversary may attempt to use the media to achieve his own version of information superiority. Commanders must also have the means to counter these attempts at misinformation and propaganda to mitigate the effects on the morale of his own troops.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OBJECTIVES

15-4. Public affairs (PA) aims to help ensure information superiority. The PA office seizes the initiative with respect to media operations and puts in place programs that—

- Protect soldiers from the effects of enemy propaganda, misinformation, and rumor.
- Support open, independent reporting and access to units, soldiers (within the limits of operations security).
- Establish the conditions leading to confidence in the coalition.
- Provide a balanced, fair, and credible presentation of information that communicates the coalition's story and messages through an expedited flow of complete, accurate, and timely information.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS OPERATIONS

15-5. PA operations assist the commander in understanding and operating in the GIE. These operations support the commander's efforts to meet the information requirements of internal and external audiences without compromising the mission.

15-6. Understanding that *perception* of an operation can be as important as the *execution* of the operation, PA staff support the commander by monitoring media perceptions and reporting trends. The staff prepares and disseminates clear and objective messages about the operation to target audiences to address any instances of misinformation or imbalanced reporting.

15-7. Successful operations require an accurate PA assessment of the situation. The PA assessment is the continual analysis of the GIE and its potential impact on the operation. This assessment

provides the commander with a thorough examination of the critical PA factors, such as—

- The number, types, and nationalities of news media representatives in theater.
- The identification of media personalities and their respective reporting trends or biases.
- Media needs and limitations.
- Media transportation and communication capabilities or requirements.
- The perception of past, current, or potential operations by internal and external audiences.

The chief challenge for the coalition PA staff is to develop a plan that not only supports the commander's concept of operations, but also takes into account the PA requirements of the coalition partners.

15-8. The forces of each nation forming the coalition are familiar with their respective national media organizations and their methods, but these may be dissimilar between countries. Commanders and PA staff must take these differences into account when developing working relationships that will allow for open and accurate reporting with a minimum of ground rules to ensure operations security.

15-9. PA operations consist of four key elements:

- **Planning.** PA planning is an integral part of operational planning and must be included at the very outset of the planning process. Public affairs officers (PAOs) seek to establish the conditions which lead to confidence in the coalition. They expedite the flow of complete, accurate, and timely information that communicates the coalition perspective. This helps to ensure media understanding of the events covered and thus contributes to fair and balanced reporting. Included in this planning element is the requirement to provide issues management and crisis communications advice to the commander and senior staff on a wide range of issues, operational and nonoperational.
- **Media operations.** Commanders and their staffs must accurately assess the level and intensity of media interest in their operation. Media operations involve advising the commander on the likely implications of media reporting on his chosen course of action. Media operations involve—
 - Facilitating media coverage of operations by anticipating and responding to the needs of the media (this includes providing access to official spokespersons and subject

matter experts). In-theater media may have additional requirements such as transportation, accommodation, and emergency medical treatment. Most media organizations will come prepared with either the necessary logistic support or the money to buy it. However, whatever level of support is provided to the media, it is important that it be consistently applied.

- Verifying media accreditation and assisting with accreditation, as required.
- Discussing the “ground rules” with respect to media coverage of ongoing operations and ensuring enforcement, as required.
- Establishing and operating an information bureau.
- **Internal communications.** There is an essential and constant requirement to inform coalition troops on operational issues as well as national and international events. This is an important function as it contributes directly to the maintenance of morale and helps to counter rumors and misinformation.
- **PA training.** Given the level of media interest in military operations, all soldiers must learn how to deal effectively with the media, both on and off the battlefield. Soldiers of all ranks must receive media awareness training prior to deployment. Attention must be paid to individuals selected as “official” spokespersons; however, the potential exists for any soldier to be asked to respond to media queries regarding their jobs and personal experiences.

INFORMATION BUREAU

15-10. The coalition force should establish a coalition information bureau (CIB) staffed by PAOs with necessary logistic support. The CIB facilitates media coverage within the area of operations (AO) by sustaining the efforts of those media representatives accompanying units and by communicating with media agencies outside the AO. In taking advantage of the principles of modularity and flexibility, the CIB must expand its capability in concert with that of the deploying force. It must be prepared to deal with the potential for a large number of media deployed throughout the AO.

15-11. Information is important to coalition force personnel and their families at home. The CIB should ensure that the international media, including the national media of the coalition partners, receive information on the coalition force’s activities. The morale of the coalition force members often is influenced by what

their family members report they have seen or heard on television and radio. Be prepared to deal with the language requirements of the various target audiences.

PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CIVIL AFFAIRS, AND PSYOPS

15-12. The common ground between PA, civil affairs (CA), and psychological operations (PSYOPS) is information. CA uses information to inform the in-theater public on assistance programs and reconstruction projects in their area. PA uses information to manage issues and inform the troops and the international media community. PSYOPS use information to attempt to change perceptions, opinions, attitudes, behavior, and beliefs of a population to gain support for civil tasks and of military activities.

15-13. PSYOPS must use government or military means for producing and disseminating messages, not the media. PSYOPS can use information from the media to reinforce its messages; however, PA must not be used to disseminate PSYOPS messages. Coordination is essential between CA, PA, and PSYOPS to ensure that no contradictions or divergences occur. The information operations coordination cell (chaired by the coalition J3/G3) normally coordinates these activities.

PA GUIDANCE

15-14. The media will want to talk to commanders and troops. This is a good idea, but commanders must avoid staged shows. Experienced media will immediately spot them. It is better to let the media talk to the troops after PA guidance has been issued to the troops and “ground rules” for reporting have been explained to accredited media. PA guidance to soldiers should include—

- The soldier’s right to talk to the media.
- Everything said is “on the record.” What is said will be quoted by name.
- Do not discuss classified or sensitive information and do not comment on policy.
- Be honest.
- If you do not know the answer, say so.
- Do not speculate. Stay within your area of expertise.
- Listen to the question carefully. If you are unsure of a question, ask the reporter to clarify it.
- Treat the media as professionals and respect their deadlines.

- Respect host nation sensitivities and speak slowly when necessary.
- Keep your answers brief and to the point.
- Always maintain eye contact with the interviewer.
- Avoid military or technical jargon.
- Relax, be yourself, and be friendly.

CHECKLIST

1. What areas come under coalition control and what areas remain national issues?
2. Has coordination been affected with other national PAOs or equivalents?
3. What is the plan for handling publicity, news correspondents, and journalists?
4. What are the biographical backgrounds of coalition senior leaders and unique equipment?
5. Has the senior PAO met the coalition senior leaders?
6. Who is the senior operation spokesperson for the coalition force?
7. Has the coalition information bureau been established?
8. Has a coordinated media policy, to include a system to provide credentials for the media, been established? This allows some control over who attends coalition force briefings.
9. Does the media understand the end state and how the force is progressing toward it?
10. Has the command aggressively countered inaccurate information with subject matter experts?
11. Is predeployment media training complete?
12. Has the senior PAO identified points of contact with agencies who will operate in the AO to arrange referrals of media queries regarding their operations?
13. Does the command have a PA plan that includes crisis management? Is the senior PAO a member of the crisis management team?
14. Does the PA plan reflect the cultural differences of all troop contributing nations and the host nation?
15. Does the PA plan consider the impact of print, radio, televised, and Internet media?
16. Does the command have a PA plan that—
 - Provides a contingency statement to use in response to media queries before initial public release of information concerning the coalition force and its mission?
 - States who (from which nation and when, or all nations simultaneously) makes the initial public release concerning the coalition force and its mission?
 - States agreed-upon procedures for the subsequent release of information concerning the coalition force and its national components?

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- States specific requirements for combat camera support, including communicating to subordinate units the need for operational documentation?

Chapter 16

Fire Support

16-1. To maximize the fires of the coalition force and to minimize the possibility of fratricide, the coalition force commander must ensure that he develops good fire support coordination throughout the coalition force. The coalition commander employs firepower to destroy, neutralize, suppress, and demoralize. It is essential in helping to defeat an opposing force's ability and will to fight. *Firepower* is the amount of fire that may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system (NATO). Applying firepower requires consideration of the volume, duration, and lethality of fire; the precision and range of munitions; and the ability to quickly coordinate the use of surveillance, targets acquisition, and strike assets. Firepower is used to achieve decisive effects. Employing firepower will most likely be a joint activity. Firepower capability comprises doctrine, organization, personnel, training, equipment, and sustainability. It is a system of systems including command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence; surveillance and target acquisition; delivery platforms; munitions; and logistics. This includes firepower delivered by air, land, sea, or space systems.

16-2. Fire support is a major component of the overall firepower capability. Fire support is the application of lethal and nonlethal effects. The effects of fire support, provided from joint force assets, are linked directly to the objectives of the coalition force commander. Coalition force commanders and their staffs synchronize the execution of fire support in time and space to increase the total effectiveness of the force. This encompasses a wide range of weapon effects. To maximize the effects of employing fire support, the coalition must integrate joint and multinational systems and procedures to determine priorities, identify and track targets, identify delivery systems, and assess postattack results. The staff must judge whether resources and requirements are balanced over the course of a coalition campaign or operation, ensuring the appropriate mix of forces and capabilities exist. Effective joint fire support will contribute substantially to coalition success. Joint detailed integration of joint fire support with maneuver of the coalition force is critical.

CHECKLISTS

FIRE SUPPORT PLANNING (NATURE OF OPERATION)

1. What is the nature of the coalition operation? For example, is it littoral or land and air phases?
2. Where does the operation lie in the spectrum of conflict?
3. What is the likely scale of effort?
4. What is the likely duration of the operation? Issues of rotation and sustainability?
5. If it escalates, are there contingency measures to meet the requirement for increased force levels? Will it be from national back-filling or fall under a call-up of reserves policy?
6. What are the intended end state and exit strategy?
7. What is the commander's intent?
8. Where is the area of operations? Consider the climatic, terrain, cultural, political and socio-economic issues.
9. What is the overall coalition force structure?
10. What capabilities need to be held at coalition level, and which will provide national support only?
11. What fire support assets are the coalition providing? What are their capabilities and command status?
12. What is the desired fire support organization for early entry forces?
13. What is the deployment time frame?
14. How will the deployment be carried out (land, air, or sea)?

COMMAND AND CONTROL

Command

1. What are the coalition levels of command?
2. What will be the command relationships for fire support assets?
3. What is the command arrangement for conducting coalition deep operations?
4. What are the intercomponent liaison arrangements?

Control

1. Will offensive support real estate requirements be considered in the overall deconfliction of real estate by G3?
2. What is the requirement for liaison officers on a 24-hours per day basis?

3. What battlespace control procedures will be used to deconflict air, aviation, indirect fire, and unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV)?
4. What battle spectrum management requirements exist in relation to electronic warfare?
5. What will be the coalition rules of engagement (ROE) before beginning hostilities and after committing the first hostile act?
6. What is the policy for using indirect fire systems using non-precision munitions within the ROE?
7. What is the policy for using smoke and illumination within the ROE?

Communications and Information Systems

1. How will national communications and information systems be integrated?
2. What coalition bearer communications systems will be used?
3. If automatic interfaces are unworkable, what will be the liaison officer requirements? How will digitized and nondigitized forces operate together?

Surveillance Target Acquisition

1. What situational understanding will the coalition have?
2. Will there be a common operational picture? How will intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) for maritime, land, and air units contribute to it?
3. How will ISTAR assets be coordinated and tasked? What are the battle damage assessment requirements?
4. Is the policy for UAV over-flights of opposing forces prior to hostilities?

Delivery Systems

1. What is the desired order of arrival of fire support assets?
2. What are the characteristics, capability, and quantity of fire support assets, including range, tactical, and operational mobility and authorized munitions?
3. What is the coalition policy for survey, meteorology, and calibration?

Weapons

1. What is the capability and interoperability of coalition munitions including proofing compatibility and ballistic data contained in fire control computers?

2. What are the planned ammunition stocks and expenditure rates?
3. What are the key interoperability constraints?
4. Are there any special ammunition handling, storage, and environmental considerations or limitations?
5. Are there any occupational health and safety constraints?
6. Are volumetric (blast) munitions available? If so, what are the constraints on their employment?
7. What nonlethal weapons are available?

Logistics

1. What fire support guidance is contained in the *Coalition Logistics Planning Guide*?
2. What is the coalition policy on battle casualty replacement?
3. Based on identified battle winning equipment, what is the priority for repair of fire support assets?
4. What will be the in-theatre repair policy?
5. How will ammunition be tracked around the battlefield?
6. What are the national integrated logistics systems (ILS)?
7. What key ILS might be identified as a coalition system or capability?
8. Are there any commercial or national constraints on employing equipment?

Doctrine

1. Is there a common coalition fire support doctrine, including definitions, fire support coordination procedures?
2. If no common coalition doctrine exists, what is the lead nation's fire support doctrine?
3. What are the applicable QSTAGs and other standardization agreements?
4. What is the availability of doctrinal publications?

Organization

1. What is the coalition structure and manning?
2. What limitations are there on the national contingent structure?

Training

1. When will training take place? At home, en route to operation or in concentration area?
2. Will in-theater ranges be available?

Fire Support

3. What will be the policy on test firing weapon systems in-theater?
4. What part will simulators play in the transition to war training strategy?
5. What collective training will take place?

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Chapter 17

Maritime Operations

Multinational maritime operations (MMOPs) cover a range of military activities undertaken by multinational forces, in peacetime or in time of war, to exercise sea control or project power ashore. Maritime forces are primarily navies; however, they may also include maritime-focused air forces, amphibious forces, or other government agencies charged with sovereignty, security, or constabulary functions at sea. When a situation requires that maritime, land, air, or a combination of forces operate together, the operation is referred to as joint.

CHARACTERISTICS OF MARITIME FORCES

17-1. The qualities that characterize maritime forces as political and military instruments in support of government policies are readiness, flexibility, self-sustainability, and mobility. Maritime forces may be used to reassure or provide succor to allies and friends, deter aggression, influence unstable situations, or respond to aggression.

READINESS

17-2. One of the strengths of maritime forces lies in their immediate availability to respond to contingencies. By maintaining proficiency in the capabilities necessary to resolve major conflicts, maritime forces can provide a wide range of services to support peacetime operations.

FLEXIBILITY

17-3. Maritime forces have been employed to resolve many international crises since the end of World War II. The inherent flexibility of maritime forces permits political leaders and commanders to shift focus on, reconfigure, and realign forces quickly to handle various contingencies. Maritime forces provide a wide range of weapons systems, military options, and logistic or administrative skills. Maritime forces can control the seas and provide diplomatic

leverage in peace or times of crisis. They perform tasks ranging from forcible entry and strike operations to noncombatant evacuation operations (NEO), disaster relief, and humanitarian assistance. The excellent strategic and tactical command, control, and communications capabilities of maritime forces provide for a uniquely controllable force that complements diplomatic efforts. Maritime forces offer presence without occupation and deterrence without commitment. They represent a worldwide, balanced, and autonomous intervention capability, which may be employed nationally or multinationally.

SELF-SUSTAINMENT

17-4. Although the degree of self-sustainment achievable by an allied force will be determined by the nature of the operation and the types of units committed by the participants, maritime forces can operate in forward areas at the end of long supply lines without significant land-based supply structure. With replenishment-at-sea, on-station replacement of personnel and ships, and the resilience of ships (their ability to sustain damage and continue the mission), maritime operations may be continued indefinitely.

MOBILITY

17-5. Maritime forces are much less constrained by political boundaries than air or ground forces. Maritime forces can deploy virtually anywhere in the world and transit the seas in accordance with international law. With their strategic, operational, and tactical mobility, maritime forces can monitor a situation passively, remain on station for a sustained period, respond to a crisis rapidly, and deploy in combat with authority. Mobility enables maritime forces to respond from over the horizon, becoming selectively visible and threatening to adversaries, as needed. If diplomatic, political, or economic measures succeed, maritime forces can be quickly withdrawn without further action ashore. Maritime forces can also respond to indications of pending crises by relocating rapidly from one end of the theater to another or from one theater to another, usually independent of fixed logistics. In combat, the ability to position maritime forces quickly provides commanders with a significant tactical and operational advantage.

EMPLOYMENT OF MARITIME FORCES

17-6. Maritime forces seek to ensure continued, unhindered, and unrestricted use of the sea to further national or shared interests and objectives. The following paragraphs discuss the nature of

maritime force employment in peace and war. It must be remembered, however, that the distinctions drawn between peacetime and wartime operations are not clear-cut in many instances.

OPERATIONS IN PEACETIME

17-7. Maritime forces lend themselves well to various peacetime operations, which differ from wartime operations in some respects. Although in some situations peacetime operations are designed to influence governments and military forces (presence and deterrence), they are increasingly designed to influence non-national entities, such as criminal organizations and transnational groups. Nongovernmental and nonmilitary organizations often have the expertise and finances to conduct certain operations and may be involved in peacetime operations to varying degrees. Maritime forces should be prepared to deal with these other organizations and recognize the contributions that they can bring to an operation. In some contingencies, maritime forces may operate more in a supporting or enabling role, contributing a supply of well-trained and equipped personnel who can adapt and sustain themselves. Peacetime operations will normally have a varying mix of security, humanitarian, and environmental components and may be grouped under the following broad headings.

Presence and Deterrence

17-8. The presence of maritime forces can avoid confrontation and support political aims without necessarily violating national sovereignty. Maritime forces may strengthen diplomatic efforts by “showing the flag” (presence) in a benign fashion as a general indicator of interest and latent capability, thereby helping to prevent emerging conflicts. Alternately, maritime forces can be deployed as a deterrent against specific actions. Maritime forces can also “shield” states at their request by establishing an at-sea presence within territorial seas, thus providing a “trip-wire” function in threatened areas. These operations are, however, fraught with danger because not all parties may cooperate with or refrain from challenging such deployments. Nevertheless, using maritime forces is less intrusive than using land-based forces

Peace Operations

17-9. The term *peace operations* is used generically to cover a range of activities, including conflict prevention, peacemaking, peacekeeping, peace enforcement, and peace building. The use of maritime forces in peace operations will usually complement land forces and may involve a considerable range of tasks. These tasks

may include monitoring or observing cease fires, interpositioning between the maritime forces of belligerents, establishing disengagement zones, providing a neutral venue for supervised negotiations, and preventing forces of the belligerent parties from violating agreements.

Humanitarian Operations

17-10. Maritime forces are well suited to support humanitarian aid efforts that relieve or reduce the suffering, loss of life, and damage to property caused by natural or man-made disasters. In particular, military forces are useful to provide a secure environment to allow the humanitarian relief efforts of other organizations to progress as directed by cognizant legal authority. Short notice readiness, flexibility, and mobility allow maritime forces to respond quickly to a disaster, particularly if they have Marines or other troops embarked. Maritime forces can be tailored to supplement or complement the efforts of the host nation, civil authorities, or nongovernmental organizations. Maritime forces may provide personnel, equipment, supply, medical and dental care, security, limited construction and engineering, communication, and transportation support.

Protection of Shipping and Freedom of Navigation

17-11. When nations make claims over contested waters, challenges to freedom of navigation may arise. In such instances, maritime forces can exercise freedom of navigation by traversing or exercising in the contested waters (in accordance with recognized international law). Maritime forces may also protect merchant shipping with flag-state consent that could otherwise be threatened.

Maritime Constabulary Tasks

17-12. In the last three decades developments in international maritime law, particularly the extension of national authority further from shore, has resulted in various low-intensity constabulary functions. These functions are likely to involve naval forces as well as coast guards, civilian maritime agencies, or both. Specific functions may include—

- Enforcement of fisheries regulations and exclusive economic zone arrangements.
- Operations against piracy.
- Counterterrorism.
- Interdiction of drugs and other contraband trade.

- Interdiction of the slave trade or illegal migration.
- Enforcement of environmental regulations.
- Control of traffic separation schemes and other maritime traffic management tasks.

Environmental Operations

17-13. Maritime forces may also be tasked to respond to oil spills and other environmental disasters. In these cases, maritime forces can be a valuable source of trained and disciplined personnel as well as equipment. Often these operations will be conducted in concert with or in support of other governmental, international, or private agencies whose specific missions include disaster response.

Embargoes/Maritime Interdiction Operations

17-14. Maritime forces may be tasked to enforce internationally imposed sanctions. Effectively enforcing sanctions may require sophisticated coordinating military operations at sea with those in the air. This is especially true in areas of armed conflict or high tension, where the absence of commonly understood and accepted rules of engagement can greatly increase the risks to enforcement units. Assigned tasks may include stopping, inspecting, seizing, and diverting suspect ships and aircraft and establishing and enforcing a maritime exclusion zone for the maritime vessels of one or more parties to a conflict.

Noncombatant Evacuation Operations

17-15. Forces conduct noncombatant evacuation operations to move personnel from an area where deteriorating security conditions place lives at risk. This type of operation is similar to an amphibious raid, involving swift incursion, temporary occupation of an objective, and fast withdrawal after the mission is complete. During NEO, rules of engagement usually limit the use of force to that required to protect the evacuees and the evacuation force. Maritime forces may have an integral capability to accomplish NEO without assistance from other forces. If not, ships stationed at sea may provide lift capability and the close, secure staging areas for other forces. By evacuating directly from a secure site to ships outside territorial seas, a very low political profile can be maintained. The evacuation force commander must be prepared to deal with the political sensitivity of the situation that will be monitored, if not controlled, from the highest level.

OPERATIONS IN WARTIME

17-16. In wartime the activities of the maritime force are normally aimed at achieving sea control and projecting power ashore.

Sea Control

17-17. Use of the sea requires a degree of control. Total sea control is rarely possible as long as an adversary continues to threaten forces in the area. Therefore, a degree of sea control is normally established within a designated area for a defined period of time. Sea control must provide security for forces, facilities, and sea lines of communications. Large maritime forces using an area for their own purposes can usually achieve and maintain sufficient sea control, but smaller specialist forces and civilian shipping require sea control to be established by other forces or escorts. Sea denial is a subset of sea control. Sea denial is achieved when maritime forces prevent an opposing force from using the sea for its own purposes. Sea denial is normally exercised in a given area and for a limited time.

Power Projection

17-18. Conflicts at sea rarely exist in isolation from a land campaign or the pursuit of territorial objectives. Even when the maritime component is operationally dominant, the ultimate outcome in the theater is likely to depend on success ashore. Maritime forces often must be prepared to operate in the littoral environment to project force ashore as part of joint operations involving naval, air, and land forces. Naval forces are normally the first forces into a crisis area and may comprise the enabling force that allows a joint force access to the region. Naval forces then contribute to operations ashore by conducting operations in direct or indirect support of those land operations. It is important to note that a maritime commander responsible for sea control may find it necessary to plan and execute power projection actions—such as maritime air attack of a littoral enemy air field—to achieve, maintain, or achieve and maintain sea control.

TASKS FOR MARITIME OPERATIONS

17-19. Although the following tasks primarily apply to wartime operations, some or all may apply to any maritime operation. All require an ongoing surveillance effort—using both force and external sensors—and good intelligence to create a common tactical picture on which the force can base decisions.

ANTIAIR WARFARE

17-20. Antiair warfare (AAW) encompasses the threat from all aircraft and airborne weapons, whether launched from air, surface, or subsurface platforms. Denial of intelligence to the enemy and achieving adequate attack warning are crucial to the AAW battle. AAW is based on the principle of layered defense: defeating air raids using sea- and shore-based aircraft, long- and medium-range surface-to-air missile systems, point defense missile systems, guns, close-in weapons systems, electronic decoys, jammers, and chaff. These layers are necessary to gain early warning, counter the enemy surveillance and targeting effort, destroy attacking aircraft before they can release their weapons, and finally to destroy or decoy missiles before they can hit friendly forces.

ANTISUBMARINE WARFARE

17-21. The antisubmarine warfare protection of a force depends on defense-in-depth and close coordination between maritime patrol aircraft, helicopters, surface ships, and friendly submarines. The complexity of such coordination and the special environmental factors involved make the submarine threat one of the most difficult problems to counter.

ANTISURFACE WARFARE

17-22. Action against enemy surface forces may seek to achieve either sea control or denial. Long-range warning from intelligence sources is valuable prior to detection by shore or ship-based fixed-wing aircraft, ship-borne helicopters, or ships' sensors. Once a threatening force is detected, its composition and disposition must be ascertained before an attack can effectively be pressed home.

STRIKE WARFARE

17-23. Maritime forces contribute to strikes against targets ashore using carrier-based strike aircraft, sea-launched cruise missiles, naval guns, and special operations forces. In maritime air operations, particularly in the littoral environment, air forces work closely with naval forces to ensure the most effective use of available air assets in strike roles.

AMPHIBIOUS WARFARE

17-24. An amphibious operation is an operation launched from the sea by naval and landing forces against a hostile or potentially hostile shore. Amphibious operations integrate virtually all types of ships, aircraft, weapons, special operations forces, and landing

forces in a concerted joint military effort. Amphibious operations are probably the most complex of all joint operations; detailed, specialized knowledge and a high degree of coordination and cooperation in planning, training, and executing are essential for success. Maritime forces will be responsible for the safe and timely arrival of seaborne forces at an amphibious objective; landing of a force in good order at the right place and time; defense of shipping; and control of ship-to-objective movement. An amphibious force can poise at sea, raiding or landing at a politically decided time and place independent of shore infrastructure.

COMMAND AND CONTROL WARFARE

17-25. Supported by intelligence, command and control (C2) warfare integrates the use of operations security, operational deception, psychological operations, electronic warfare, and physical destruction to deny information to, influence, degrade, or destroy an adversary's C2 capabilities and to protect friendly C2 against such actions.

SPECIAL OPERATIONS

17-26. Maritime special operations forces contribute direct and indirect support to sea control and power projection missions. Capable of operating clandestinely, these forces can provide advance force operations, hydrographic reconnaissance, and near-shore reconnaissance in advance of a landing; direct action missions; combat search and rescue missions; and the ability to degrade enemy lines of communications.

MINE WARFARE

17-27. Mine warfare can involve using offensive mines and defensive mine countermeasures (MCM). Offensive minelaying operations aim to dislocate enemy war efforts and improve the security of friendly sea lines of communications by destroying or threatening to destroy enemy seaborne forces. MCM include active measures (to locate and clear mined areas), passive measures (to route shipping around high threat areas), and self-protective measures (to reduce ship signature).

NAVAL CONTROL OF SHIPPING

17-28. A multinational maritime mission may require some form of control and coordination of shipping within a given region. The control and coordination of shipping aids the force commander by reducing the surveillance and reconnaissance effort and managing

confrontation between shipping and an adversary. Naval control of shipping (NCS) is implemented by advising ship owners and operators of the situation, the region(s) affected, and the measures being implemented. Shipping authorities accepting NCS agree to provide position, movement, and communication information to naval authorities and, subject to the master's discretion, comply with any routing information and direction given by naval authorities.

CHECKLIST

1. Has liaison been established with the maritime headquarters?
2. Has a maritime component commander been named?
3. Has the staff identified and supported and supporting relationships with the maritime element?

Chapter 18

Air Operations

Coalition air operations aims to gain and maintain sufficient control of the air for exploiting air power to achieve the coalition commander's objectives or achieve strategic goals through a coalition campaign. Unified action is essential for effectively using air power; to achieve its greatest effects, it must be concentrated at a decisive point in time and space. To attain the strength of unified air action and to ensure that the capabilities of air power are used efficiently as the overall situation demands, air operations are based on two principles. The first principle is that unity of command facilitates effectively applying air power to meet the coalition objectives. This is normally achieved by designating a coalition air component commander. The second principle is that centralized planning concentrates air assets to achieve decisive results and maximum synergy.

EMPLOYMENT OF AIR POWER

18-1. Control of the air is one of the critical factors in deciding the outcome of military operations. Gaining control of the air is not an end in itself, but is only useful if it is then exploited as a means to a greater end. Air power can be allotted concurrently to lines of operation within the coalition campaign. Such simultaneous use of its capabilities is one of its greatest strengths. Once sufficient control of the air has been achieved, coalition forces should exploit the full range of air power capabilities to project combat power in support of the coalition campaign objectives.

18-2. Air power is an essential element across the entire spectrum of military operations at any level. It can be brought to bear on political, military, economic, or social structures simultaneously or separately. It can be coordinated with land and maritime surface and subsurface operations or employed independently. Therefore, air power can potentially influence a situation at any time or place deemed necessary. It has the ability to immediately escalate or de-

escalate any kind of conflict. However, effectively using air power is conditioned by many factors, not the least of which are the capabilities and attributes of the air assets themselves. By virtue of their speed and range, air assets can rapidly deliver precision combat power and presence anywhere in the world. When coordinated and packaged correctly, these air assets can provide concentrated fire power which, given the lethality and precision of modern airborne munitions, can disproportionately affect the conflict.

18-3. Air power's reach and concentration of force allow it to be employed in a broad range of operations, both lethal and non-lethal, to achieve strategic, operational, and tactical effects. Air power, or the threat of its use, therefore offers various ways of attacking the enemy cohesion and will to fight at all levels while maintaining significant economy of effort.

18-4. The flexibility, reach, and ability to concentrate force enables air power to conduct or support parallel lines of operation against different targets, and at different levels of operations, concurrently. Furthermore, air power can be rapidly adapted to meet evolving operational requirements through its ability to switch from one role or objective to another. This permits the coalition commander to refocus effort at will or to permit operational pauses in other lines of operation without relaxing pressure on the enemy. Using air power asymmetrically provides the coalition commander with the means to take advantage of both friendly strengths and enemy weaknesses while preserving his own freedoms of action.

COALITION AIR COMPONENT COMMANDER

18-5. The coalition commander may designate a coalition air component commander (CACC) to control the capabilities of coalition air operations. He establishes the authority and command relationships of the CACC and assigns his responsibilities. These include the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of joint air operations based on the coalition commander's concept of operations and air apportionment decision. These activities rely on the full representation and expertise of all elements of the coalition force contributing to the air operations plan. At the tactical level of operations, the CACC's authority typically includes exercising tactical command over assigned and attached forces and tactical control over other military capabilities or forces made available for tasking. The coalition commander may also establish supporting and supported relationships between components to facilitate

operations. He retains the option of controlling air operations directly using the coalition headquarters staff. The coalition commander will normally vest authority in a component commander to carry out the duties of the airspace control authority (ACA) and air defense commander (ADC). Since the CACC is responsible for air operations and airspace control measures and air defense operations have an integrated relationship, the CACC would be the most likely choice for appointment as the ACA and ADC. Any division of these responsibilities would require detailed coordination for safe and effective air operations.

AIR OPERATIONS PLANNING AND AIR TASKING

18-6. Air operations planning involves identifying air objectives that contribute to the coalition campaign objectives; determining the air strategy to exploit coalition air assets to support the coalition objectives; and identifying centers of gravity to satisfy the coalition's strategic, operational, and tactical objectives. The air operations planning also involves developing the concept of operations that describe the best course of action as well as producing the air operations plan through which the CACC articulates and communicates his strategy for achieving the coalition commander's operations plan.

18-7. The air tasking cycle is used to promote efficiently and effectively using the available coalition air capabilities and assets. It begins with the coalition commander's air apportionment process and culminates with the combat assessment of previous missions and sorties. The cycle provides a repetitive process for the planning, coordinating, allocating, and tasking of air missions and sorties while following the coalition commander's guidance. The cycle accommodates changes in the operational situation or to the commander's guidance. It also accommodates late notice requests for support from other commanders. The air tasking cycle is an analytical, systematic approach that focuses targeting efforts on supporting operational requirements to produce an air tasking order (ATO). A timely coalition ATO is critical; other commanders conduct planning and operations based on the content and scheduling in the ATO and depend on its accuracy.

AIRSPACE CONTROL

18-8. Airspace control primarily complements and supports the coalition commander's campaign plan without adding undue restrictions and with minimal adverse impact on the capabilities of any coalition forces. Each commander must be able to use the

airspace with maximum freedom consistent with the degree of operational risk directed by the coalition commander. Airspace control procedures are designed to prevent mutual interference, facilitate air defense identification, safely accommodate and expedite the flow of all air traffic, enhance combat effectiveness in support of the coalition objectives, and prevent fratricide.

18-9. When designated by the coalition commander, the ACA must establish an airspace control system, preparing the airspace control plan, promulgate the relevant airspace control orders (ACOs), implement airspace control means, and harmonize regional airspace control plans. Rapidly distributing the ACOs and their updates to all commanders within the force in the area of responsibility is a crucial factor in the operation of an airspace control system. The ACA is supported by the airspace coordination center where all component commanders with air assets are represented. All component commanders must comply with the airspace control plan; however, the coalition commander provides procedures to adjudicate differences that the ACA and the component commanders cannot resolve. Centralized direction by the ACA does not imply that the ACA assumes operational control or tactical control over any air assets.

AIR DEFENSE

18-10. Air defense (AD) is an overall coalition responsibility. Coalition AD integrates the capabilities of all component air defense assets to protect and influence the battlespace associated with the coalition campaign plan. The ADC should plan and direct the coalition AD assets that the component commanders will execute. The ADC protects the force from hostile air activity. He integrates and coordinates the force AD assets into a coalition AD plan (including the host nation AD systems); promulgates and employs common procedures for air battle management and the reduction of mutual interference; controls and coordinates all AD operations by the component commanders; and coordinates with the ACA to ensure that the airspace control plan best supports AD operations.

CHECKLIST

1. Has a coalition air component commander been designated by the coalition commander?
2. Has an airspace control authority been designated by the coalition commander?
3. Has an area air defense commander been designated by the coalition commander?
4. Has liaison been established between the coalition air operations center and the other appropriate headquarters?

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Chapter 20

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)

INTRODUCTION

20-1. Experiences in recent coalition operations have underscored the importance of collecting information through the use of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. ISTAR increases situational awareness (SA), which enhances tempo, force protection and fratricide avoidance. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of the use of ISTAR among commanders and their staffs. It includes an explanation of ISTAR and responsibilities for the process.

20-2. In order for coalition commanders to achieve greater SA, it is essential to have information and intelligence on the entire battlespace, including adversaries, neutral forces, and friendly forces. Operations and intelligence staffs perform key roles in identifying the information that needs to be collected, planning and controlling collection operations, and utilizing the information acquired. Some information and intelligence concerning adversaries and the battlespace may already exist, but more commonly it will need to be actively collected via ISTAR operations. Information and intelligence that has been collected will contribute to the common operational picture (COP). ISTAR is not used to acquire friendly force information

ISTAR CONCEPT

20-3. ISTAR is a grouping of information collection, processing, dissemination and communication assets designed, structured, linked and disciplined to provide situational awareness (SA), support to targeting and support to commanders in decision making.

20-4. The role of the ISTAR capability is to integrate the intelligence function with surveillance, target acquisition

Chapter 19

Urban Operations

19-1. The urban environment is a common constituent of the battlespace and all countries have become increasingly involved in Urban Operations (UO) as coalition partners.

19-2. Mounted across the full spectrum of conflict, UO are planned and conducted on or within urban and adjacent natural terrain. The dominant features are the densities of population, structures, potential firing positions, combat and non-combat activity, friendly and enemy forces, line of sight difficulties, and compression of the time available for military tasks.

19-3. UO differ from operations in other environments in that the compounding effect of these densities creates friction and stressors for coalition forces that are far in excess of those encountered in other operational environments. UO have been characterized by non-contiguous areas of operations at the lowest tactical levels, high casualty rates, including non-combatants, and collateral damage. Coalition nations must have a clear understanding of the problematic nature of UO such that the specific areas of coalition activity that can overcome interoperability issues can be emphasized.

19-4. The purpose of this chapter is to focus coalition commanders and staff on interoperability issues specific to the conduct of UO.

A COMMON CONCEPT FOR UO

19-5. The central tenet of the ABCA concept for UO is a maneuverist warfighting philosophy that generates superior tempo and surprise through the application of simultaneity of effects. This seeks to shatter the enemy's cohesion and will to fight thereby creating a deteriorating situation with which he cannot cope. By targeting the enemy's will to resist, this approach can achieve victory sooner, with fewer casualties and less damage to the urban environment and its population. Given the

densities that dominate the urban environment, the maneuverist approach and mission command are ideally suited to UO.

19-6. The decision to commit military forces to UO will depend heavily on understanding the situation in physical and moral terms. The military must sit within a joint, multi-component, structure that is able to cover issues such as law and order, control of utilities, and the media. The military, in conjunction with appropriate civilian organizations, must understand the physical, cultural and administrative effect of military action before, during and after operations. All actions throughout the campaign must be directed towards the agreed political endstate.

19-7. The Commander should recognize that military involvement with non-combatants can create both opportunities, such as improved human intelligence (HUMINT), and dangers, such as civilian hostility and violence. In some cases, such as humanitarian assistance and peacekeeping operations, the safety and well being of the urban area and its inhabitants are fundamental objectives of the operation. The coalition may be required to protect infrastructure and the lives of non-combatants for a variety of practical reasons. In a situation in which the coalition may be required to engage enemy forces in combat within an urban area, callous treatment of non-combatants may discourage civilians from providing coalitions with invaluable HUMINT assistance and may even encourage civilians to support enemy forces within the area of responsibility. Furthermore, local and international media coverage of coalition forces may focus on the suffering of innocent civilians, jeopardizing domestic and international public support for the operation.

19-8. Commanders and staff will be familiar with national variations of core functions (e.g. Assess, Shape, Dominate, Transition (US); Find, Fix, Strike, Exploit (UK); Find, Fix, Strike (CA); Shape, Shield, Strike, Sustain (AS/NZ)). While this chapter has no intention of redefining national core functions, emerging multi-national conceptual development¹ proposes a more comprehensive framework of Understand, Shape, Engage, Consolidate and Transition (USECT). This framework

¹ NATO RTO Study 'UO in the Year 2020' dated 24 May 02

better illustrates the complexity of UO and the vital need to Understand in order to allow Shaping, Engaging and Consolidating actions. It promotes unity of purpose, assists in the coordination of military and non-military activity, and aids in understanding the complexities of UO.

19-9. The precepts of the elements of USECT are summarized below:

- Understand. The continuous need to understand the battlespace is critical to the application of the maneuverist approach in the conduct of UO. There is a requirement to:
 - Analyze geopolitical, cultural and demographic aspects of the area of operations.
 - Gain and process information about hostile forces, the physical environment and non-combatants.
 - Anticipate second and third order effects² of actions.
- Shape. Actions taken on the physical and moral planes to set conditions for subsequent action.
- Engage. Combat, humanitarian assistance and disaster relief efforts applied at decisive points that will most directly accomplish the coalition mission.
- Consolidate. Action taken to protect what has been gained and to retain the initiative for subsequent activities.
- Transition. Redeployment to facilitate the handover of control to a subsequent authority.

IMPACT OF THE URBAN ENVIRONMENT

19-10. Urban Densities. The urban environment is complex and diverse, ranging from sophisticated, layered metropolis superstructures within a well-developed infrastructure, to high-density urban shantytowns with no infrastructure. It includes villages, towns and cities which may themselves contain commercial, industrial and manufacturing areas, as well as a variety of

communication, telecommunication and energy production facilities. The complexity of this environment has been defined as a series of densities³ that create sensory and capability overload. The densities are:

- Population.
- Three-dimensional (3-D) battlespace.
- Integration of infrastructure.
- C2 systems.
- Forces.
- Combat and non-combat activities.

19-11. Impact of Densities on Military Operations. Urban densities complicate all levels of command and demand more flexible plans and more responsive decision making processes. The densities are magnified in time and space resulting in a compression of the rates of military activity which make it more difficult to control tempo. Together, this creates sensory and capability overload. In facing the challenge, military forces must match, reduce, maintain or capitalize on these densities. The specific impacts of urban densities on military operations are as follows:

- Difficulty in ensuring essential services for the civil population.
- Problems caused by diversity of culture, including language, ideology and religion.
- Problems caused by the multiplicity of socio-economic interaction between individuals and groups.
- Unanticipated interactions of population with the environment.
- Dealing with large numbers of people.
- Operating in complicated, multi-dimensional geometry (including surface, sub-surface, above-surface, airspace and the electro-magnetic spectrum).
- Quantity of dead space.

³ From 'Heavy Matter – UO Density of Challenge' – Russell Glenn, National Defense Research Institute – Arroyo Center – RAND 2000.

- Restricted mobility.
- Creation of electronic shadow⁴.
- Requirement for 3-D arcs.
- Complicated C2 and situational awareness⁵.
- Unintended tactical fragmentation⁶.
- Increased danger of fratricide.
- Danger of exposure to toxic industrial material.
- Complicated information operations.
- Ability to influence non-military communications systems.
- Increased media attention.
- Difficulties in sustaining the force.
- Massing of forces creating lucrative targets.
- Compression of decision time.
- Shorter time frames for all military activities.
- Risk of information overload.
- Understanding a rapidly changing battlespace.
- Increased stress on personnel.
- Increased consumption of equipment and supplies.

INTEROPERABILITY ISSUES

19-12. The capabilities required to mitigate the effects of the urban environment are derived from an understanding of the densities and their impact on the conduct of military operations. The integration of these capabilities within a coalition force leads to a series of interactions⁷ which are critical to the successful conduct of operations. Consideration of these interactions exposes interoperability issues. These issues, and resulting

⁴ The masking effect of natural and artificial terrain which degrades or negates the influence of the Electro-Magnetic Spectrum.

⁵ The understanding of the operational environment in the context of a commander's (or staff officer's) mission (or task).

⁶ The bunching or dispersal of forces, often caused by the loss of command and control evident in UO.

⁷ An interaction is any exchange of command, fire support, maneuver elements, information, intelligence, and / or logistics.

questions which need to be addressed by coalition commanders and staff, are shown below, grouped by combat function.

Maneuver

19-13. Task Organization. UO will require units to be task organized at lower levels than in most other operations. Nations should be prepared to task organize at lower levels of command. Commanders must understand the lowest level at which interoperability is enabled in terms of combat functions. For instance, specialist elements that cross-attach may require LOs to organize support that is available only within their parent organization. Failing to do so may result in incoming task organized slices being inappropriate for the allocated task.

19-14. Second and Third Order Effects. Due to the complexity of coalition operations within the urban environment, second and third order effects of force actions on the battlespace and population are more likely and difficult to determine. The planning process, including selection of CCIR, must include consideration of the consequences of coalition actions with regard to all known urban densities. Additional collection resources may need to be allocated to this task.

19-15. Integration of Combat Activities and Humanitarian Assistance. There is tension between the provision of essential services to the population and the need to maintain tactical tempo. Commanders should understand that the timely provision of essential services can shape and enable or become a friction to the close fight.

Fire Support.

19-16. Fire Support Coordination Measures. UO require the engagement of targets in all dimensions. The existence of multi-dimensional target sets complicates the application of direct and indirect fires and other effects in urban environments. Commanders should consider nation-specific Rules of Engagement (ROE) in relation to the target set. Weapon control status must be established and consideration must be given to coordinating procedural measures in order to prevent fratricide.

19-17. Precision Fire and Collateral Damage. The densities of the urban environment place a greater premium on precision fire. The risk of collateral damage, fratricide and Laws of Armed Conflict violations may limit the application of some weapon effects. Commanders should consider the coalition's combat ID capabilities, techniques and procedures and understand the level of authorization for use of fire support assets. Additionally, the level of precision for all available coalition fire support should be defined and the assets tasked accordingly.

19-18. Non-Lethal Effects. The requirement to limit collateral damage and civilian casualties leads to the consideration of non-lethal effects. National policy on the application of non-lethal effects and capabilities vary within the coalition. Capacities vary within national forces. Again, commanders should consider nation-specific ROE and legal constraints.

Mobility, Counter-Mobility, Survivability

19-19. National Interpretation. The urban environment creates specific mobility and counter-mobility problems for military forces. The means and their application vary within the coalition. Commanders should consider the national interpretation of military tasks with respect to mobility / counter-mobility. For instance, the employment of means such as flame, blast or mines is in conflict with some nation-specific ROE.

19-20. Toxic Industrial Material (TIM). The presence of large quantities of TIM, requires that military forces have the capability to identify their location and status, to detect their release, to understand their impact and to protect the force and potentially the population. Releases of TIM, whether intentional or not, have the potential to degrade force protection and cause collateral damage. Commanders should consider the exploitation and protection of industrial sites in UO. Damage to the infrastructure's 'system of systems' may have second and third order effects on subsequent operations.

19-21. Collateral Damage and Mobility. Military operations will affect the trafficability and habitability of the urban environment. Commanders should consider the negative impacts of operations on existing lines of communication and infrastructure, from both a military

and civil perspective. Military planners must be aware of the critical nodes of infrastructure such as electrical, water, health services and sewage that transcend formation boundaries. Damage or neglect to these facilities can result in problems for forces and the indigenous population. Higher centralized coordination will be required to facilitate control. Damage of urban infrastructure has long lasting effects that are difficult to mitigate.

Intelligence.

19-22. Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) Capabilities. UO exacerbate the difficulty in detecting, recognizing, identifying and locating⁸ entities in a timely manner. National capabilities to receive, display and analyze the battlespace vary, and appropriate ISTAR capabilities may not always exist at the lower levels. Commanders must understand the levels of dissemination and resolution of intelligence that each coalition element can receive and use. Commanders should also consider each coalition member's ability to represent the battlespace at tactical levels⁹ and assign appropriate ISTAR capability when grouping and tasking elements commensurate with the desired tempo of operations. The management and control of information flow must ensure the delivery of relevant useful information to the appropriate level of command that supports the close fight in a timely manner.

19-23. Monitoring the Battlespace. The density of routes, both ground and air, in the urban environment exceeds the capacity of forces to monitor all movement. Commanders must consider how they monitor sub-surface and super-surface battlespace. They must also identify criteria for, and allocate priority to, monitoring and controlling routes and airspace.

Command, Control, Communication, and Computing (C4)

19-24. C2 Implications for Attachments and Detachments. Effects drawn from parent organizations

⁸ In the example of a tank, Detect - to know that there is something there; Recognize - to know that it is a tank; Identify - to know that it is a T-72; and Locate - to know exactly where it is in space

⁹ Platoon, company, battle group, brigade.

may not be accessible to elements detached to other national commands. Elements detached to other national commands may drop linkages to effects such as precision strike, ISTAR and digital information flow. Liaison packages with appropriate communications will need to be considered. Commanders must establish common information requirements that are then reflected in CCIRs and the coalition's operating picture.

19-25. Liaison. The capacity to interact with the human element is critical in the urban environment. Units will need more liaison teams in the urban environment because of the density of essential services and people. The requirement for liaison by type and number will vary in accordance with the complexity of the terrain. The necessary liaison capability must be accessible from the appropriate level (as low as sub-unit) to support the close fight. Liaison will typically be required at lower levels and teams will need communications and transport commensurate with the supported maneuver elements.

19-26. Endurance and Tempo. Endurance will vary considerably with the tempo of operations. Higher tempo operations will necessitate rotation, resupply and/or replacement of forces at a higher rate. Commanders should consider sustainability of operations in terms of endurance and tempo in UO.

19-27. Proliferation of Communication Systems. Exercising command and control within the urban environment will lead to the proliferation of low-level tactical communications in close proximity. This presents the potential for overload. There is a need for frequency management and strict net discipline that should, ideally, be standardized through the application of established radio procedures. Commanders need to understand the increased importance of dismounted/mounted communications based on some nations' adoption of the "mother ship" concept.

19-28. Non-Military Communications Systems. The proliferation of non-military communications systems provides opportunity and threat. Information will continue to move within the battlespace regardless of coalition force attempts to exert control. Friendly SA must incorporate monitoring of these systems. The commander

should consider non-military communications nodes as key points.

19-29. Tactical Terms and Symbology. National tactical terms and symbology can differ. Varied interpretation necessitates more detailed commander's intent and back-briefings. Commanders and staffs must ensure that common tactical terms and symbology are used.

19-30. Representation of 3-D Battlespace. It is difficult to represent all entities within a complex 3-D battlespace. Staffs must manage 3-D tracking of all elements (friendly, neutral, hostile and unknown). Data or manual display media must reflect surface, sub-surface and super-surface locations in terms of space and time.

19-31. Control Measures. There is commonality of control measures but potential exists for confusion in their marking and delineation. Commanders must identify mission specific criteria for the selection of control measures and consider them for both sub-surface and super-surface application. Control measures must be focused on the delivery of desired effect, and consideration should be given to nation specific fire control procedures in terms of cross-boundary activities.

19-32. Electronic Shadow. The urban environment commonly masks and interferes with electronic communications. Staffs must consider the placement of C4 nodes with additional emphasis on rebroadcast and multiple communications modes, including the use of communications RV and SOP.

Combat Service Support

19-33. Logistic Operations in Non-Linear Battlespace. There is greater demand on most aspects of CSS in UO due to the densities and the non-contiguous and non-linear nature of the battlespace. Evolving concepts of UO often dictate that ground lines of communication are insecure, periodic or non-existent. This will, for instance, make it difficult to adhere to casualty evacuation time standards. Logistic groupings must reflect maneuver groupings in order to provide appropriate support. In UO, this support will mean increased emphasis on ammunition resupply, maintenance support for weapons and equipment, and the requirement for specialist medical services forward.

19-34. SA and Protection of CSS. Logistic elements operate close to maneuver elements and are subject to similar threats, but often do not have the same SA and protection. The commander must consider the mobility and protection of logistic elements in a non-contiguous and non-linear battlespace. For example, logistic elements will normally require a maneuver element as escort.

RELIGIOUS MINISTRY

19-35. These interoperability issues and resulting questions are not exhaustive and in many cases will lead to more specific issues and questions. The challenge for commanders and staff within the coalition is to ensure they can be answered with confidence prior to the conduct of UO.

CHECKLISTS

MANUEVER

1. What is the lowest level of organization that each nation will attach to support another nation through detachment?
2. What densities exist within the battlespace and which of these impact on the mission?
3. Which effects, other than first order, are acceptable with regard to mission success?
4. What means of gauging second and third order effects exist within the coalition?
5. What humanitarian assistance and combat actions may occur concurrently?
6. How are these to be coordinated to maintain tactical tempo?

FIRE SUPPORT

1. How will the commander control engagements across coalition boundaries?
2. What precision capability, including joint support, is present within the coalition force?
3. What effects may be required?
4. What are the second and third order effects?
5. Are ROE relevant to the tactical situation?
6. What non-lethal capabilities exist within the force?
7. Which non-lethal effects may be required?
8. What are the non-lethal second and third order effects?
9. What limitations do national / coalition ROE place on the use of non-lethal effects?

MOBILITY, COUNTER-MOBILITY, SURVIVABILITY

1. What mobility / counter-mobility capabilities exist within national forces?
2. How will these be applied in accordance with the tactical tasks?
3. What survivability capabilities exist within national forces?
4. Where are the hazardous sites?
5. Will these impact on the application of effects / maneuver?
6. What priorities have been allocated in terms of protecting known sites?
7. What are the risks to non-combatants and subsequent operations?

8. What capabilities exist within the coalition to manage TIM?
9. What are the critical nodes of key infrastructure within the area of influence?
10. What priority will be allocated to the protection of essential services?
11. How will these critical nodes be controlled?

INTELLIGENCE

1. What ISTAR capabilities exist within coalition forces?
2. How does a coalition commander maintain and communicate a common vision of the battlefield?
3. What data and staff systems exist within the coalition force?
4. What monitoring capabilities exist within national forces?
5. Which routes / airspace are significant in terms of maneuver, CASEVAC, resupply, infiltration, threat, non-combatant movement, etc?
6. How will routes /airspace be prioritized and monitored?

COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATION, AND COMPUTING (C4)

1. What effects are disconnected when forces are attached/detached to another national command and how is this overcome?
2. Where (and to what level) are LO teams needed?
3. Do the nominated LO teams have appropriate communications and transport?
4. What proportion of forces are available for employment?
5. What net discipline procedures are in place and have they been widely disseminated and understood?
6. Have frequencies been allocated in accordance with the commander's intent?
7. What communications systems exist within the battlespace?
8. How can these be exploited or denied?
9. Are all forces familiar with the operational terms and symbology?
10. How is the 3-D environment represented?
11. Which coalition partner is the most appropriate to manage the military geo-spatial support?
12. What control measures will be used?
13. What orders regarding procedures relating to control measures are required?
14. How are sub-surface control measures established and how do they relate to the super-surface control measures?

15. What capabilities exist to overcome the impact of electronic shadow?

COMBAT SERVICE SUPPORT

1. How is support provided forward, i.e., what elements are grouped forward?
2. How will lines of communications be secured when required?
3. What protected mobility exists within the force?
4. What logistics concept will best support the commander's intent?
5. What levels of protection and SA exist within the coalition force CSS capability?

Chapter 20

Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance (ISTAR)

INTRODUCTION

20-1. Experiences in recent coalition operations have underscored the importance of collecting information through the use of intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance (ISTAR) capabilities. ISTAR increases situational awareness (SA), which enhances tempo, force protection and fratricide avoidance. The purpose of this chapter is to provide a better understanding of the use of ISTAR among commanders and their staffs. It includes an explanation of ISTAR and responsibilities for the process.

20-2. In order for coalition commanders to achieve greater SA, it is essential to have information and intelligence on the entire battlespace, including adversaries, neutral forces, and friendly forces. Operations and intelligence staffs perform key roles in identifying the information that needs to be collected, planning and controlling collection operations, and utilizing the information acquired. Some information and intelligence concerning adversaries and the battlespace may already exist, but more commonly it will need to be actively collected via ISTAR operations. Information and intelligence that has been collected will contribute to the common operational picture (COP). ISTAR is not used to acquire friendly force information

ISTAR CONCEPT

20-3. ISTAR is a grouping of information collection, processing, dissemination and communication assets designed, structured, linked and disciplined to provide situational awareness (SA), support to targeting and support to commanders in decision making.

20-4. The role of the ISTAR capability is to integrate the intelligence function with surveillance, target acquisition

(TA), reconnaissance and other information generating assets, in order to improve SA, streamline decision-making processes, and cues maneuver, strike or other ISTAR assets. Intelligence encompasses three elements: a product, a process and an organization. All three elements are included in the “I” in ISTAR. At the heart of the ISTAR capability are intelligence staffs and units that process data and information from single-sources and generate the all-source intelligence needed by commanders to develop understanding and make informed decisions.

20-5. The effectiveness of ISTAR operations results from the coordination of the collection assets and the integration of the resultant information and intelligence. Both coordination and integration require a high degree of cooperation between the operations and the intelligence staffs. In order to achieve effective ISTAR, commanders use their organic assets to collect the required information. Subordinate units may be directed to use their collection assets to support a commander’s ISTAR plan; higher and/or flanking organizations may be requested to support a commander’s ISTAR plan. More than one collection asset should be tasked to acquire the same information, a method known as dual sourcing or redundancy. Dual- sourcing guards against deception and ensures that tasking is met in the most effective manner.

ISTAR AND INTELLIGENCE

20-6. Intelligence drives and exploits ISTAR and is its principal outcome (See Chapter 3). On behalf of the commander, intelligence staffs perform a key role in, but do not ‘own’ the ISTAR process. The ISTAR process originates from both the Intelligence Cycle, undertaken by intelligence staffs, and the operational scheme of maneuver, which is managed by the operations staff and the targeting process. During the Intelligence Cycle, intelligence staffs identify the information and intelligence requirements on behalf of all staff branches and analyze how to obtain it. The management of these overarching intelligence and information requirements is conducted by means of a Collection Plan, which is which is supervised by the intelligence staff on behalf of the commander. Accordingly, ISTAR is a subset of the overarching Collection Plan, as depicted in Figure 1. On

the occasions intelligence staffs do not have executive control over assigned collection assets, they typically recommend to the operations staff how the intelligence/information is to be obtained. Operations staff usually leads the detailed coordination and approval of ISTAR operations. The information derived from ISTAR operations is provided concurrently to the intelligence cycle, the targeting process and other appropriate staff.

ISTAR OPERATIONS - PLANNING AND MONITORING

20-7. Commanders set the collection priority and direct the focus of ISTAR collection. They receive the resultant information and intelligence that contributes to SA and answers the questions posed in the Priority Intelligence Requirements (PIR). The Intelligence Preparation of the Battlespace (IPB) and Operational Planning Processes (OPP) identify further intelligence and information requirements that may necessitate an ISTAR operation within the broader operational framework. Intelligence staffs are responsible for aggregating and validating such requirements and determining which requirements can be met through the ISTAR process. Once appropriate collection assets are identified, orders are initiated for the planning and execution of an operation. Commanders, through their operations staff are responsible for approving ISTAR operations. The organization tasked with collecting information is responsible for the detailed planning and conduct of the operation and dissemination of the information as appropriate. All information will be sent to the intelligence staff for processing while time critical information will be provided directly to users as quickly as possible. In the light of new information, the intelligence staff identifies the need for new collection operations. Accordingly, the ISTAR operations plan and matrix will require constant monitoring and updating. The ISTAR plan may either be disseminated within an Operations Order, as an annex to the order or separately. The ISTAR plan may be disseminated in a written, tabular or graphic form. An example of an ISTAR Synchronization Matrix is at Annex A.

THE ISTAR ARCHITECTURE

20-8. The architecture encompasses the ISTAR collection assets, the organizations that control them, the

staff cells that task the collectors and process the information they collect, the users of the product and the CIS infrastructure that links them all together. The architecture should allow for the free flow of information to its constituent elements, the ability to pass requests for information (RFI) and the ability to task as well as control collection assets. The management of information is an essential part of the architecture and is facilitated by the communications staff.

CONCLUSION

20-9. ISTAR is an important part of the collection process for acquiring information and then utilizing that information to achieve SA. The ISTAR process is a natural consequence of the intelligence cycle and the information obtained contributes to the intelligence process. Whilst intelligence staff generally plans what to collect and operations staff control how and who conducts the collection, all staff will utilize the information obtained. An example of an ISTAR Synchronization Matrix is provided on the next page.

EXAMPLE OF AN ISTAR SYNCHRONIZATION MATRIX

Time	-8	-6	-4	-2	H	+2	+4	+6	+8	Notes
En Activity	Fmn Recce	Fight in Sy Zone	Defend Main posn		CB Fire		Fight in Sy Zone	Defend Main Posn	CB Fire	
ASTOR	← AA 1&2 →									Priority is movement detection
TAR	← MC 2&3 →		← MC 1&3 →				← MC 3&4 NAI 3 →			
UAV 1	← MC 2&4 TAI 1&2 →							← TAI 2 →		UAVs 2&3 priority H-2 to H+2 and H+6 to H+8 is for targeting
UAV 2			← NAI 1&3 →				← TAI 3&5 →			
UAV 3								← NAI 2 →		
EW	← PIR 6 NAI 3&4 →							← PIR 3, NAI 1 →		
Armd Recce	← NAI 1,2&3 →							← NAI 2&4 →		
STA Sys						← TAI 3&5 →			← TAI 2 →	Only emit when cued
STA PIts	← NAI 4,5&6 →									Due for extraction after H+12

CHECKLISTS

PRIOR TO THE ISTAR OPERATION

MANEUVER - MISSION ANALYSIS

1. When, where and what is the maneuver operation; who is the threat; and what are the assigned forces?
2. What do I need to know on the adversary(s) and battle space in order to do my tasks?
3. What gaps do I have in my knowledge on the adversary and battlespace?
4. What intelligence/information on the adversary and battlespace is available from the intelligence staff?
5. What intelligence/information requirements on the adversary and battlespace should I forward to the intelligence staff?

INTELLIGENCE STAFF – DIRECTION PHASE OF THE INTELLIGENCE CYCLE

1. What are the commanders Priority Intelligence Requirements?
2. What intelligence/information requirements on the adversary and battlespace result from IPB and OPP and do I already have it available?
3. What are the available sources of the information (e.g. intelligence agencies, open source, databases or subject matter experts)?
4. If the information is unavailable, what ISTAR assets may be suitable to acquire the information, including assigned assets and those assigned to higher and subordinate organizations?
5. What recommendations would you make to the controller of the ISTAR organization (e.g. commander or operations staff) on whether to collect, where, when and how to collect, what information to specifically collect, who it should be provided to and by what method of dissemination and who should be specifically tasked to conduct the collection?

OPERATIONS STAFF

- 1 Do I agree with the information requirement, the priority and necessity of the need and the recommendations on the ISTAR assets to obtain it?
- 2 What are the consequences of not acquiring the information by a specific time and what are the risks or consequences of conducting a particular ISTAR operation?

- 3 What ISTAR assets are available and suitable for tasking (consultation may be required with the ISTAR organization to confirm task worthiness)?
- 4 Has dual use (high technology complemented by low technology) been achieved to create depth and redundancy to the ISTAR plan?
- 5 Do elements of this need to be integrated into the Maneuver plan?
- 6 Should this ISTAR operation be authorized by an order or directive?
- 7 Who needs to use this information to modify the plan or conduct targeting?

FOLLOWING THE CONDUCT OF THE ISTAR OPERATION

1. What information was obtained and who needs to see it in a single-source form (intelligence, operations, targeting, logistics staff etc)?
2. How and where should the information be stored so that it can be accessed later?
3. What other information is now required (see above Direction Phase of the Intelligence Cycle)?

Appendix A

Capabilities

A-1. Each of the ABCA nations provides its own distinct forces and capabilities to a coalition. These capabilities differ based on national interests, objectives, arms control limitations, doctrine, organization, training, leader development, equipment, history, defense budget, and domestic politics. Orchestrating these capabilities into coalition operations depends on differences in organization, capabilities, and doctrine. If other nations are also involved, these differences will be much greater.

A-2. Understanding these differences can determine if coalition operations are a success or failure. Units of the same type in one nation's army may not perform the same functions as units in another army. An engineer unit in one army may have capabilities to build roads or buildings, while another may be limited to laying out minefields or building defensive positions.

A-3. The commander of the coalition force must be able to integrate these capabilities to achieve the desired end state. Selecting the right mix is a challenge. The coalition staff must be proactive in understanding the capabilities and limitations of the nations in the coalition force.

A-4. Representatives of each nation must be present during planning. If a unit is given a mission it is incapable of performing, the plan will not work. National representatives can ensure that tasks are appropriate to the force. If possible, national representatives should be available in each staff element. They must thoroughly understand their nation's capabilities and limitations.

A-5. Within the ABCA Program, QSTAG 1030, *Staff Planning Data Requirements*, provides a format for providing specific details of each nation's forces to guide planning decisions. Listed equipment is restricted to that which materially affects the organization's combat power and equipment unique to the organization. Using the format in QSTAG 1030 presents an option for obtaining information.

A-6. Doctrine is another important issue. If a nation is given a mission for which it does not train or understand, it will probably fail. National forces will normally operate using their own

doctrine internally, while externally their actions should conform to the overall direction of the coalition force. To make this work, however, coalition commanders must know the differences in the other nations' doctrine. ABCA forces operating as part of a coalition military command should follow imbedded doctrine and procedures previously ratified in QSTAGs.

A-7. Conventional coalition force capabilities include the following assets and operations:

- Air defense.
- Armor.
- Artillery.
- Aviation.
- Engineer.
- Infantry.
- Intelligence.
- Medical.
- Military police.
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical defense.
- Ordnance.
- Personnel.
- Quartermaster.
- Signal.
- Transportation.

Symbol	American	British	Canadian	Australian	New Zealand
.	Squad	Section	Element smaller than a section	Section	Section
..	Section		Section		
...	Platoon Detachment	Platoon Troop Flight	Platoon	Platoon Troop Flight	Platoon Troop Flight
	Company Battery Troop	Company Squadron Battery	Company Squadron Battery Flight	Company Squadron Battery	Company Squadron Battery
	Battalion Squadron	Battalion Regiment	Battalion Regiment Squadron	Battalion Regiment	Battalion Regiment
	Regiment Group		Regiment Wing		

Figure A-1. Comparative Formation and Unit Designations

Symbol	American	British	Canadian	Australian	New Zealand
X	Brigade	Brigade	Brigade Brigade Group Aviation Group	Task force Brigade	Brigade
XX	Division	Division	Division	Division	Division
XXX	Corps	Corps	Corps	Corps	
XXXX	Numbered Army		Army		

Figure A-1. Comparative Formation and Unit Designations (Continued)

SPECIAL OPERATIONS FORCES

A-8. Special operations forces can be a very valuable asset to a coalition. Special operations forces possess unique capabilities that can complement conventional capabilities. Special operations forces are area oriented and usually have personnel experienced and conversant in the languages and cultures found in the area of operations. Special operations forces units can assist with liaison to facilitate interoperability with multinational forces. When commanders consider using special operations forces, they must understand the capabilities of the forces and properly apply those capabilities.

A-9. A special operations forces commander may be necessary to accomplish a specific mission or to control special operations forces in the area of operations. This commander will normally be the commander with the preponderance of special operations forces and the requisite command and control. He would exercise day-to-day command and control of assigned or attached special operations forces. He will also allocate forces against tasks in support of command. The command may define a special operations area for use by the special operations forces. Establishing such a special operations area may delineate and facilitate simultaneous conventional and special operations in the same general operational area.

A-10. The commander must determine where in the organization certain special operations forces best fit, for example, as components, under the G/S3, or some other structure. Both the civil-military operations and psychological operations (PSYOPS) supporting operations developed by the respective staff officers are normally integrated into the operation order by the G/S3. Due to the political sensitivity of these areas, approval authority for these

operations normally remains with coalition establishing authorities.

A-11. At the earliest opportunity, the requirement for civil-military operations and PSYOPS units and staff augmentation must be identified to the command's higher headquarters. These units may require reserve component augmentation to be fully capable. This should be taken into consideration when requesting these assets because of the process and lead-time necessary to obtain them. Civil-military operations, PSYOPS, and public affairs actions can dramatically affect the perceived legitimacy of peace operations. Civil-military operations actions should reinforce and be reinforced by PSYOPS themes and actions. PSYOPS themes and actions should be coordinated with public affairs officer initiatives to avoid creating a dichotomy, whether real or perceived.

ENGINEERS

A-12. QSTAG 1175, *Predeployment Stage Engineer Information Exchange Procedures*, covers "Engineer Information Exchange Procedures for Support Capabilities, Utilities Requirements, and Other Critical Information during the Preparation Stage Prior to Deployment." This QSTAG equally applies to phases during operations with little modification. In addition to QSTAG 1175, specific information on obstacles, equipment capabilities, future engineer planning, engineer order for battle (ORBAT), and command, control, and communications is required. QSTAG 1174, *Compatible Engineer Doctrine for Engineer Support to Force Projection and Sustainment*, also contains the following requirements for engineer information before a deployment:

- Identify terrain visualization requirements.
- Determine types and capabilities of engineer units for the coalition and other services.
- Determine the facility support requirements from the coalition force and its supported units, like latrines and base camp construction.
- Determine the condition of and requirements for infrastructure in the civil-military operations such as roads, airfields, ports, and power generation facilities.
- Identify the availability and type of engineer resources in the operating area.
- Determine real estate support requirements.
- Identify humanitarian and nation assistance engineering requirements.

AVIATION

A-13. QSTAG 847, *Operational Procedures for Battlefield Aviation*, contains the following requirements for aviation information prior to deploying:

- Determine the aviation assets, capabilities, and requirements of the coalition force.
- Identify the aviation logistic capabilities of the coalition force.
- Identify current and projected requirements for an air line of communications.
- Determine aviation support required from coalition forces.
- Identify the intended base of operations.

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Appendix B

Threat Assessment Format

B-1. The threat assessment should consider the following:

- The adversary's military intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets and capabilities. Can he detect and locate friendly activities?
- The adversary's espionage and covert intelligence capability. Does he have operatives in the area of operations (AO)?
- The adversary's capability to conduct information operations and command and control warfare activities, including those aimed at audiences or targets outside the AO.
- The adversary's early warning—including distant early warning (DEW)—capability. Can he intercept, direction find, jam, or interfere with friendly transmissions? Does he possess DEW? Laser blinding weapons are currently available on the international market, and other weapon systems will probably be fielded in the near future.
- The adversary's weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. This should consider political intent, industrial infrastructure, delivery systems, and warheads. It should also consider the potential impact of strikes in terms of degradation, casualties, loss of tempo, and their physical and psychological effect on allies and civil populace.
- The adversary's capability to conduct deep operations, particularly his longer-range strike assets. Can his main forces interfere with the coalition's rear operations? His weapons, logistics, doctrine, training, intent, and performance in recent conflicts should be considered. Factors include air; surface-to-surface missiles¹; air-delivered forces; naval and marine assets; special forces; and operational level forward and raiding detachments and operational maneuver groups.
- Adversary sympathizers, agents, and partisans in the AO. Will they conduct information gathering, espionage, guerilla acts, or a combination of activities against us?
- Terrorist, criminal, and insurgent organizations. What are their aims, capabilities, and methods?

¹Over 20 nations possess medium range surface-to-surface missiles, mainly SCUD missiles.

- In operations other than war, the adversary's anti-air and armor capability. Is additional protection required, like defensive aid suites? An anti-air and armor capability is assumed in warfighting.
- The attitude of the civil population (by region if appropriate) to the force presence. Are they hostile, neutral, or favorably disposed towards us? Could the population's perceptions be altered by friendly or adversary actions, including information operations?
- Sabotage, in the form of planned attacks by adversary special forces or other agents, or more spontaneous activities by locally employed civilians.
- Subversion and hostile psychological operations. An adversary will usually attempt to subvert friendly forces, either individually, to gain leverage, or collectively for political and military advantage.
- Likelihood of theft. This can be a significant problem in poorer countries.
- Health risks. Endemic and sexually transmitted diseases, climatic extremes, and environmental and pollution hazards that may include residual WMD contamination and the prevalence of drugs.
- Mines. The presence and location of vehicle and anti-personnel mines in the AO. Current and earlier conflicts must be considered.
- Road conditions and local driving patterns. In Bosnia, road deaths outnumber those killed by military action.
- Fire hazards. Weather and vegetation may create fire hazards. Living in makeshift accommodation presents a substantial fire risk, particularly in a cold climate.
- Fratricide. The risk of fratricide increases in warfighting, but is present at all times. It is particularly likely in multi-national operations.
- Attack aviation. Adversary aviation attacks threaten our own rear operations. The most vulnerable area for a threat posed by an adversary's attack is the rear operations area. Commanders must consider and plan for this threat.

Appendix C

CIMIC Estimate

The civil-military cooperation (CIMIC) staff officer prepares the CIMIC Estimate during the commander's decision-making process. The CIMIC officer's estimate and the commander's decision will be the basis for the CIMIC Annex of the Operation Order.

Civil-Military Cooperation Operations Estimate Number ____.

References: Maps, charts, or other documents.

1. **MISSION.** The commander's restated mission.
2. **SITUATION AND CONSIDERATIONS**
 - a. Intelligence Situation. Include information obtained from the intelligence officer. When the details make it appropriate and the estimate is written, a brief summary and reference to the appropriate intelligence document or an annex of the estimate may be used.
 - (1) Characteristics of the area of operations. These characteristics include physical features, climate, and basic political, economic, and psychological factors.
 - (a) Attitudes of the populace (cooperative or uncooperative).
 - (b) Availability of necessities (food, clothing, water, shelter, and medical care). Include civilian capabilities of self-support.
 - (c) Availability of local material and personnel to support military operations, such as host nation, nongovernmental organizations, and international organizations.
 - (d) Characteristics, migration rates, and numbers of dislocated civilians in the area.
 - (e) Amount and type of damage suffered by the economy—particularly in the transportation, public utilities, and communication fields).
 - (f) Status and character of civil government.

- (g) State of health of the civilian populace.
- (2) Enemy strength and dispositions. Consider sabotage, espionage, subversion, terrorism, and movement of dislocated civilians.
- (3) Enemy capabilities.
 - (a) Affecting the mission.
 - (b) Affecting CIMIC activities.
- b. Tactical Situation. Include information obtained from the commander's planning guidance and from the operations officer.
 - (1) Present dispositions of major tactical elements.
 - (2) Possible courses of action (COAs) to accomplish the mission. (These COAs are carried forward through the remainder of the estimate.)
 - (3) Projected operations and other planning factors required for coordination and integration of staff estimates.
- c. Personnel Situation. Include information obtained from the personnel officer.
 - (1) Present dispositions of personnel and administration units and installations that have an effect on the CIMIC situation.
 - (2) Projected developments within the personnel field likely to influence CIMIC.
- d. Logistic Situation. Include information obtained from the logistics officer.
 - (1) Present dispositions of logistic units and installations that have an effect on the CIMIC situation.
 - (2) Projected developments within the logistic field likely to include CIMIC.
- e. CIMIC Situation. In this subparagraph, the status is shown under appropriate subheadings. In the case of detailed information at higher levels of command, a summary may appear under the subheading with reference to an annex to the estimate.
 - (1) Disposition and status of CIMIC elements and related significant military and nonmilitary elements.
 - (2) Current problems faced by the command. Estimate the impact of future plans of the supported unit operation pertinent to the CIMIC mission.

- (3) Projected impact of civilian interference with military operations.
- (4) Government functions.
 - (a) Public administration.
 - (b) Public safety.
 - (c) Public health.
 - (d) Labor.
 - (e) Legal.
 - (f) Public welfare.
 - (g) Public finance.
 - (h) Public education.
 - (i) Civil defense.
- (5) Economic functions.
 - (a) Economics and commerce.
 - (b) Food and agriculture.
 - (c) Civilian supply.
 - (d) Property control.
- (6) Public facilities functions.
 - (a) Public works and utilities.
 - (b) Public communications.
 - (c) Public transportation.
- (7) Special functions.
 - (a) Arts, monuments, and archives.
 - (b) Civil information.
 - (c) Cultural affairs.
 - (d) Dislocated civilians.
- (8) Public information functions.
 - (a) Television.
 - (b) Media.
 - (c) Coordination with joint task force information operations plan.

- f. Assumptions. Until specific planning guidance becomes available, assumptions may be required for initiating planning or preparing the estimate. These assumptions are then modified as factual data becomes available.
- 3. **ANALYSIS OF COAs.** Under each subheading (paragraph 2e) for each COA, analyze all CIMIC factors indicating problems and deficiencies.
- 4. **COMPARISON OF COAs**
 - a. Evaluate CIMIC deficiencies; list the advantages and disadvantages of each proposed COA.
 - b. Discuss the advantages and disadvantages of each operational and tactical COA under consideration from the CIMIC standpoint. Those that are common to all COAs or are considered minor should be eliminated from the list. Include methods of overcoming deficiencies or modifications required in each COA. Priority will be given to one major CIMIC activity that most directly relates to the mission, such as minimizing civilian interference with tactical and logistic operations or providing and supporting the functions of civil government, community relations, and the like.
- 5. **CONCLUSION/RECOMMENDATIONS**
 - a. Indicate whether the mission set forth in paragraph 1 can be supported from the CIMIC standpoint.
 - b. Indicate which COAs can best be supported from the CIMIC standpoint.
 - c. List primary reasons why other COAs are not favored.
 - d. List the major CIMIC problems that must be brought to the commander's attention. Include specific recommendations concerning the methods of eliminating or reducing the effect of these deficiencies.

Annexes (as required)

Appendix D

Examples of Force Protection Measures

D-1. Defensive measures provide a defense against the threat—passively or actively. Examples of defensive measures include—

- Air defense.
- Nuclear, biological, and chemical (NBC) alert and dress states.
- Maneuver reserve.
- Increased patrolling.
- Protective equipment, such as body and appliqué armor or prefabricated shelters.
- Physical security measures such as fences and additional guards.
- Alert states and policy on wearing personal protective equipment.
- Immunization and health education.
- Out-of-bounds areas for friendly forces.
- Road conduct measures.

D-2. Offensive measures are adopted when the threat can be preempted or no other defense is possible. Examples include—

- Offensive command and control warfare measures, especially against headquarters; communications; and intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance assets.
- Destruction of ballistic missiles and supporting facilities.
- Destruction of NBC industrial infrastructure and means of distribution.
- Arrest of suspected adversary sympathizers.
- Out-of-bounds areas for the civil population, to deny them access to friendly forces or locations.

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Appendix F

Developing Rules of Engagement

F-1. The following questions will assist in the development of Rules of Engagement within the coalition force:

1. What geographic limitations will be applied to coalition led forces? Prohibitions? Authorizations? Relative to combat search and rescue operations?
2. What limitations will be applied relative to the positioning of coalition forces to other designated forces?
3. What actions are authorized to prevent the boarding, detention, or seizure of designated aircraft, vessels, vehicles or property? What levels and types of force can be applied?
4. Are forces authorized to intervene in non-military activities? What non-military activities will be authorized for intervention? What level and types of force can be applied?
5. Will the passing of warnings be authorized?
6. Will ordering of diversions be authorized? ? What levels and types of force can be applied?
7. Will boarding operations be authorized? ? What levels and types of force can be applied?
8. Will detention or seizure operations be authorized? What is the defined scope of those operations? What levels and types of force can be applied?
9. Will infrared or visual illuminants be authorized? How will they be controlled?
10. Has the criteria to identify potential targets been defined? What specific requirements must be met prior to an engagement of a potential target?
11. Are forces authorized to exercise in the presence of a potential enemy?
12. Are forces authorized to conduct overt simulated attacks? What are the restrictions related to those actions?
13. Are forces authorized to designate targets?
14. Are forces authorized to respond to harassment operations? What levels and types of force can forces use in conducting counter-harassment and harassment operations?

15. Are riot control agents authorized? What are the restrictions on the use of riot control agents and under what circumstances?

16. Is the use of force authorized? Under what circumstances and in what types of designated operations is it authorized? (This is related primarily to peace support, evacuation, humanitarian aid and other similar operations.) What levels and types of force can be applied?

17. Is the use of specific weapons prohibited or restricted in designated circumstances?

18. Are forces authorized to conduct information operations? What types of information operations can be applied? What levels of response can be applied?

19. Are forces authorized to use electronic countermeasures? What levels of electronic countermeasures can be applied and to what systems?

20. Are forces authorized to use land or maritime mines? What are the restrictions on the use of land or maritime mines?

21. Are forces authorized to conduct attacks (not related to self defense)? What types of attacks are authorized and under what circumstances? What levels and types of force can be applied?

F-2. The coalition should decide certain issues relating to Rules of Engagement prior to the start of any operations. This will be dependent on the type or types of operations being performed.

22. Does the coalition have a common definition for self-defense?

23. Are there levels of self-defense defined (i.e. necessary, proportional, or imminent)?

24. Have rules been established concerning permission to attack based on hostile intent and hostile act?

25. Have rules of engagement been established for air operations?

26. Have rules of engagement been established for air defense operations?

27. Have rules of engagement been established for maritime operations?

28. Does the coalition have a common amplifying guidance and definitions relative to the rules of engagement?

Bibliography

The following references provide an understanding of the joint and Army doctrine of the ABCA nations.

UNITED STATES

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- ADFP 3. *Rules of Engagement.*
- ADFP 6. *Operations.*
- ADFP 9. *Joint Planning.*
- ADFP 10. *Communications.*
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- ADFP 19. *Intelligence.*
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ATP-34. *Tactical Air Support of Maritime Operations.*

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Glossary

ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS

AAW	antiair warfare
ABCA	American-British-Canadian-Australian
ACA	airspace control authority
ACO	airspace control order
ACP	airspace control plan; Allied Communications Publication
ACS	airspace control system
ACSA	acquisition cross-Service agreement
AD	air defense
ADC	air defense commander
ADFP	Australian Defence Force Publication
ADP	automated data processing
Adv	adversaries (graphic only)
AECI	l'Agence Espagnole de Coopération Internationale
AHP	Allied Hydrographic Publication
AJP	allied joint publication
AM	amplitude modulation
Anal	analysis (graphic only)
AO	area of operations
APP	Allied Procedures Publication
ASC	airspace control
Atk	attack (graphic only)
ATO	air tasking order
ATP	Allied Tactical Publication
AusAID—Aus	Australian Agency for International Development
AUSCANNZUKUS	AS, CA, NZ, UK, US navies command, control, and communications
AXP	Allied Exercise Publication

B-GL	Canadian publication
C2	command and control
C3	command, control, and communications
C3I	command, control, communications, and intelligence
C4	command, control, communications, and computers
C4I	command, control, communications, computers, and intelligence
CA	civil affairs
CACC	coalition air component commander
CAO	chief administrative officer
CCIR	commander's critical information requirements
CCIRM	Collection, Coordination and Intelligence Requirements Management
CCMEB	coalition civil-military engineering board
CCO	coalition contracting office
CDA	coalition deployment agency
CFACC	coalition force airspace control commander
CFC	coalition forces commander (graphic only)
Char	characterization (graphic only)
CI	counterintelligence
CIB	coalition information bureau
CIDA—CA	Canadian International Development Agency
CIMIC	civil-military cooperation
CINC	commander in chief
CIS	communications and information systems
CISPG	<i>Communications and Information Systems Planning Guide</i>
Civ	civilian (graphic only)
CJFC	commander, joint task force
CLPG	<i>Coalition Logistics Planning Guide</i>
CLPSB	coalition logistic procurement support board

CMO	civil-military operations
CMOC	civil-military operations center
Cmptr	computer (graphic only)
COA	course of action
COH	<i>Coalition Operations Handbook</i>
COMBEXAG	Combined Exercise Agreement Between the Navies and Air Forces of the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, Australia and New Zealand
Comms	communications (graphic only)
COMSEC	communications security
CONOPS	concept of operations (graphic only)
Co-ord	coordination (graphic only)
CPG	coalition planning group
CPRC	coalition personnel reception center
CSS	combat service support
CVB	coalition visitors bureau
DEW	distant early warning
DFID-UK	Department for International Development
DII	defense information infrastructure (graphic only)
DIRMOBFOR	Director of Mobility Forces
DNBI	disease and nonbattle injury
DOD	Department of Defense
E3D	AWACA Delta aircraft model designation
ECHO	European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office
EMCOM	electronic countermeasures
EPB	electronic preparation of the battlefield
EW	early warning; electronic warfare
EWH	<i>Electronic Warfare and Organization Handbook</i>
FAO	foreign area officer
FLSG	force logistics support group
FM	field manual; frequency modulation

Fnd	friendly (graphic only)
FOB	forward operating base
FP	Canadian publication
G1	assistant chief of staff, personnel
G2	assistant chief of staff, intelligence
G3	assistant chief of staff, operations
G4	assistant chief of staff, logistics
G5	assistant chief of staff, policy and plans
G6	assistant chief of staff, communications
GBAD	ground based air defense
GCIV	Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949
GI&S	geospatial information and services
GIE	global information environment
HN	host nation
HNS	host nation support
HQ	headquarters
HSS	health service support
HUMINT	human intelligence
IA	implementing arrangement
ICRC	International Committee of the Red Cross
IFF	identification, friend or foe
IH	<i>Intelligence Handbook</i>
IHL	International Humanitarian Law
INDO	International and National Donor Organization
Info	information (graphic only)
Int	intelligence (graphic only)
INTERFET	International Force East Timor
IO	information operations; international organizations
IOM	International Organization for Migration
IPB	intelligence preparation of the battlefield

IR	information requirements
ISB	intermediate staging base
ISR	intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance
ISTAR	intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition and reconnaissance
ITV	in-transit visibility
J3	joint operations staff officer
J6	joint communications staff officer
JDHQ	joint deployable headquarters
JOA	joint operations area
LIMEX	Limited exercise
LO	liaison officer
LOAC	law of armed conflict
LOGSTAT	logistics status report
LRC	logistics readiness center
LWD	land warfare doctrine
MCM	mine countermeasures
MEDEVAC	medical evacuation
Mgmt	management (graphic only)
MIE	military information environment
MIH	<i>Medical Interoperability Handbook</i>
MMOP	multinational maritime operation
MNF	multinational force
MOOTW	military operations other than war
MOU	memorandum of understanding
Msl	missile (graphic only)
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NBC	nuclear, biological, and chemical
NCA	National Command Authorities
NCS	naval control of shipping

NEO	noncombatant evacuation operations
Net	network (graphic only)
NGO	nongovernmental organization
NIE	national information environment
NII	national information infrastructure (graphic only)
NVG	night vision goggle(s)
NZP	New Zealand publication
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
ODHIR	Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights
OEG	operation exposure guide
OOTW	operations other than war
OPCOM	operational command
OPCON	operational control
OPDEC	operational deception
OPLAN	operation plan
OPORD	operation order
OPSEC	operations security
ORBAT	order of battle
OSCE	Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe
OTAD	over-the-air-distribution
PA	public affairs
PAO	public affairs officer
PKO	peacekeeping operations
POL	petroleum, oils, and lubricants
POLAD	political advisor
Pop	population (graphic only)
POW	prisoner of war
PRM	Office of Population, Refugees, and Migration
PSO	peace support operations
PSS	personnel service support

PSYOPS	psychological operations
PVO	private voluntary organization
QAP	Quadripartite Advisory Publication
QSTAG	quadripartite standardization agreement
RAP	recognized air picture
RI	relevant information
RM	risk management
ROE	rules of engagement
S1	battalion/brigade personnel staff officer
S2	battalion/brigade intelligence staff officer
S3	battalion/brigade operations staff officer
S4	battalion/brigade logistics staff officer
S5	battalion/brigade policy and plans operations staff officer
S6	battalion/brigade communications staff officer
SCUD	surface-to-surface missile system
SF	special forces (graphic only)
SIF	selective identification feature
SJA	Staff Judge Advocate
SOF	special operations forces
SOFA	status-of-forces agreement
SOP	standing operating procedures
Spt	support (graphic only)
SRSG	Special Representative to the Secretary-General
SSM	surface-to-surface missile
STAP	surveillance and target acquisition plan
Surv	surveillance (graphic only)
TACOM	tactical command
TACON	tactical control
TCN	troop contributing nation

Techs	techniques (graphic only)
TO	theater of operations
TOA	transfer of authority
TOR	terms of reference
trng	training (graphic only)
UAV	unmanned aerial vehicle
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNHCHR	UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
UNHCR	UN High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF	United Nation's Children Fund
UNPROFOR	UN Protection Force
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USFK	United States Forces Korea (graphic only)
WFP	World Food Programme (UN
WMD	weapons of mass destruction

TERMS AND DEFINITIONS

- air tasking order** A method used to task and disseminate to components, subordinate units, and command and control agencies projected sorties/capabilities/forces to targets and specific missions.
- airspace control authority** (NATO) The commander designated to assume overall responsibility for the operation of the airspace control system in the airspace control area.
- airspace control order** An order implementing the airspace control plan that provides the details of the approved requests for airspace control measures.
- airspace control plan** Provides specific planning guidance and procedures for the airspace control system for the joint force area of responsibility/joint operations area.

- airspace control system (NATO)** An arrangement of those organizations, personnel, policies, procedures, and facilities required to perform airspace control functions.
- alliance** An alliance is the result of formal agreements such as treaties between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that furthers the common interests of the members.
- antisubmarine warfare (NATO)** Operations conducted with the intention of denying the enemy the effective use of submarines.
- area of influence** A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under his command or control. (QSTAG 894)
- area of interest** That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory to the objectives of current or planned operations. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces that could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission.(QSTAG 894)
- area of operations** That portion of an area of war necessary for military operations and for the administration of such operations. (QSTAG 894)
- area of responsibility (NATO)** The geographical area assigned to each NATO strategic command and to each regional command of Strategic Command Europe.
- battle damage assessment** The timely and accurate estimate of damage resulting from the application of military force, either lethal or non-lethal, against a predetermined objective.
- civil affairs (US)** The activities of a commander that establish, maintain, influence, or exploit relations between military forces and civil authorities, both governmental and nongovernmental, and the civilian populace in a friendly, neutral, or hostile area of operations in order to facilitate military operations and consolidate operational objectives. Civil affairs may include performance by military forces of activities and functions normally the responsibility of local government. These activities may occur prior to, during, or subsequent to other military actions. They may also occur, if directed, in the absence of other military operations.

- civil-military cooperation** (NATO) Cooperation in peace or war between civil and military authorities, both NATO and national, with a view to ensuring an effective overall defense of the NATO area.
- civil-military operations** Group of planned activities in support of military operations that enhance the relationship between the military forces and civilian authorities, and the population. These operations should promote the development of favorable emotions, attitudes, or behavior in neutral, friendly, or hostile groups.
- coalition** an ad hoc arrangement between two or more nations for common action.
- coalition action** a multinational action outside the bounds of established alliances, usually for a single occasion, or for longer cooperation in a narrow sector of common interest.
- coalition force** a force composed of military elements of nations that have formed a temporary alliance for some specific purpose.
- coalition operations** operations conducted by forces of two or more nations, which may not be allies, acting together for the accomplishment of a single mission.
- combat search and rescue** The recovery of distressed personnel during war or military operations other than war.
- combat service support** (NATO) The support provided to combat forces, primarily in the fields of administration and logistics.
- command post exercise** (NATO) An exercise in which the forces are simulated, involving the commander, his staff, and communications within and between headquarters.
- commander's critical information requirements** A comprehensive list of information requirements identified by the commander as being critical in facilitating timely information management and the decision making process that affect successful mission accomplishment. The two key subcomponents are critical friendly force information and priority intelligence requirements.
- compatibility** Capability of two or more items or components of equipment or material to exist or function in the same system or environment without mutual interference. (QSTAG 894)

- coordinating authority** The authority granted to a commander or individual assigned responsibility for coordinating specific functions or activities involving forces of two or more countries or commands, or two or more services or forces of the same service. He has the authority to require consultation between the agencies involved or their representatives, but does not have the authority to compel agreement. In case of disagreement between the agencies involved, he should attempt to obtain essential agreement by discussion. In the event he is unable to obtain essential agreement he shall refer the matter to the appropriate authority. (QSTAG 894)
- counterintelligence** (NATO) Those activities which are concerned with identifying and counteracting the threat to security posed by hostile intelligence services or organizations or by individuals engaged in espionage, sabotage, subversion or terrorism.
- Director of Mobility Forces** (US) Normally a senior officer who is familiar with the area of responsibility or joint operations area and possesses an extensive background in airlift operations. When established, the director of mobility forces serves as the designated agent for all airlift issues in the area of responsibility or joint operations area, and for other duties as directed. The director of mobility forces exercises coordinating authority between the airlift coordination cell, the air mobility element, the Tanker Airlift Control Center, the joint movement center, and the air operations center in order to expedite the resolution of airlift problems. The director of mobility forces may be sourced from the theater's organizations, United States Transportation Command, or United States Atlantic Command.
- electronic warfare** (NATO) Military action to exploit the electromagnetic spectrum encompassing: the search for, interception and identification of electromagnetic emissions, the employment of electromagnetic energy, including directed energy, to reduce or prevent hostile use of the electromagnetic spectrum, and actions to ensure its effective use by friendly forces.
- fire support coordination** (NATO) The planning and executing of fire so that targets are adequately covered by a suitable weapon or group of weapons.

firepower (NATO) The amount of fire which may be delivered by a position, unit, or weapon system.

fratricide Unintentional deadly force used against one's own countrymen or fellow comrades; killed or destroyed by "friendly fire."

geospatial information and services The concept for collection, information extraction, storage, extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, extraction, storage, dissemination, and exploitation of geodetic, geomagnetic, imagery both commercial and national source, gravimetric, aeronautical, topographic, hydrographic, littoral, cultural, and toponymic data accurately referenced to a precise location on the earth's surface. These data are used for military planning, training, and operations including navigation, mission planning, mission rehearsal, modeling, simulation and precise targeting. Geospatial information provides the basic framework for battlespace visualization. It is information produced by multiple sources to common interoperable data standards. It may be presented in the form of printed maps, charts, and publications; in digital simulation and modeling databases; in photographic form; or in the form of digitized maps and charts or attributed centerline data. Geospatial services include tools that enable users to access and manipulate data, and instruction, training, laboratory support, and guidance for the use of geospatial data.

health service support (US) All services performed, provided, or arranged by the Services to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental or physical well-being of personnel. These services include, but are not limited to, the management of health services resources, such as manpower, monies, and facilities; preventive and curative health measures; evacuation of the wounded, injured, or sick; selection of the medically fit and disposition of the medically unfit; blood management; medical supply, equipment, and maintenance thereof; combat stress control; and medical, dental, veterinary, laboratory, optometric, medical food, and medical intelligence services.

host nation support (NATO) Civil and military assistance rendered in peace, crisis, and war by a host nation to allied forces and NATO organizations which are located on or in

transit through the host nation's territory. The basis of such assistance is commitments arising from the NATO Alliance or from bilateral or multilateral agreements concluded between the host nation, NATO organizations and (the) nation(s) having forces operating on the host nation's territory. (QSTAG 894)

- human intelligence** (NATO) A category of intelligence derived from information collected and provided by human sources.
- identification, friend or foe** (NATO) A system using electromagnetic transmissions to which equipment carried by friendly forces automatically responds, for example, by emitting pulses, thereby distinguishing themselves from enemy forces.
- information operations** Actions taken to affect adversary information and information systems while defending one's own information and information systems.
- interchangability** A condition which exists when two or more items possess such functional and physical characteristics as to be equivalent in performance and durability, and are capable of being exchanged one for the other without alteration of the items themselves, or of adjoining items, except for adjustment, and without selection for fit and performance (QSTAG 894)
- intermediate staging base** (DOD) A temporary location used to stage forces prior to inserting the forces into the host nation.
- interoperability** The ability of systems, units or forces to provide services to and accept services from other systems, units, or forces and to use the services so exchanged to enable them to operate effectively together. (QSTAG 894)
- in-transit visibility** The ability to track the identity, status, and location of units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; medical patients; and personal property from origin to consignee or destination across the range of military operations.
- joint** Connotes activities, operations, and organizations in which elements of more than one service of the same nation participate. (QSTAG 894)
- law of armed conflict** (DOD) That part of international law that regulates the conduct of armed hostilities

- lines of communications** (NATO) All the land, water, and air routes that connect an operating military force with one or more bases of operations, and along which supplies and reinforcements move.
- mine countermeasures** All methods for preventing or reducing damage or danger from mines.
- mission** A clear, concise statement of the task of the command and its purpose. (QSTAG 894)
- mission creep** Tangential efforts to assist in areas of concern unrelated to assigned duties that cripple efficient mission accomplishment.
- multinational operations** A collective term to describe military actions conducted by forces of two or more nations, typically organized within the structure of a coalition or alliance.
- national command** A command that is organized by, and functions under the authority of a specific nation. It may or may not be placed under a NATO commander. (QSTAG 894)
- naval control of shipping** (NATO) Control exercised by naval authorities of movement, routing, reporting, convoy organization, and tactical diversion of allied merchant shipping. It does not include the employment or active protection of such shipping.
- noncombatant evacuation operations** Actions whereby noncombatants are evacuated from foreign countries when their lives are endangered by war, civil unrest, or natural disaster to safe havens.
- nonmilitary agencies** All civilian agencies, whether governmental, non-governmental, UN, international or private.
- operation exposure guidance** The maximum amount of nuclear radiation which the commander considers a unit may be permitted to receive while performing a particular mission or missions.
- operation order** (NATO) A directive, usually formal, issued by a commander to subordinate commanders for the purpose of effecting the coordinated execution of an operation.
- operation plan** (NATO) A plan for a single or series of connected operations to be carried out simultaneously or in succession. It is usually based upon stated assumptions

and is the form of directive employed by higher authority to permit subordinate commanders to prepare supporting plans and orders. The designation "plan" is usually used instead of "order" in preparing for operations well in advance. An operation plan may be put into effect at a prescribed time, or on signal, and then becomes the operation order.

- operational command** (NATO) The authority granted to a commander to assign missions or tasks to subordinate commanders, to deploy units, to reassign forces, and to retain or delegate operational and/or tactical control as may be deemed necessary. It does not of itself include responsibility for administration or logistics. May also be used to denote the forces assigned to a commander.
- operational control** (NATO) The authority delegated to a commander to direct forces assigned so that the commander may accomplish specific missions or tasks which are usually limited by function, time, or location; to deploy units concerned, and to retain or assign tactical control of those units. It does not include authority to assign separate employment of components of the units concerned. Neither does it, of itself, include administrative or logistic control. (QSTAG 894)
- operations security** (NATO) The process which gives a military operation or exercise appropriate security, using passive or active means, to deny the enemy knowledge of the dispositions, capabilities and intentions of friendly forces.
- order of battle** (NATO) The identification, strength, command structure, and disposition of the personnel, units, and equipment of any military force.
- petroleum, oils, and lubricants** (NATO) A broad term which includes all petroleum and associated products used by the Armed Forces.
- private voluntary organization** Private, nonprofit humanitarian assistance organization involved in development and relief activities. Private voluntary organizations are normally United States-based. "Private voluntary 75 organization" is often used synonymously with the term "nongovernmental organizations."
- psychological operations** (NATO) Planned psychological activities in peace and war directed to enemy, friendly, and neutral

audiences in order to influence attitudes and behavior affecting the achievement of political and military objectives. They include strategic psychological activities, psychological consolidation activities, and battle-field psychological activities. (QSTAG 894)

- PTARMIGAN** This is not an acronym, but instead, a term used in secure communication systems
- rules of engagement** (NATO) Directives issued by competent military authority which specify the circumstances and limitations under which forces will initiate and/or continue combat engagement with other forces encountered.
- signals intelligence** (NATO) The generic term used to describe communications intelligence and electronic intelligence when there is no requirement to differentiate between these two types of intelligence, or to represent fusion of the two.
- standardization** Within NATO, the process of developing concepts, doctrine, procedures and designs to achieve and maintain the most effective levels of compatibility, interoperability, interchangeability, and commonality in the fields of operations, administration, and materiel. (QSTAG 894)
- table of organization and equipment** (NATO) The table setting out the authorized numbers of men and major equipment in a unit/formations
- tactical command** (NATO) The authority delegated to a commander to assign tasks to forces under his command for the accomplishment of the mission assigned by higher authority.
- tactical control** (NATO) The detailed and, usually, local direction and control of movements or maneuvers necessary to accomplish missions or tasks assigned.
- theater of operations** A subarea within a theater of war defined by the geographic combatant commander required to conduct or support specific combat operations. Different theaters of operations within the same theater of war will normally be geographically separate and focused on different enemy forces. Theaters of operations are usually of significant size, allowing for operations over extended periods of time.

- time-phased force and deployment list** It identifies types and/or actual units required to support the operation plan and indicates origin and ports of debarkation or ocean area.
- unmanned aerial vehicle** A powered, aerial vehicle that does not carry a human operator, uses aerodynamic forces to provide vehicle lift, can fly autonomously or be piloted remotely, can be expendable or recoverable, and can carry a lethal or nonlethal payload. Ballistic or semi-ballistic vehicles, cruise missiles, and artillery projectiles are not considered unmanned aerial vehicles.
- weapons of mass destruction** In arms control usage, weapons that are capable of a high order of destruction and/or of being used in such a manner as to destroy large numbers of people.

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